# Yolanda Catalina Miller v. Andrew M. Saul

> District Court, C.D. California · July 6, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10041256

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 6, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10041256

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding a non- 15 examining physician’s opinion can constitute substantial evidence if it is supported 16 by other evidence in the record and is consistent with it
- finding ALJ properly relied 23 on non-examining state agency physician’s assessment in determining the claimant’s 24 RFC and in rejecting the treating doctor’s opinion regarding the claimant’s functional 25 limitations

## Opinion text

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 YOLANDA C. M., Case No. CV 20-1339-RAO

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
14 ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
15 Defendant.
16
17 I. INTRODUCTION
18
Plaintiff Yolanda C. M.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial of
19
her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”).2 For the reasons stated
20
below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and the action is
21
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
22
///
23

24 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
25 Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United
26 States.
27
2 Plaintiff does not challenge the denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”). (Joint Submission (“JS”) at 5.) Accordingly, the Court addresses
28 only Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of her SSI claims.
1 II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
2 On February 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for DIB and, on
3 January 9, 2017, she filed a Title XVI application for SSI, alleging in both
4 applications that she had been disabled since November 30, 2014, due to diabetes,
5 high blood pressure, “thyroid,” carpal tunnel, and “tumor on pituitary.”
6 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 85, 212, 245, 296.) Her DIB claims were denied
7 initially on July 28, 2016, and upon reconsideration on September 26, 2016. (AR 85,
8 202, 212.) On October 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing, and a
9 hearing on both applications was held on September 26, 2018. (AR 175-92, 222-23,
10 245.) Appearing unrepresented, Plaintiff testified, along with an impartial vocational
11 expert. (AR 175-92.) On December 4, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
12 found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, pursuant to the Social Security
13 Act,3 from November 30, 2014, through the date of the decision. (AR 93.) The ALJ’s
14 decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council
15 denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff filed this action on July 2,
16 2020. (Dkt. No. 1.)
17 The ALJ followed a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether
18 Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,
19 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged
20 in substantial gainful activity since November 30, 2014, the alleged onset date. (AR
21 87.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of diabetes
22 mellitus with distal neuropathy and morbid obesity. (AR 87.) At step three, the ALJ
23 found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
24 meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
25 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (AR 89.)

26 3 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are
27 unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental
impairment expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for
28 a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
1 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual
2 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20
3 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (AR 89.) At step four, based on Plaintiff’s
4 RFC and the vocational expert (“VE”)’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is
5 capable of performing past relevant work as a caregiver as actually performed and as
6 an accounts receivable as actually and generally performed. (AR 92-93.)
7 Accordingly, the ALJ did not proceed to step five, and instead, found that there are
8 jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
9 perform. (AR 23-24.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has not been under
10 a disability . . . from November 30, 2014, through the date of this decision.” (AR
11 93.)
12 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
13 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s
14 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are
15 supported by substantial evidence, and if the proper legal standards were applied.
16 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence .
17 . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means—and means only—‘such
18 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
19 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, —U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d
20 504 (2019) (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017).
21 An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed
22 and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his
23 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725
24 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
25 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a
26 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record
27 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the
28 Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001)
1 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to more
2 than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v.
3 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart,
4 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d
5 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing
6 the ALJ’s conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The
7 Court may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability
8 determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.”
9 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340
10 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)).
11 IV. DISCUSSION
12 Plaintiff presents two issues for review as to her Title XVI claim: (1) whether
13 the ALJ properly considered the relevant medical evidence of record in her
14 determination of severe impairments and in her assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC; and
15 (2) whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective statements in her
16 assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC. (JS at 4-14, 28-31.) For the reasons below, the Court
17 agrees with Plaintiff that remand is warranted.
18 A. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Relevant Medical Evidence
19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the relevant medical
20 evidence in determining her severe impairments and in assessing her RFC. (JS at 4-
21 14.)
22 1. Step Two
23 Plaintiff appears to contend that the ALJ failed to properly consider the
24 severity of the combination of impairments affecting her knees, legs, back, hands,
25 and mental functioning at step two. (JS at 5.)
26 a. Applicable Legal Standards
27 The step two inquiry is meant to be a de minimis screening device. Smolen v.
28 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
1 153–54, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987)). At step two, the ALJ identifies
2 a claimant’s severe impairments, i.e., impairments that significantly limit his or her
3 ability to do basic work activities.4 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Smolen, 80 F.3d at
4 1290. A determination that an impairment is not severe requires evaluation of
5 medical findings describing the impairment, and an informed judgment as to its
6 limiting effects on a claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. Social Security
7 Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *4 (Jan. 1, 1985).5
8 The ALJ must take into account subjective symptoms in assessing severity,
9 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290, but “medical evidence alone is evaluated . . . to assess the
10 effects of the impairment(s) on ability to do basic work activities.” SSR 85-28 at *4.
11 An impairment or combination thereof may properly be found not severe if the
12 clearly established objective medical evidence shows only slight abnormalities that
13 minimally affect a claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. Webb v. Barnhart,
14 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290.
15 b. The ALJ’s Decision
16 Here, at step two, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s bilateral knee pain, lower back
17 pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and memory disorder and found they were not severe
18 impairments. (AR 87-88.) The ALJ noted that despite diagnostic imaging showing
19 mild degenerative joint disease in the knees, Plaintiff did not complain of significant
20 joint pain and/or weakness; physical examinations revealed the lower extremities
21 were without deformity, clubbing, cyanosis or edema; there was normal muscle tone,
22 strength, and range of motion; and there were no significant neurological changes.
23 (AR 88, 427-28, 439, 472, 502, 555.) Regarding Plaintiff’s lower back pain, the ALJ
24 noted that despite evidence of chronic L5, S1 radiculopathy and an MRI of the lumbar
25 spine showing mild to moderate degenerative changes, physical examinations noted

