# DeFilippo v. County of Stanislaus

> District Court, E.D. California · September 11, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055597

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** September 11, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055597

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating false arrest and imprisonment are subject to a one-year statute of 4 limitations pursuant to section 340
- holding that a prosecutor was granted absolute immunity for the 27 presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant at a probable cause hearing
- holding that while leave to amend shall 24 | be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 GEORGIA DEFILIPPO, et al., No. 1:18-cv-00496-DJC-BAM
12 Plaintiffs,
13 v. ORDER
14 COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 This action concerns Plaintiffs’ arrest and prosecution by Defendants in
18 connection with the alleged murder of Korey Kauffman. Plaintiffs raise a number of
19 claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law based on their arrest and
20 the investigation that preceded it. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
21 dismiss some of the claims raised in the Third Amended Complaint. (Defs.’ Mot. (ECF
22 No. 115).) For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED
23 IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
24 I. Background
25 Plaintiffs are the wife and daughter of criminal defense attorney Frank Carson.
26 Carson was arrested in 2015 on suspicion that he was involved in a murder for hire
27 scheme that resulted in the murder of Korey Kauffman. Plaintiffs were also arrested
28 and charged in connection with the alleged murder but these charges were dismissed
1 by the assigned judge after a lengthy preliminary hearing. Plaintiffs claim that the
2 arrest of Carson and Plaintiffs was the result of a conspiracy to retaliate against Carson
3 for his actions as a defense attorney. Plaintiffs have filed the present suit against both
4 county and city Defendants based on the alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ federal civil
5 rights as well as violations of California state law.
6 The Court previously partially granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
7 dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with leave to amend. After Plaintiffs submitted a Third
8 Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss.1
9 II. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss
10 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
11 be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint
12 lacks a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient facts alleged under a
13 cognizable legal theory. ., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th
14 Cir. 2019). The Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes them in
15 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
16 , 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). A complaint must plead “sufficient
17 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
18 , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting ,
19 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in
20 favor of the nonmoving party.”
21 , 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014).
22 III. Allegations in the Complaint
23 In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs include dozens of pages of detailed
24 factual allegations which can be summarized as follows: Plaintiffs Georgia DeFilippo
25

26 1 The present order is one of three issued simultaneously by the Court in related cases with similar
pending motions to dismiss. ,
27 No. 1:20-cv-00747-DJC-BAM; , No. 1:18-cv-01403-DJC-BAM. Broadly
speaking, these cases relate to the same series of events. Accordingly, the analysis in each of the
28 Court’s three orders is largely identical, except where otherwise noted.
1 and Christina DeFilippo, along with attorney Frank Carson, were arrested on August
2 14, 2015, and accused of involvement with a murder for hire scheme that resulted in
3 the death of Korey Kauffman, who had been reported missing in April 2012.2 (TAC at
4 7.) Carson was “reviled by many in law enforcement” as well as the Stanislaus County
5 District Attorney’s office (“SCDA”). ( ) The murder for hire theory was based in part
6 on the idea that Kauffman was suspected of a prior theft from Carson’s property. (
7 at 8–9.) On April 4, 2012, shortly after Kauffman’s disappearance, Defendant Kirk
8 Bunch filed a report about a conversation with Michael Cooley, Carson’s neighbor and
9 purportedly the last person to see Kauffman alive. ( at 9.) In Defendant Bunch’s
10 report, Cooley “sought to implicate Carson, and by extension Plaintiffs” in Kauffman’s
11 death. ( ) After prosecutors learned of the potential link between Carson and
12 Kauffman’s disappearance, the SCDA “[s]uddenly . . . became very interested in this
13 missing person case.” ( )
14 Defendants Harris and Birgit Fladager created a task force to investigate
15 Kauffman’s disappearance. ( ) Defendant Fladager supervised the investigation
16 team which included Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, Cory Brown, and Jon Evers. ( at
17 10.) Defendant Harris was also originally responsible for supervising these
18 Defendants but was later replaced by Defendant Marlissa Ferreira after Defendant
19 Harris “was accused of jury tampering and contempt of court in a case he had with
20 Carson as [opposing] counsel.” ( at 10–11.)
21 During the investigation, Plaintiffs were never accused by any witness of
22 involvement in a crime. ( at 11.) Multiple other suspects were disregarded and
23 exculpatory evidence was not disclosed to the judge who signed Plaintiffs’ arrest
24 warrants. ( at 11–15.) As part of the investigation, Defendants Bunch, Jacobson,
25 and Evers conducted a seven-hour interrogation of Robert Woody after he was
26

27 2 Plaintiffs inconsistently spell Korey Kauffman’s last name “Kaufman” and “Kauffman” throughout the
TAC. As the latter spelling is more commonly used in that document, the Court will use the spelling
28 “Kauffman” in this order.
