# Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc.

> District Court, C.D. California · December 7, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10042539

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** December 7, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.

Present: The Honorable PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kamilla Sali-Suleyman Not Reported N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None None
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Remand filed by plaintiff Genaro Juarez (“Plaintiff”)
(Docket No. 11). Plaintiff challenges the propriety of the Notice of Removal filed by defendants
Calmet Services, Inc. and Calmet Properties, LLC (“Defendants”). Pursuant to Rule 78 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter is
appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for December 20, 2021,
is vacated, and the matter taken off calendar.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court on September 12, 2021. The
Complaint alleges wage and hour claims on behalf of Plaintiff and a putative class of
Defendants’ employees for: (1) failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to California Labor
Code sections 510, 1194, and 1199; (2) failure to pay minimum wages pursuant to California
Labor Code sections 1197 and 1199; (3) failure to provide meal periods pursuant to California
Labor Code section 512; (4) failure to provide rest periods pursuant to California Labor Code
section 226.7; (5) failure to pay wages upon termination in violation of California Labor Code
sections 201, 202, and 203; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements pursuant to
California Labor Code section 226; (7) failure to timely pay wages pursuant to California Labor
Code section 204; (8) failure to pay vacation time pursuant to California Labor Code section
227.3; and (9) unfair business practices pursuant to California Business and Professions Code
section 17200.
Defendants filed their Notice of Removal on November 12, 2021. In their Notice of
Removal, Defendants asserted that the Court possesses federal question jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the action because at least some of the claims in Plaintiff's Complaint are
completely preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”),
29 U.S.C. § 185, because Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), which meets the requirements for exemptions under

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.

state law such that certain of Plaintiff's claims arise under the CBA rather than state law.
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand contends that all of Plaintiff's claims arise under state law and that
it is not necessary to interpret the terms of the CBA. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, none of
the claims alleged in the Complaint are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA and the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
II. Analysis
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only
over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). A suit filed in state court
may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over
the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removed action must be remanded to state court if the federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 1447(c). “The burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against
removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.
1999). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising
under” federal law. Removal based on § 1331 1s governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987).
Under the rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face
of a plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Id. at 392. If the complaint does not specify
whether a claim is based on federal or state law, it is a claim “arising under” federal law only if
it is “clear” that it raises a federal question. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.
1996). Thus, the plaintiff is generally the “master of the claim.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
There is no federal question jurisdiction simply because there is a federal defense to the claim.
Id. The only exception to this rule is where a plaintiffs federal claim has been disguised by
“artful pleading,” such as where the only claim is a federal one or is a state claim preempted by
federal law. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987).
Here, Defendants contend that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because, at a
minimum, the Complaint’s first, third, and eighth claims arise under section 301 of the LMRA,
and that the remaining claims are either derivative of those claims or the Court possesses
supplemental jurisdiction over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 301 of LMRA states
that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees .. . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.
parties... 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 to require
claims “alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract [to] be brought under § 301 and be
resolved by reference to federal law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210, 105 S.
Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985). This preemption of state claims “extend[s] beyond suits
alleging contract violations” to those requiring interpretation of the provisions of labor
agreements:
[Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of
that agreement, must be resolved by references to uniform federal
law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach
of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result
would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the
requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims
for tortious breach of contract.
Id. at 210-11. However, the scope of section 301 preemption is not absolute:
[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially
involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is
pre-empted by § 301 other provisions of the federal labor
law.... Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is
illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301
beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with
congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that
proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of
a labor contract.
Id. at 211-12. “In order to help preserve state authority in areas involving minimum labor
standards, the Supreme Court has distinguished between claims that require interpretation or
construction of a labor agreement and those that require a court simply to ‘look at’ the
agreement.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-26, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93
(1994)). In particular, “when the meaning of contract terms is not subject to dispute, the bare
fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation
plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (citing Lingle v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410
(1988)).
“TE]|ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on one hand,
and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as
the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is
‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10.
Accordingly, preemption under section 301 requires a two-step analysis. Alaska Airlines Inc. v.
Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920-22 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc); Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491
F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2007).
Assessing whether a claim is preempted by section 301 is a two-step process. First, the
Court must determine “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an
employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. “Ifa claim arises
entirely from a right or duty of the CBA—for example, a claim for violation of the labor
agreement, whether sounding in contract or in tort—t 1s, in effect, a CBA dispute in state law
garb, and is preempted. In such cases, the CBA 1s the ‘only source’ of the right the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate.” Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921 (footnote, citations, and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[C]laims are not simply CBA disputes by another name, and so are not
preempted under this first step, if they just refer to a CBA-defined right; rely in part on a CBA’s
terms of employment; run parallel to a CBA violation; or invite use of the CBA as a defense.”
Id. (citations omitted).
If the right asserted by the plaintiff is conferred by state law, the Court proceeds to the
second step, in which it must determine whether the plaintiffs claim is nevertheless
“substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d
at 1059 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394). If the claim requires the court to “interpret,”
rather than merely “look to,” the collective bargaining agreement, then the claim is substantially
dependent thereon and is preempted by section 301. Id. at 1060. “The plaintiff’s claim is the
touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement must
inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim.” Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199, 1203
(9th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted) (quoting Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683,
691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc))). “[It is not] enough that resolving the state law claim requires a
court to refer to the CBA and apply its plain or undisputed language—for example, to discern
that none of its terms is reasonably in dispute; to identify bargained-for wage rates in computing
a penalty; or to determine whether the CBA contains a clear and unmistakable waiver of state
law rights.” Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921-22 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation
marks omitted).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.
As explained in Defendants’ Notice of Removal, and ignored in Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand, the provisions of the California Labor Code on which several of Plaintiff's wage and
hour claims rely contain exceptions that apply to employees covered by CBAs in certain
circumstances. For instance, California Labor Code section 514 provides:
Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid
collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides
for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the
employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all
overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those
employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum
wage.
Cal. Lab. Code § 514. According to the Notice of Removal, and not disputed by Plaintiff, the
CBA that covers Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent satisfies the requirements of section
514. Asa result, Plaintiff's first claim, which alleges a violation of section 510, does not apply
to Plaintiff, and state law therefore does not confer the right asserted by plaintiff to overtime
wages. Instead, the source of that right can only be the CBA.
Because the first step of the LMRA preemption analysis establishes that the right asserted
by Plaintiff is not conferred by state law, the second step of that analysis, determining if the
CBA must be interpreted, or merely “looked to,” is not triggered. See Curtis v. Irwin Industries,
Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2019 (“Curtis’s CBAs in this case meet the requirements of
section 514, and therefore Curtis’s claim for overtime pay is controlled by his CBAs. Because
Curtis’s right to overtime “exists solely as a result of the CBA,” his claim that Irwin violated
overtime requirements by not paying him for the 12 off-duty hours is preempted under § 301.
Thus, his claim fails at step one of the preemption analysis.”) (quoting Kobold v. Good
Samaritan Reg’] Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)); see also id. at 1153-54 (“By its
terms, therefore, the default definition of overtime and overtimes rates in section 510 does not
apply to an employee who is subject to a qualifying CBA. If Curtis’s CBAs in this case meet the
requirements of section 514, Curtis’s right to overtime ‘exists solely as a result of the CBA,’ and
therefore is preempted under § 301.”) (quoting Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032).