26 4 Basic work activities are “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs[.]”
27 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b).
5 SSRs do not have the force of law, but a reviewing court generally accords them
28 some deference. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001).
1 musculoskeletal structures were near normal with normal symmetry, tone, strength,
2 and range of motion; there was no effusion, instability or tenderness; and there were
3 no significant neurological changes. (AR 88, 397, 428, 439, 472, 523-24.) Regarding
4 Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ noted that diagnostic testing revealed
5 bilateral median nerve dysfunction at the wrist consistent with carpal tunnel
6 syndrome; Plaintiff denied joint pain, weakness and/or issues with coordination;
7 physical examinations were normal and the upper extremities were without
8 deformities, clubbing, cyanosis or edema; normal muscle tone, strength and range of
9 motion were noted; and there were no significant neurological changes. (AR 87-88,
10 396, 428, 439, 472-74.) Regarding Plaintiff’s mental disorder, the ALJ found that
11 Plaintiff’s memory remained intact on psychiatric examinations. (AR 89, 436.)
12 c. Discussion
13 The overall treatment record supports the ALJ’s finding at step two. Plaintiff
14 presents a different interpretation of the objective medical evidence and diagnoses.
15 (JS at 7-14.) While Plaintiff’s interpretation of the evidence is not unreasonable,
16 neither is the ALJ’s interpretation. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (“Where evidence is
17 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that
18 must be upheld.”). Further, mere diagnosis of an impairment, or even treatment for
19 it, is insufficient to establish severity at step two, especially when the objective
20 medical evidence in the record fails to show any work-related limitations connected
21 to the impairment. See Harvey v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3899282, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July
22 29, 2013) (citing Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court
23 is not persuaded by the additional evidence Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals
24 Council, dated after the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council found did not
25 relate to the period at issue. (JS 10-11; AR 1-81, 100-74.)
26 Even assuming that the ALJ erred in making her step two determination, any
27 error was harmless because she considered all symptoms when determining
28 Plaintiff’s RFC. (AR 89.) See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007)
1 (even if the ALJ erred by not including an impairment at step two, any error was
2 harmless because the ALJ considered the limitations posed thereby in later steps of
3 the sequential evaluation process).
4 Accordingly, remand is not warranted at step two.
5 2. Medical Opinion Evidence
6 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in considering the medical opinion
7 evidence in assessing her RFC. (JS at 6.)
8 a. Applicable Legal Standards
9 The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC “based on all of the
10 relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3); see Robbins, 466
11 F.3d at 883 (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996)). In doing so,
12 the ALJ may consider any statements provided by medical sources, including
13 statements that are not based on formal medical examinations. See 20 C.F.R.
14 § 416.927.6 An ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s RFC must be affirmed “if the
15 ALJ applied the proper legal standard and his decision is supported by substantial
16 evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Morgan
17 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).
18 Courts give varying degrees of deference to medical opinions based on the
19 provider: (1) treating physicians who examine and treat; (2) examining physicians
20 who examine, but do not treat; and (3) non-examining physicians who do not examine
21 or treat. Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009);
22 see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. Most often, “[t]he medical opinion of a claimant’s
23 treating physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as it ‘is well-supported by