1 recorded saying he had killed Kauffman. ( at 15–16.) Defendants Bunch, Jacobson,
2 and Evers informed Woody of the theory involving Carson and Plaintiffs and
3 pressured Woody despite him repeatedly denying “any involvement in, or knowledge
4 of, the Kauffman murder . . . .” ( at 16.) Woody was threatened with the death
5 penalty and life in prison, and told he had an opportunity to implicate others in the
6 murder. ( ) During the interrogation, Woody took a 20-minute bathroom break,
7 accompanied by Defendants Bunch and Jacobson. ( at 17.) This period was not
8 recorded and when Woody returned, he repeated back part of the theory that Bunch,
9 Jacobson, and Evers had told him previously: “that [Woody’s] employers, Baljit Athwal
10 and Daljit Athwal had murdered Kauffman and that they did it because they were
11 asked by Carson to watch over his property for thieves.” ( ) Defendants Bunch,
12 Jacobson, and Evers conducted several additional interviews with Woody over the
13 next two years during which they reinforced what Woody had told them. ( at 18–
14 22.) Woody eventually recanted his confession on April 24, 2014, and passed a
15 polygraph stating that he had nothing to do with Kauffman’s murder. ( at 22–23.)
16 On August 13, 2015, Defendant Brown submitted a Ramey Warrant for
17 Plaintiffs’ arrest. ( at 23.) The preparation of this warrant request was “a ‘group
18 consensus’ between [Defendant Brown] and Defendants Fladager, Ferreira, Bunch,
19 Evers, and Jacobson on what charges to seek and what facts to include (and exclude)
20 in the warrant.” ( at 23.) The ultimate warrant was a 325-page “unorganized,
21 rambling document” that failed to establish probable cause. ( at 23–25.) The arrest
22 warrant also contained a number of “fabrications, material omissions[,] and misleading
23 statements.” ( at 26–29.)
24 After Plaintiffs’ arrest, Georgia DeFilippo remained in jail for fifty days and was
25 eventually released on $4.5 million bail. ( at 29.) Christina DeFilippo was released
26 after booking. ( ) “A preliminary hearing began on October 13, 2015, and
27 continued for 18 months, one of the longest in California history.” ( ) The charges
28 ////
1 against Plaintiffs were eventually dismissed on April 10, 2017, by Superior Court
2 Judge Barbara Zuniga who found that probable cause did not exist. ( at 30.)
3 IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
4 A. Claims That Plaintiffs Concede Should be Dismissed
5 As an initial matter, in response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs concede two
6 categories of claims should be dismissed.
7 First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs improperly brought suit against
8 Defendants in their official capacity as the Court previously dismissed these claims as
9 redundant to Plaintiffs’ claims against Stanislaus County. (Defs.’ Mot. at 3.) In their
10 opposition, Plaintiffs concede that these official claims are improper and state they
11 were included due to a “drafting error.” (Pls.’ Opp’n (ECF No. 121) at 3.) Plaintiffs
12 state these claims are no longer being asserted by the Plaintiffs. ( ) Accordingly,
13 claims against Fladager, Harris, Ferreira, Bunch, Jacobson, and Brown in their official
14 capacities are dismissed.
15 Second, Defendants argue in their motion that Defendants Fladager and Harris
16 are not proper parties to a municipal liability claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) In the
17 opposition, Plaintiffs also concede this point and voluntarily dismiss the claims against
18 Fladager and Harris based on municipal liability. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) Accordingly, these
19 claims are also dismissed.
