# Williams v. The People of the State of California

> District Court, E.D. California · June 28, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10045610

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 28, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10045610

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 CLIFTON WILLIAMS, JR., Case No. 1:22-cv-00509-AWI-BAM
11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
12 v.
(Docs. 2)
13 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, et al., SCREENING ORDER GRANTING
14 PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND
Defendants.
15 (Doc. 1)
16 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
17
Plaintiff Clifton Williams, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in
18
forma pauperis, initiated this civil rights action on April 29, 2022. Plaintiff’s complaint is
19
currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. 1.)
20
I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
21
Concurrent with his complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis
22
without prepaying fees or costs pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code section 1915(a).
23
(Doc. 2.) Plaintiff has made the showing required by section 1915(a), and accordingly, the
24
request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
25
II. Screening Requirement and Standard
26
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
27
governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
28
1 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
2 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
3 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b);
4 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
6 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
7 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
9 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
10 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
11 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
13 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
14
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
15
is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
16
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
17
III. Plaintiff’s Allegations
18
Plaintiff is currently housed at the Stanislaus County Public Safety Center. He brings suit
19
against The People of the State of California; District Attorney P. Hogan; Jessica Davies,
20
Modesto Police Officer; and County of Stanislaus for claims of false arrest, false imprisonment,
21
harassment, racial profiling, malicious prosecution, arrest without probable cause. (See generally
22
Doc. 1, Compl.)
23
Plaintiff alleges that on 6/17/21, he was parked in front of a store on private property. He
24
was not breaking any laws and was sitting in his vehicle. He had his driver’s side and passenger’s
25
side windows down. Officer Davies pulled behind Plaintiff’s vehicle, blocking Plaintiff in. She
26
got out of her patrol car and made full contact with Plaintiff at the driver’s side window
27
“harassing” Plaintiff about his back windows which she claimed were too tinted. In her report,
28
1 Officer Davies claims Plaintiff was talking to someone at the driver side window and someone
2 else at the passenger side window when she contacted Plaintiff. She was able to see inside
3 Plaintiff’s vehicle, “but still harassed me about my windows,” and saying that Plaintiff is in a
4 known drug area at a store in a neighborhood of minorities. Plaintiff claims that she was racial
5 profiling him as an African American man.
6 Plaintiff alleges, “Even without probable cause Officer Davies placed me under arrest and
7 did an illegal search and seizure and seizure evidence unlawfully.” Plaintiff claims that “knowing
8 this district attorney Patrick Hogan continued his malicious prosecution until my attorney had to
9 file a motion to surpress [sic] to get it dismissed on 4/19/22.” The case was dismissed because
10 Plaintiff was arrested and brought to court without probable cause.
11 IV. Discussion
12 Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
13 state a cognizable claim. As Plaintiff proceeds in pro se, he will be given an opportunity to amend
his complaint to cure these deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. To assist
14
Plaintiff, the Court provides the relevant pleading and legal standards that appear applicable to his
15
claims.
16
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
17
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and
18
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
19
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
20
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
21
(citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
22
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
23
at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are
24
not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557.
25
Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for
26
relief. Plaintiff’s complaint relies on generalized and conclusory allegations and lacks specific
27
factual allegations about what happened, who was involved and what each person did to violate
28
1 Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must state that facts of what
2 happened and how he was injured.
3 B. Prosecutorial Immunity
4 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring suit against Defendant Hogan, he may not do
5 so. “A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for his
6 conduct in ‘pursuing a criminal prosecution’ insofar as he acts within his role as an ‘advocate for
7 the State’ and his actions are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
8 process.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Lacey v. Maricopa
9 Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir.2012) (“Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial
10 functions are entitled to absolute immunity against constitutional torts.”). Therefore, Defendant
11 Hogan would be entitled to prosecutorial immunity for actions associated with Plaintiff’s criminal
12 prosecution.
13 C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff brings suit against The People of the State of California, which the Court
14
construes to be against the State of California. Claims for damages against the state, its agencies
15
or its officers for actions performed in their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh
16
Amendment, unless the state waives its immunity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
17
(1985) (Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court); see also
18
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Suits for injunctive relief are
19
also generally barred. See Nat'l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2002);
20
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear . . . that in the
21
absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the
22
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the
23
State of California.
24
D. Unlawful Arrest, Search, Seizure
25
Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for unlawful arrest, search, and seizure. “A claim
26
for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided
27
the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cty. of San
28
1 Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a claim under § 1983 for false arrest and
2 imprisonment, however, a plaintiff must allege facts “to demonstrate that there was no probable
3 cause to arrest him.” See Cabrera v. City of Huntingdon Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998)
4 (citing George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992)). Probable cause “exists
5 when under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person
6 would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the person arrested] had committed a
7 crime.” Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Smith,
8 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches.
9 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth
10 Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application [and] each case it
11 requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
12 that the search entails.” Id. “Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner
13 in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”
Id.
14
Here, Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts to support a lack of probable cause for his
15
arrest. Plaintiff reports that he was doing nothing wrong, the officer harassed him and had no
16
reason to arrest him and his charge was ultimately dismissed a year later. Plaintiff, however, does
17
not include any factual allegations concerning the events leading up to his arrest, what triggered
18
the arrest, what was said or done, or any other factual allegations to state a cognizable claim for
19
unlawful arrest. Plaintiff fails to allege facts that that demonstrate there was no probable cause to
20
arrest him. Plaintiff also fails to include any factual allegations as to the search, its scope or even
21
what happened. Probable cause is determined based on the totality of circumstances known to the
22
arresting officers at the time of arrest. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
23
Plaintiff alleges he was racially profiled. Apart from the bare allegation that Plaintiff