24 6 For all claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c applies, not
25 § 416.927. The new regulations provide that the Social Security Administration “will
not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
26 medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from
27 your medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. The claim here, however, was filed
before March 27, 2017. Thus, the Court analyzes Plaintiff's claim pursuant to the
28 treating source rule set forth in § 416.927.
1 medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
2 inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.’”
3 Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
4 § 404.1527(c)(2)). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater
5 weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician, and the opinion of an examining
6 physician is given greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. See
7 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014).
8 The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to reject a treating or
9 examining physician’s uncontradicted opinion. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675; Lester, 81
10 F.3d at 830-31. When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by
11 another opinion, the ALJ may reject it only by providing specific and legitimate
12 reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 633; Lester,
13 81 F.3d at 830; Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th
14 Cir. 2008). “An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ requirement by ‘setting
15 out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating
16 his interpretation thereof, and making findings.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012
17 (citation omitted). Although the opinion of a non-examining physician “cannot by
18 itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either
19 an examining physician or a treating physician,” such an opinion may serve as
20 substantial evidence when it is consistent with and supported by other independent
21 evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc.
22 Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding ALJ properly relied
23 on non-examining state agency physician’s assessment in determining the claimant’s
24 RFC and in rejecting the treating doctor’s opinion regarding the claimant’s functional
25 limitations).
26 b. The ALJ’s Decision
27 In determining the RFC, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of the non-
28 examining State Agency physicians, who found Plaintiff was capable of a full range
1 of light work. (AR 91.) On initial review of Plaintiff’s DIB claim, A. Lizarraras,
2 M.D., evaluated the medical evidence and opined that Plaintiff could perform light
3 work, noting that the longitudinal evidence showed a stable pituitary macroadenoma,
4 hypothyroidism and thyroiditis. (AR 198-99.) In July 2016, Dr. Lizarraras
5 determined that Plaintiff’s condition was not disabling on any date through December
6 31, 2014, when Plaintiff was last insured for disability benefits. (AR 200.) On
7 reconsideration of Plaintiff’s DIB claim in September 2016, M. Amado, M.D.
8 affirmed a light RFC between November 30, 2014 and December 31, 2014, noting
9 that most of the medical evidence of record on file was past the date last insured.
10 (AR 207.) The ALJ found the State Agency opinions consistent with the medical
11 evidence. (AR 91-92.)
12 The ALJ gave less weight to the April 2018 treating opinion of Samuel Wilson,
13 M.D., who opined that Plaintiff could stand or sit for 30 minutes due to neuropathic
14 and right knee pain, could walk 25 feet without stopping, would need to lie down
15 during the day, could rarely handle and finger or reach down, could lift and carry less
16 than five pounds, suffered from anxiety and panic attacks, needed help with her
17 activities of daily living, and could not work. (AR 92, 504-09.) The ALJ discounted
18 Dr. Wilson’s opinion because his assessed limitations were inconsistent with and not
19 supported by his own progress notes and medical evidence, and he did not provide
20 any significant treatment for Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 92.)
21 c. Discussion
22 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC because (1) the
23 State Agency physicians’ opinions cannot form the sole basis for the RFC
24 assessment; and (2) the State Agency physicians’ opinions are from 2016 and only
25 address Plaintiff’s application for Title II benefits, focusing on her condition prior to
26 her date last insured in 2014, because she had not yet filed her Title XVI application.
27 (JS at 6.)
28 ///
1 Here, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The record
2 contains medical opinion evidence from the State Agency physicians and Dr. Wilson,
3 a treating source.7 (AR 198-99, 207, 504-09.) The ALJ effectively rejected Dr.
4 Wilson’s opinion. (AR 92.) This left the State Agency physicians’ opinions, which
5 the ALJ found consistent with the medical evidence. (AR 91-92.) The ALJ noted
6 that despite Plaintiff’s morbid obesity, distal polyneuropathy, benign pituitary mass,
7 carpal tunnel syndrome and degeneration, her physical examinations were “largely
8 unremarkable” aside from mild decrease in sensation. (AR 91, 428, 439, 472, 550.)
9 These physical examinations show no deformities, clubbing, cyanosis, or edema in
10 extremities; normal musculoskeletal tone, strength and range of motion; no effusions,
11 instability or tenderness to palpation; no neurological changes; decreased pulse but
12 normal vibration sensation in feet; and gait within normal limits. (AR 428, 439, 472,