20 B. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ Judicial Deception and False Imprisonment and
21 False Arrest Claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira
22 In their motion, Defendants argue that two sets of claims are not timely under
23 the requisite statute of limitations: Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment judicial deception
24 claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira; and Plaintiffs’ false arrest and
25 false imprisonment claims against these same Defendants. Plaintiffs initially contend
26 that their claims are timely under the rule for accrual. To the extent that these
27 claims are not timely or the rule does not apply, Plaintiffs argue that statutory
28 ////
1 and equitable tolling apply. The Court will first determine the date each set of claims
2 was accrued and then determine whether are subject to tolling.
3 1. Accrual of Claims
4 a. Fourth Amendment Judicial Deception Claims
5 Turning first to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment judicial deception claims, as these
6 claims are brought pursuant to section 1983, the Court must apply the statute of
7 limitations for personal injury of the state in which the claim arose.
8 , 631 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) In California, there is a
9 two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
10 § 335.1. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this is the proper statute of limitations but
11 instead contend that these claims are timely under the rule, as well as being
12 subject to statutory and equitable tolling. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4–8.)
13 Pursuant to the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in , 512
14 U.S. 477 (1994), individuals are not permitted to recover damages via section 1983
15 “for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
16 caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid”
17 unless the plaintiff proved that “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
18 direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
19 authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's
20 issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .” at 486–87. Where there are ongoing
21 state court proceedings, the resolution of which are required to satisfy the rule,
22 the Supreme Court has held that the cause of action “accrues only once the
23 underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff's favor.”
24 , 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019). However, accrual occurs “when the plaintiff has a
25 complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain
26 relief.” , 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citations omitted). To determine
27 whether a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, the Court must look to
28 the analogous common law tort to determine when the cause of action accrued.
1 While most Fourth Amendment violations accrue when “the wrongful act
2 occurs,” , 796 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit has
3 clarified that “judicial deception” claims accrue differently owing to the need for the
4 party to be able to view the affidavit supporting a warrant before pursuing an action
5 on these grounds. , 865 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 2017).
6 As such, the Court is required to apply the discovery rule which “requires that judicial
7 deception claims begin accruing when the underlying affidavit is reasonably
8 available.”
9 Here, accrual of Plaintiffs’ deception claims would be at the point that the
10 affidavit underlying the warrant for Plaintiffs’ arrest was available. Both parties agree
11 that this occurred in 2015.3 (Defs.’ Mot. at 3; Pls.’ Opp’n at 4 n.1.) As Plaintiffs’ judicial
12 deception claims would have accrued at this point, Plaintiffs’ claims are not saved by
13 the rule as Plaintiffs did not file the present action until April 10, 2018. Thus,
14 unless Plaintiffs’ judicial deception claims are tolled, they are not timely.
15 b. False Arrest/Imprisonment Claim
16 Turning next to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for false arrest and false
17 imprisonment, this claim was brought under California Government Code sections
18 820, 820.4, and 815.2, not section 1983. As such, it is subject to the rules for accrual
19 for the cause of action under state law. , No. 05-cv-
20 01778-DSF, 2006 WL 8434718, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006).
21 Under California law, false arrest and imprisonment claims are subject to a one-
22 year statute of limitations.4 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340; , No. 09-cv-
23 1250-JLS-POR, 2011 WL 530039, at *13–14 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Plaintiff's false
24
3 Plaintiffs attempt to introduce some ambiguity as to when the arrest warrant was available, suggesting
25 in their Opposition that “it have become reasonably available to Plaintiffs sometime after October
2015.” (Opp. at 4, n. 1 (emphasis in original).) That ambiguity, however, is inconsistent with the
26 allegation in the operative complaint that the entire warrant was released online following the press
conference announcing the charges. (TAC at ¶ 50.)
27 4 As these are claims against government employees, they are also subject to the limitations of the
California Tort Claims Act in addition to the statute of limitations. Compliance with the California Tort
28 Claims Act as to these claims is addressed separately below.
1 arrest claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to false
2 imprisonment claims.”); , 96 Cal. App. 3d 834,
3 840 (1979) (stating false arrest and imprisonment are subject to a one-year statute of
4 limitations pursuant to section 340). Though a false arrest and imprisonment claim
5 may arise at the time of arrest, in California “the statute of limitations [does] not
6 commence to run until [plaintiff’s] discharge from jail.“ , 96 Cal. App. 3d at
7 840.
