# Free Spirit Organics, NAC v. San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors

> District Court, E.D. California · June 27, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10045547

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** June 27, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
1] Free Spirit Organics, NAC, et al., No. 2:17-CV-02271-KJM-JDP
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER
13 v.
14 San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors, et
15 al.,
16 Defendants.
17
18 Plaintiffs claim various San Joaquin County officials violated their constitutional rights by
19 | prohibiting plaintiffs from growing hemp. See generally Third Am. Compl. (TAC), ECF
20 | No. 100. The court previously granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, dismissing all
21 | but one claim. Prev. Mot. (Aug. 11, 2020), ECF No. 101; Prev. Order (Mar. 25, 2022) at 13, ECF
22 | No. 107.
23 For the one remaining claim, which rested on the Fourth Amendment, the court held that
24 | although the Sheriff’'s Department had obtained a valid warrant to search and seize the plaintiffs’
25 | hemp crop, the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the search was unreasonable because it was not
26 | conducted in compliance with the warrant’s terms. Prev. Order (Mar. 25, 2022) at 13-16. The
27 | plaintiffs asserted this claim against the “Shenff,” defined as “a group of public employees
28 | charged with enforcement of actions in the unincorporated parts of San Joaquin County.” TAC

1 ¶ 16. As plaintiffs sued the Sheriff’s office rather than individual officers, their claim could
2 succeed only under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Jackson
3 v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2014); Wagner v. Santa Clara Sheriff’s Off., 116 F.3d 488
4 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of “claims against the Sheriff’s Office”
5 because complaint did not “allege the existence of any practice, policy, or custom”). In its prior
6 order, however, the court said it was dismissing the plaintiffs’ Monell claim without dismissing
7 the Fourth Amendment claim. Prev. Order (Mar. 25, 2022) at 17–18. The allegations the
8 plaintiffs offered in support of the Monell claim described only “isolated or sporadic incidents,”
9 which do not suffice to state a claim. Id. at 18. Plaintiffs have included the same allegations in
10 the operative complaint now before the court.
11 Because the plaintiffs have not pleaded a claim under Monell, the County argues the
12 remaining Fourth Amendment claim must also now be dismissed. See generally Mot. (Apr. 8,
13 2022), ECF No. 108. Alternatively, the defendants request relief under Rule 60 in the form of
14 dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim. See id. at 11. The motion is fully briefed. Opp’n,
15 ECF No. 109; Suppl., ECF No. 110; Reply, ECF No. 111. The court now submits the motion on
16 the papers.
17 Rule 60 is the appropriate tool to correct the error in this court’s previous order. Under
18 Rule 60(a), a court “may correct . . . a mistake arising from oversight or omission.” This rule
19 permits a court to ensure its orders achieve the results it “originally intended.” Tattersalls, Ltd. v.
20 DeHaven, 745 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and marks omitted). In other words, the
21 rule permits a court to correct a previous order when what is “spoken, written or recorded is not
22 what the [court] intended to speak, write or record.” Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc, 743 F.2d 643,
23 644 (9th Cir. 1984).
24 No factual allegations in the operative complaint support the plaintiffs’ theory that the
25 Sheriff’s Office as an agency of the County is liable under Monell. The complaint alleges only
26 that “[c]onsistent with policy and custom, [d]efendants . . . enforced Ordinance 4497 against
27 [p]laintiffs.” TAC ¶ 93. Reciting the elements of a Monell claim without factual allegations is
28 insufficient to state a claim. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir.
1 | 2012). For that reason, the court’s prior order should have disposed of all claims against the
2 | County, including the Fourth Amendment claim that the court erroneously permitted to continue.
3 | Dismissing that claim now corrects the error, however inadvertent.
4 The court previously determined that plaintiffs should not be granted leave to amend their
5 | complaint again. Prev. Order (Mar. 25, 2022) at 20. The plaintiffs have offered no persuasive
6 | reason to reconsider that decision. The operative complaint is thus dismissed without leave to
7 | amend.
8 | I. CONCLUSION
9 The motion for relief under Rule 60 (ECF No. 108) is granted. The Third Amended
10 | Complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. All previously set deadlines and hearing dates
11 | are vacated. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 | DATED: June 27, 2022.
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CHIEF ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10045547. Public record. Not legal advice.