# (PS) Van den Heuvel v. El Dorado County Transit

> District Court, E.D. California · August 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055340

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055340

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding 4 || that a paratransit provider was not required to accommodate a disabled plaintiff's request to 5 || modify the paratransit policy by providing her with the transit vehicle of her choice, noting the 6 | Secretary of Transportation is in control of the overall framework
- describing paratransit services as 20 those offered to an individual who has a “specific impairment-related condition which prevents 21 [him] from traveling to a boarding locating or from a disembarking location”

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JEAN MARC VAN DEN HUEVEL, No. 2:22–cv–1734–DAD–KJN PS
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
13 v.
(ECF No. 11.)
14 EL DORADO COUNTY TRANSIT, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 6), when liberally construed at the screening
18 phase, appeared to assert a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
19 for defendant El Dorado County Transit’s failure to provide plaintiff with transportation services
20 despite his disabilities.1 (ECF No. 7.) Defendant now moves to dismiss, asserting that because
21 the complaint states plaintiff did receive transportation services—just not the particular drop-off
22 point he requested—his ADA claim fails. Defendant requests leave to amend be denied as futile
23 (ECF Nos. 11, 15.). Plaintiff opposed dismissal by referencing his physical condition and the
24 county’s library branch, and by lodging personal attacks on defense counsel. (ECF No. 14.)
25 For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed with
26 prejudice.
27
1 This case was referred to the undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21) for the entry of findings
28 and recommendations. See Local Rule 304.
1 Legal Standards
2 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which
3 relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a
4 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix,
5 Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
6 complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic
7 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
8 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
9 supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
10 (2009). Thus, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
11 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
12 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
13 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
14 When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
15 the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
16 89, 94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan
17 v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is not, however, required to accept as true
18 “conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,”
19 or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v.
20 CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).
21 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7
22 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). If upon dismissal the court
23 finds amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
24 Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
25 Analysis
26 As the court noted at screening, plaintiff’s original complaint was difficult to discern, as it
27 only quoted phrasing about race, color, and national origin, named as defendant El Dorado
28 County Transit and a person named Alicia, and requested $500,000 in damages. (ECF No. 1, 3.)
1 The court found this original complaint failed to state a claim, but granted plaintiff leave to
2 amend given his unrepresented status and the possibility that he could provide more facts to state
3 a discrimination complaint. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“1AC”) was
4 equally difficult to discern, but did indicate that plaintiff’s concern centered around defendant El
5 Dorado Transit’s failure to accommodate his asserted disability related to plaintiff’s use of the
6 county’s transportation services. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff cited the Americans with Disabilities Act
7 as the authority for his claim. (Id.)
8 The ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities against those with disabilities. 42
9 U.S.C. § 12101. Title II of the ADA states: “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
10 reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
11 services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
12 entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II, plaintiff must assert (among other
13 things) that he “was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public
14 entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
15 entity.” Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
16 Regarding an alleged disabled person’s meaningful access (via reasonable
17 accommodations) to public transportation services, a distinction exists between those services
18 deemed “paratransit” and the common “fixed route” systems. Cf., e.g., Stroman v. Sacramento
19 Regional Transit Dist., 70 Fed. Appx. 438, 439 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing paratransit services as
20 those offered to an individual who has a “specific impairment-related condition which prevents
21 [him] from traveling to a boarding locating or from a disembarking location”); with, e.g., 42
22 U.S.C. § 12141(3) (describing fixed route systems as those that provide “designated public
23 transportation on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed
24 schedule”).
25 Here, in its dismissal motion, defendant notes how the 1AC explicitly states that plaintiff
26 was seeking an “easy stop at the accessible Green Valley Church,” and defendant simply refused
27 to alter its fixed route. (See ECF No. 6 at 1.) Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this, instead
28 focusing in his opposition on the nature of his disability. However, even assuming plaintiff is
1 || disabled under the ADA, he cannot state a discrimination claim for defendant’s refusal to alter its
2 || fixed route system at plaintiff's mere request. It is by design a fixed system. See, e.g., Boose v.
3 || In—Met Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon, 587 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
4 || that a paratransit provider was not required to accommodate a disabled plaintiff's request to
5 || modify the paratransit policy by providing her with the transit vehicle of her choice, noting the
6 | Secretary of Transportation is in control of the overall framework).’
7 Ordinarily, the court liberally grants an unrepresented plaintiff leave to amend. However,
8 | given the facts stated in the complaint and legal framework, the court concludes that granting
9 | further leave to amend would be futile. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 339.
10 RECOMMENDATIONS
11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
12 1. The action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
13 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
14 | These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to
15 || the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after
16 || being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with
17 || the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
18 || Recommendations.” Plaintiffis advised that failure to file objections within the specified time
19 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455
20 | (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
21 | Dated: August 31, 2023
22 AO Norra
23 KENDALL J. WEA
vand.1734 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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25 | 2 Asto plaintiff's other accusations in his opposition, that defense counsel has attempted to
26 || deceive the court, has made false statements, and is somehow connected to a broader conspiracy
(see ECF No. 14), the court warns plaintiff that such unfounded accusations are unwarranted,
27 || legally frivolous, and support a finding that plaintiff should be deemed a vexatious litigant. This
is not the first time defendant has been warned in this court, and other California courts have in
28 | fact found him to be a vexatious litigant.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10055340. Public record. Not legal advice.