8 Under these rules, Plaintiffs’ false arrest and imprisonment claims would have
9 begun to run on the date each Plaintiff was released from custody — October 4, 2015,
10 for Plaintiff Georgia, and on August 14, 2015, or shortly thereafter, for Plaintiff
11 Christina. As such, this action was filed well beyond the one-year statute of limitations
12 for these sorts of claims. The accrual rules are also inapplicable to these claims
13 as is specific to actions brought under section 1983. , 512 U.S. at 486–
14 87; , No. 05-cv-1778-DSF, 2006 WL 8434718, at
15 *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (distinguishing California state law false arrest claims from
16 section 1983 claims).
17 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ false arrest/imprisonment claims against Defendants
18 Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are untimely unless statutory or equitable tolling is
19 applicable.
20 2. Statutory Tolling
21 Plaintiffs argue that their judicial deception claims as well as their false arrest
22 and imprisonment claims should also be subject to statutory tolling under California
23 Government Code section 945.3. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 5.) Defendants contend that this
24 statute is not applicable to Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira as they are not
25 “peace officers” within the meaning of this statute. (Defs.’ Reply (ECF No. 123) at 3–4.)
26 “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state's statute of
27 limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state's law regarding
28 tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is
1 inconsistent with federal law.” , 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
2 Section 945.3 provides that a defendant in a criminal action may not bring a civil suit
3 “against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based upon
4 conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged
5 . . . . while the charges against the accused are pending before a superior court.” Cal.
6 Gov’t Code § 945.3. Section 945.3 further tolls these civil claims “during the period
7 that the charges are pending.” Whether this statute properly applies to
8 Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira depends on whether these Defendants,
9 who are all employed as attorneys by the SCDA (TAC at ¶ 67), are properly
10 considered “peace officers” under section 945.3. Defendants suggest that this Court
11 apply the definition of “peace officer” found within California Penal Code
12 section 830.1(a). (Defs.’ Reply at 3.) Plaintiffs argue that the definition provided by
13 Penal Code section 830.1(a) is not meant to apply to Government Code section 945.3
14 as the latter statute makes no reference to Penal Code section 830.1(a). (Pls.’ Opp’n at
15 6.) Plaintiffs also oppose on the grounds that, within the “plain meaning” of section
16 945.3, Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are peace officers, regardless of the
17 “literal language” of the statute. ( at 5–6.)
18 Other courts in this district have previously declined to apply section 954.3 to
19 one of these three Defendants, Defendant Fladager, based on the same conduct on
20 the grounds that “[p]rosecutors are not considered ‘peace officers’ under state law.”
21 , No. 1:15-cv-00311-TLN-BAM, 2022 WL 4237713, at *4
22 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2022); , 1:20-cv-00770-TLN-
23 BAM, 2022 WL 4237538, at *4. The Court reaches a similar conclusion here. Courts
24 have consistently looked to section 830.1(a) when determining whether an individual
25 is a peace officer for the purposes of applying section 945.3.
26 , 1:16-cv-01834-DAD-SKO2017 WL 3394126, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017);
27 , No. 12-cv-656-ODW-MRW, 2012 WL 2071781, at *2
28 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2012) 2012 WL 2071765
1 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012); , 2:10-cv-00557-GEB-DAD, 2011 WL 5102994,
2 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011). Section 830.1(a) does not designate an attorney
3 employed an attorney employed in the office of a district attorney as a peace officer.
4 Cal. Pen. Code § 830.1(a); , 2022 WL 4237713, at *4; , 2022 WL
5 4237538, at *4. Additionally, though section 830.1(a) does provide that investigators
6 for a district attorney’s office are peace officers, this only applies to “an inspector or
7 investigator ” by the office. Neither party contends that
8 Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira were employed as investigators and,
9 though Plaintiffs have claimed that these Defendants were as investigators,
10 section 830.1(a) plainly only identifies as a peace officer those officially as
11 an investigator by a district attorney’s office.