u Plaintiff contends, relying on Labor Code section 510(a)(2), which excludes from its
application an “alternative workweek schedule adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to Section 514,” that only CBAs that have alternative workweek schedules
are exempted by section 514, but that narrow reading of the interplay between sections 510 and

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-8922 PA (RAOx) Date December 7, 2021
Title Genaro Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff's third and eighth claims, at a minimum, trigger similar exclusions for workers
covered by CBAs and therefore appear to be similarly preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(e) (providing that the meal period requirements of section 512(a) and
(b) do not apply to employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement that, among
other requirements, provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular
hourly rate of pay of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate); Cal. Lab.
Code § 227.3 (requiring payment of vested vacation time “[u]nless otherwise provided by a
collective-bargaining agreement”). Even if the meal period and vacation pay claims were not
preempted, and although Defendants assert that the a remaining “derivative” claims alleged in
the Complaint are similarly preempted, because the Court, at a minimum, possesses
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over those claims, the Court need not, at
this stage, definitively determine if the remaining claims are preempted by section 301 of the
LMRA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that, at a minimum, the Complaint’s first,
claim is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, and that the Court therefore possesses federal
question jurisdiction over that claim and supplemental over the remaining claims. The Court
therefore denies Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

514 is inconsistent with Curtis and Vranish v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 223 Cal. App. 4th 103, 166
Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (2014). As the Court reads the two sections, section 510(a)(3) provides that
there is no overtime claim based on an alternative workweek schedule contained in a qualifying
CBA as defined by section 514, but section 514 additionally applies more broadly to exempt
overtime claims based on circumstances that do not involve alternative workweek schedules, as
long as the CBA satisfies section 514’s requirements.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10042539. Public record. Not legal advice.