24
suspects that law enforcement targeted him due to his race, the complaint is devoid of any
25
indication that Plaintiff was discriminated against due to his race. The complaint's statement about
26
the alleged racial profiling is not tied in any meaningful way to any of the other allegations in the
27
complaint. While the complaint's reference to “racial profiling” may suggest some intentional act,
28
1 there is nothing further in the Complaint to support this allegation. Absent any factual basis, the
2 complaint fails to support a claim that Plaintiff was the subject of racial discrimination. “To
3 prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly
4 showing that ‘the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [them] based
5 upon membership in a protected class,’ (citing see Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158,
6 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)), or
7 that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational
8 relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591,
9 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008).
10 E. Malicious Prosecution
11 A claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process is not generally cognizable under
12 Section 1983 if a process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher
13 v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The exception is
“when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection
14
of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to denial of constitutional rights.” Id.
15
(citations omitted). In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a
16
plaintiff “must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable
17
cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific
18
constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations
19
omitted); see also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Lacey v.
20
Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012). A malicious prosecution claim may be
21
brought against prosecutors or against the individuals who wrongfully caused the prosecution.
22
Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). Probable cause is an absolute defense to
23
malicious prosecution. Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009).
24
In order to state a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must show that the prior
25
proceeding was commenced by or at the direction of a defendant and it was: 1) pursued to a legal
26
termination favorable to plaintiff; 2) brought without probable cause; and 3) initiated with malice.
27
Ayala v. Environmental Health, 426 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2006). For the termination
28
1 to be considered “favorable” to the malicious prosecution plaintiff, it must be reflective of the
2 merits of the action and of the plaintiff's innocence of the charges. Villa v. Cole, 4 Cal.App.4th
3 1327, 1335 (1992); Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068 (“An individual seeking to bring a malicious
4 prosecution claim must generally establish that the prior proceedings terminated in such a manner
5 as to indicate his innocence.”). In this regard, “a dismissal in the interests of justice satisfies this
6 requirement if it reflects the opinion of the prosecuting party or the court that the action lacked
7 merit or would result in a decision in favor of the defendant,” and “[w]hen such a dismissal is
8 procured as the result of a motion by the prosecutor and there are allegations that the prior
9 proceedings were instituted as the result of fraudulent conduct, a malicious prosecution plaintiff is
10 not precluded from maintaining his action unless the defendants can establish that the charges
11 were withdrawn on the basis of a compromise among the parties or for a cause that was not
12 inconsistent with his guilt.” Id.
13 Plaintiff has failed to describe how any individual Defendant caused the case to be
prosecuted against Plaintiff with malice and without probable cause nor presented any specific
14
facts about any prosecution dismissal. A dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or
15
agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings. Villa, 4
16
Cal.App.4th at 1335. “[A]s a matter of law...the favorable termination which is essential to the
17
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action cannot be based on the dismissal of the criminal
18
charges remaining after the defendant in a criminal proceeding has entered a plea of nolo
19
contendere to one or more of the charges in the accusatory pleading pursuant to a plea bargain.
20
Cote v. Henderson, 218 Cal. App. 3d 796, 804 (1990). Plaintiff's complaint does not clearly
21
indicate the facts upon which his case was dismissed.
22
F. Monell Liability
23
Under section 1983, a local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its
24
employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social
25
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Generally, a claim against a local government
26
unit for municipal or county liability requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or
27
practice ... was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation ... suffered.” Galen v. Cty.
28
1 of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007).
2 Plaintiff does not allege facts to support a claim that any alleged constitutional violation
3 was the result of a deliberate policy, custom or practice instituted by the County of Stanislaus.
4 G. State Law Claims
5 Although unclear, it appears Plaintiff is attempting to pursue state law claims in this
6 action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original
7 jurisdiction, the “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
8 so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
9 case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in
10 subsections (b) and (c). The Supreme Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed
11 before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v.
12 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
13 state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28
U.S.C. § 1367. As Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, the
14
Court declines to screen Plaintiff’s state law claims.
15
Further, “California's Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a [state]
16
public entity or its employees for money or damages be presented to the California Victim
17
Compensation and Government Claims Board ... no more than six months after the cause of
18
action accrues.” Lopez v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01773-AWI, 2015 WL 1293450, at *13 (E.D. Cal.
19
2015) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2). “Timely claim
20
presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is ... a condition precedent to plaintiff's
21
maintaining an action against defendant and thus an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” Id.
22
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The “obligation to comply with the Government
23
Claims Act” is independent of the obligation to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the
24
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). McPherson v. Alamo, No. 3:15-cv-03145-EMC, 2016
25
WL 7157634, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Parthemore v. Col, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1376
26
(2013)).
27
Plaintiff appears to raise claims under California state law. However, Plaintiff does not
28
1 allege that he presented a claim to the California Government Claims Program (the successor to
2 the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board) within six months of the incidents
3 underlying this action. Thus, Plaintiff's state-law claims, to the extent he raises any, are not
4 cognizable. Pradia v. Becerra, No. 1:20-CV-01348 JLT(PC), 2021 WL 1839613, at *4 (E.D.
5 Cal. May 7, 2021).
6 V. Conclusion and Order
7 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
8 state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court
9 will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the
10 extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
11 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
12 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556
13 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
14
Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated
15
claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no
16
“buckshot” complaints).
17
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
18
Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended
19
complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.”
20
Local Rule 220.
21
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
22
1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;
23
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an
24
amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order (or file a notice of
25
voluntary dismissal); and
26
///
27
///
28
1 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the
2 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order
3 and for failure to state a claim.
4
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: June 28, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10045610. Public record. Not legal advice.