12 Plaintiffs suggest that this Court should consider Defendants Fladager, Harris,
13 and Ferreira to be peace officers as failing to do so would defeat the plain purpose of
14 section 945.3. (Pls’ Opp’n at 5–6.) In support of this contention, Plaintiffs rely on
15 , 386 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (Cal. N.D. 2019). The court in
16 determined that they needed to go beyond the plain meaning of section 945.3
17 in order to properly apply the statute in line with its purpose. at 1143–44. The
18 concern in was with the term “superior court” and whether it should be read as a
19 reference to any trial court, regardless of the name of the court. at 1144–45. In
20 reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the legislative history of
21 section 945.3, which clearly showed that the California legislature intended the statute
22 to apply to criminal actions in any trial court. at 1144–45.
23 By contrast, Plaintiffs here have not provided any evidence that the current
24 definition of a peace officer does not align with the California legislature’s intent.
25 Moreover, unlike the term “superior court”, there does appear to be any sort of
26 ambiguity regarding how “peace officer” is to be defined under California law.
27 Section 830.1 provides a detailed list of individuals to be considered peace officers
28 and, as noted by Plaintiffs, the California legislature has not hesitated to update this
1 list to cover the exact individuals they wish to be covered. ( Pls.’ Opp’n at 6 (listing
2 various changes to the individuals covered by section 830.1).) Other sub-sections of
3 the California Penal Code even expressly differentiate between peace officers as
4 defined by Section 830.1 and “[an] attorney employed by . . . a county office of a
5 district attorney . . . .” Cal. Pen. Code § 832.9. There is no indication that Defendants
6 Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira should properly be considered peace officers for
7 purposes of section 945.3. For this Court to make this decision would be to override
8 what appears the California Legislature’s clear decisions about who is, and is not, a
9 peace officer under California law.
10 Accordingly, statutory tolling under California Government Code section 954.3
11 does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira as
12 those Defendants are not peace officers within the meaning of California law.
13 3. Equitable Tolling
14 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that equitable tolling should apply to Plaintiffs’
15 claims of false imprisonment/arrest and judicial deception against Defendants
16 Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 7.)
17 As noted above, in section 1983 actions, the Court applies the forum state’s
18 statute of limitations for personal injury actions, including the state’s equitable tolling
19 law so long as it is consistent with federal law. , 393 F.3d at 927. Equitable
20 tolling is applied by California courts where it is necessary “to prevent the unjust
21 technical forfeiture of causes of action, where the defendant would suffer no
22 prejudice.” at 928 (citations omitted) (citing , 31 Cal. 4th
23 363 (2003)). “Under California law, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably
24 toll a statute of limitations: (1) defendant must have had timely notice of the claim; (2)
25 defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise barred
26 claim; and (3) plaintiff's conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith.”
27 , 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
28 ////
1 Despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, this claim fails at the first
2 requirement. Relying on , 45
3 Cal. 4th 88 (2008), Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were given adequate notice of the
4 claim and are not prejudiced by defending the claim here since the Defendants were
5 “involved in the investigation and the events leading to the initiation of the criminal
6 proceeding.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 7.) In , the California Supreme Court held that
7 a claim under the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act was equitably tolled while
8 the plaintiff voluntarily pursued an internal administrative procedure. . at 96. The
9 Court observed that the “filing of an administrative claim, whether mandated or not,
10 affords a defendant notice of the claims against it so that it may gather and preserve
11 evidence, and thereby satisfies the principal policy behind the statute of limitations.”
12 . at 102.
13 The equitable tolling identified in does not apply here.
14 considered several circumstances where this type of equitable tolling might apply:
15 “where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second
16 action; where administrative remedies must be exhausted before a second action can
17 proceed; or where a first action, embarked upon in good faith, is found to be
18 defective for some reason.” . at 100. None of these factors are present here.
19 Plaintiffs were the subject of the underlying criminal action; it did not involve Plaintiffs
20 themselves pursuing one of several legal remedies. (“Broadly speaking,
21 the doctrine applies when an injured person has several legal remedies and,
22 reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.”) (internal citations and quotations
23 omitted). Plaintiffs point to no case applying equitable tolling to a second suit where
24 the first suit involved a criminal complaint against Defendants who were plaintiffs in a
25 later civil suit.
26 Even if the doctrine theoretically applied, the other requirements for equitable
27 tolling are not met in this case. Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants had timely notice of
28 the claims in this case as they were “all intimately involved in the investigation and the
1 events leading to the initiation of the criminal proceeding.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 7.)
2 Defendants’ involvement in the criminal action against Plaintiffs holds no bearing on
3 whether they were put on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims. The claims present in the first
4 case were criminal charges against Plaintiffs; nothing about this prior action or the
5 claims involved would put Defendants on notice of the claims brought here. This is
6 not a situation “where a defendant in the second claim was alerted to the need to
7 gather and preserve evidence by the first claim even if not nominally a party to that
8 initial proceeding.” , 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 n.3 (9th Cir.
9 1993). As such, equitable tolling is not applicable to Plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings as
10 Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira were not given timely notice of Plaintiffs’
11 claims in those proceedings. , 192 F.3d at 916.
12 Given the above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss as untimely Plaintiffs’ Fourth
13 Amendment Judicial Deception claims as well as Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment and
14 arrest claims as to Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira is granted.
15 C. Failure to Comply with the California Tort Claims Act
16 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims
17 are barred by a failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). Parties
18 bringing a suit for monetary damages against a public entity under California law must
19 first comply with CTCA which requires “the timely presentation of a written claim and
20 the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.”
21 , 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); , 628
22 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1225 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Failure to comply with the CTCA bars a party
23 from bringing the relevant state law claims. , 628 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. The
24 complaint need not only plead compliance with the CTCA but also “allege facts
25 demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement.
26 Otherwise, his complaint ... fail[s] to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
27 action.” (citations omitted). Personal injury claims are required to be presented
28 within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2.
1 Plaintiffs’ false arrest and imprisonment claims against Defendants Fladager,
2 Harris, and Ferreira accrued at the time Plaintiffs were released from jail. , 96
3 Cal. App. 3d at 840. Plaintiffs state that they filed claims, in compliance with section
4 911.2, on October 3, 2017. (TAC at 48.) This is substantially more than six months
5 after Plaintiffs’ claims accrued upon their release from county jail in 2015.
6 Plaintiffs’ failure to present their claims is likely moot as a result of the Court’s
7 finding above that Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment and arrest claims against Defendants
8 Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are untimely. However, to the extent those claims are
9 not untimely, based on the allegations in the TAC Plaintiffs have also failed to comply
10 with the CTCA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
11 dismiss Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment and arrest claims against Defendants Fladager,
12 Harris, and Ferreira on these grounds is also granted.
13 D. Prosecutorial Immunity under Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6
14 Defendants ask that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction
15 of emotional distress and violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 on the basis of
16 Defendants’ alleged prosecutorial immunity under California Government Code
17 section 821.6. This provision provides immunity to liability for public employees
18 where the injury was “caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or
19 administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts
20 maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. This immunity
21 does not extend to “liability for false arrest or false imprisonment” as such
22 confinement is unlawful or without process. , 754 F. Supp.
23 2d 1095, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2010). This exception to section 821.6 applies to other
24 claims that are based on a false arrest or imprisonment. , 568 F.3d
25 1063, 1071 (concluding section 821.6 was inapplicable not only to a false
26 imprisonment claim but also to “related state causes of action”); , 754
27 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (applying this rule to a Bane Act claim); , 78 F.
28 Supp. 3d 1228, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying section 821.6 immunity for intentional
1 infliction of emotional distress claims based on a wrongful detention). Defendants
2 argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are not solely predicated on false arrest and imprisonment
3 so this exception to section 821.6 immunity should not apply. Plaintiffs argue that
4 doing so at this stage would be premature as the Court has not yet found that there
5 was probable cause to justify the arrest.
6 Plaintiffs’ claims are closely related and intertwined with their alleged false
7 arrest and false imprisonment. Defendants may be correct that this is not the sole
8 basis for Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress and Bane Act claims.
9 However, as alleged, Plaintiffs’ claims all stem from their eventual alleged false arrest
10 and imprisonment. Moreover, the fifth cause of action for a violation of the Bane Act
11 expressly mentions Plaintiffs’ arrest (TAC ¶ 120), as does the seventh cause of action
12 for intentional infliction of emotional distress (TAC ¶¶ 141, 142). At this stage of the
13 proceedings, attempting to extricate the portions of those claims that do not involve
14 Plaintiffs’ false arrest — if there are any — would require detailed factual determinations
15 that are not appropriate and cannot be made at this stage. Though the Court may still
16 determine that Defendants are entitled to section 821.6 immunity at a later stage of
17 these proceedings, based on the allegations present in the TAC, the Court does not
18 find that Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are entitled to section 821.6
19 immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
20 violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 at this stage of these proceedings.
21 E. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claim as to Defendants Fladager,
22 Harris, and Ferreira
23 The third cause of action in Plaintiffs’ TAC is brought under section 1983 for
24 violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. (TAC at 52–54.) Plaintiffs claim
25 that Defendants Fladager, Harris, Ferreira, Bunch, Jacobson, Evers, and Brown
26 violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights by fabricating evidence against them, resulting in
27 both Plaintiffs being arrested and Plaintiff Georgia being held in jail for fifty days. (
28 at 54.) Defendants move to dismiss these claims as to Defendants Fladager, Harris,
1 and Ferreira on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable Fourteenth
2 Amendment claim as to these Defendants.
3 A Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim, sometimes called a
4 claim, is a claim that “there is a clearly established constitutional due
5 process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence
6 that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” , 263 F.3d
7 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); , 857 F.3d 789, 793 (9th
8 Cir. 2017). To state a claim, the violation of due process must result in a
9 deprivation of liberty and the plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant official
10 deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the
11 plaintiff's deprivation of liberty.” , 847 F.3d at 798 (citation omitted). A
12 plaintiff must establish the second causal element by proving “that (a) the act was the
13 cause in fact of the deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury would not have
14 occurred in the absence of the conduct; and (b) the act was the ‘proximate cause’ or
15 ‘legal cause’ of the injury, meaning that the injury is of a type that a reasonable person
16 would see as a likely result of the conduct in question.”
17 Defendants initially argue that Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are
18 entitled to prosecutorial immunity as to these claims. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
19 Amendment claims as to Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira appear to span a
20 large time period and concern a number of different alleged acts. To the extent these
21 allegations concern these Defendants’ preparation of the arrest warrant application,
22 actions during preliminary hearings, and disclosure of discovery, these actions are
23 squarely within the protection of absolute prosecutorial immunity as they are
24 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
25 , 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012); , 500 U.S. 478,
26 492 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor was granted absolute immunity for the
27 presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant at a probable cause hearing);
28 , 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (holding that a prosecutor’s activities in
1 preparing and filing charging documents are protected by absolute immunity);
2 , 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prosecutor’s decision not
3 to turn over exculpatory material before, during, or after trial was “an exercise of the
4 prosecutorial function and entitles the prosecutor to absolute immunity from a civil
5 suit for damages.”).
6 However, Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims also extend well before the
7 filing of charging documents and concern their conduct during the investigation into
8 Kauffman’s disappearance. ( TAC at 31–35.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that
9 these Defendants “advised the officers and investigators throughout the investigation”
10 and that they acted outside their role as prosecutors during the investigation by
11 interviewing witnesses, coercing testimony, fabricating evidence, and otherwise
12 supervising the investigation. ( ) These alleged acts appear to be outside the
13 judicial phase of the criminal process and are not covered by the absolute immunity
14 provided to prosecutors. , 693 F.3d at 912 (“prosecutors are not necessarily
15 immune for actions taken outside this process, including actions logically—though not
16 necessarily temporally—prior to advocacy, such as those ‘normally performed by a
17 detective or police officer,’ like gathering evidence, and those separate from the
18 process, like providing legal advice to the police.”) As the Ninth Circuit has noted,
19 “[d]etermining what functions are prosecutorial is an inexact science.” . While it is
20 possible that Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira are entitled to prosecutorial
21 immunity as to the entirety of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims, at this stage,
22 the Court must take as true the allegations within the complaint. , 919 F.3d at
23 1160. Under this standard, Plaintiffs’ allegations as to Defendants Fladager, Harris,
24 and Ferreira’s involvement in the investigation are sufficient to conclude that they are
25 not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for at least some of their alleged actions.
26 Defendants more broadly contend that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the
27 withholding of evidence are insufficient as the Court previously determined that
28 Plaintiffs did not adequately allege they were detained for an “unusual length of time”
1 and because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support a supervisor liability theory
2 as to the withholding of evidence. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7–8.) The Court does not need to
3 reach these issues here as the withholding of evidence during pretrial proceedings is
4 plainly covered by prosecutorial immunity, as determined above. , 320 F.3d at
5 1030.
6 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
7 Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira as to
8 any acts that occurred during the judicial phase of criminal proceedings including the
9 preparation of the arrest warrant, the withholding of evidence during pretrial
10 proceedings, and any actions they took as a prosecutor in connection with preliminary
11 proceedings. However, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims
12 as they relate to the involvement of Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira in the
13 earlier three-year investigation that, at this stage, appears to fall outside of
14 prosecutorial immunity.
15 F. Plaintiffs’ Bane Act Claims
16 In Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to
17 state a cognizable Bane Act claim under California Civil Code section 52.1 against all
18 Defendants as Plaintiffs have not alleged that any Defendant acted with specific intent
19 to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9.) Plaintiffs contend that
20 they have satisfied the specific intent element through allegations of threats,
21 intimidation, and coercion by each Defendant and the claim that the Defendants were
22 involved in a conspiracy to deny Plaintiffs’ rights. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 16–17.)
23 Taking the allegations in the TAC as true, the Court finds Plaintiffs have alleged
24 sufficient facts to support that Defendants acted with specific intent to violate Plaintiffs’
25 constitutional rights. The Bane Act provides a private cause of action against anyone
26 who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by
27 threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by an individual or
28 individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or laws
1 and rights secured by the Constitution or laws of California.” Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(a).
2 Plaintiffs are correct that ”a reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is
3 evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.”
4 , 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotations
5 omitted). The complaint, as currently formulated, clearly asserts facts to support the
6 claim that Defendants acted with reckless disregard to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
7 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants prepared and requested arrest warrants
8 for Plaintiffs despite knowing the evidence to support such an arrest was insufficient.
9 Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants did this in order to coerce Plaintiff into
10 fabricating evidence implicating Carson in furtherance of their plan of retaliation
11 against him. (TAC at ¶¶ 124–125.) At this stage of these proceedings, these
12 allegations are sufficient to show that Defendants acted with reckless disregard to
13 Plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable seizure. , 888 F.3d at 1043.
14 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
15 CONCLUSION
16 This is an unusual case. The Court is cognizant of the fact that a Superior Court
17 Judge dismissed the underlying criminal charges as to the Plaintiffs in this action,
18 which necessarily lends support to the allegations in the Complaint, making them
19 more “plausible on their face” than they might have otherwise been. , 556
20 U.S. at 678. Whether Plaintiffs will be able to produce sufficient evidence to support
21 those allegations in order to survive summary judgment or prevail at trial is of course a
22 question to be left for another day.
23 In accordance with the above and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY
24 ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 115) is GRANTED IN PART
25 and DENIED IN PART as follows:
26 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims against Fladager, Harris, Ferreira,
27 Bunch, Jacobson, and Brown in their official capacity is GRANTED;
28 2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims against Fladager and
1 Harris is GRANTED;
2 3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Judicial Deception, False
3 Imprisonment, and False Arrest Claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris,
4 and Ferreira as untimely is GRANTED;
5 4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ False Imprisonment and False
6 Arrest Claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira for failure to
7 comply with the California Tort Claims Act is GRANTED;
8 5. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris,
9 and Ferreira for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of
10 California Civil Code § 52.1 on the basis of immunity under Cal. Gov't Code
11 § 821.6 is DENIED;
12 6. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims
13 against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira on the basis of
14 prosecutorial immunity is GRANTED related to actions taken during judicial
15 proceedings, but is DENIED where the claims relate to the involvement of
16 Defendants in the earlier investigation; and
17 7. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under California Civil Code
18 section 52.1 against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira is DENIED.
19 To the extent the Court has dismissed claims in the Third Amended Complaint,
20 | these claims are dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiffs have had several
21 || opportunities to cure the defects identified above, and the Court finds that any further
22 | amendments would be futile. K/Jamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv.
23 | Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall
24 | be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments).
25
26 IT |S SO ORDERED.
97 | Dated: _ September 8, 2023 Beek |) obbeatie
Hon. Daniel labretta
28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055597. Public record. Not legal advice.