13 550.) In general, these findings would permit the State Agency physicians’ opinions
14 to constitute substantial evidence. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (holding a non-
15 examining physician’s opinion can constitute substantial evidence if it is supported
16 by other evidence in the record and is consistent with it). Here, however, the State
17 Agency physicians’ opinions have limited probative value regarding Plaintiff’s SSI
18 claim because the State Agency physicians considered the medical evidence only as
19 it related to Plaintiff’s DIB claim, i.e., for the period between November 30, 2014 to
20 December 31, 2014. (AR 196, 207.) See Coffman v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5826790, at
21 *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2015) (remanding where ALJ rejected all treating and
22 examining opinions and remaining State Agency opinions addressed the medical
23 evidence only as to plaintiff’s DIB claim). For the later-filed SSI claim, the period
24 between December 31, 2014 and the date of the ALJ’s decision was relevant, and the
25 State Agency physicians’ opinions did not address the medical evidence as it related
26 to that period. Thus, it appears that the RFC assessment for the period after
27
7 The consultative examination by Dr. Liu on January 15, 2019, occurred after the
28 ALJ’s decision and does not relate to the period at issue. (AR 2, 45-49.)
1 December 31, 2014, was mistakenly based on the State Agency opinions. To the
2 extent the RFC assessment post-December 31, 2014 was based solely on the ALJ’s
3 interpretation of the medical evidence, she was not qualified to make a functional
4 assessment as a layperson. Id. (“[A]n ALJ is simply not qualified to interpret raw
5 medical data in functional terms.”) (quoting Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1102,
6 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999)
7 (per curiam), and citing Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975)).
8 The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ is not precluded from relying on the
9 State Agency physicians’ opinions on the ground that their review was prior to
10 Plaintiff’s Title XVI application, but cites only general statutes relating to what
11 evidence a State Agency physician considers, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1),
12 416.913(a)(1). The Commissioner further argues that in addition to the longitudinal
13 record, the ALJ also considered the third-party testimony and Plaintiff’s subjective
14 allegations in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (JS at 15.) The ALJ, however, essentially
15 rejected the third-party testimony and Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and
16 erroneously relied on the State Agency physicians’ opinions regarding her DIB
17 claim. (AR 90-92.) The Court finds that the ALJ erred by formulating an RFC
18 without a physician’s assessment of Plaintiff’s functional capacity after December
19 31, 2014.8 Perez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 958 F.2d 445, 446 (1st Cir.
20 1991) (per curiam) (“[W]here an ALJ reaches conclusions about [a] claimant’s
21 physical exertional capacity without any assessment of residual functional capacity
22 by a physician, the ALJ’s conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence and
23 it is necessary to remand for the taking of further functional evidence.”). It was
24 improper for the ALJ to make an RFC determination for Plaintiff’s SSI claim based
25
8 The fact that subsequent evidence was introduced after the State Agency review is
26 not the issue here, but rather that the State Agency physicians’ opinions addressed
27 the medical evidence only as it related to Plaintiff’s DIB claim, and there was no
other medical opinion in the record, except for Dr. Wilson’s rejected opinion, that
28 addressed the medical evidence as it related to Plaintiff’s later-filed SSI claim.
1 on the State Agency physicians’ opinions solely regarding Plaintiff’s DIB claim.
2 The Court cannot find the ALJ’s error harmless, as it cannot confidently
3 conclude that the ALJ’s RFC assessment and the non-disability decision would have
4 been the same absent such error. Dr. Wilson’s opinion suggests that Plaintiff’s
5 functional limitations would prevent Plaintiff from performing all work. (AR 504-
6 09.)
7 Accordingly, remand is warranted to reevaluate the medical opinion evidence.
8 B. The Court Declines to Address Plaintiff’s Remaining Issue
9 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address
10 Plaintiff’s remaining issue. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)
11 (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach
12 [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v.
13 Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not
14 address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with
15 any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”).
16 C. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings
17 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision should be vacated and the matter
18 remanded for further proceedings. (JS at 38-39.) The Commissioner agrees that
19 should the Court find reversible error, the proper remedy is remand for further
20 proceedings. (JS at 39.)
21 The Court agrees with the parties that remand for further administrative
22 proceedings on Plaintiff’s SSI claim is appropriate, as further administrative review
23 could remedy the ALJ’s errors. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th
24 Cir. 2015) (remanding for an award of benefits is appropriate in rare circumstances).9
25
9 Before ordering remand for an award of benefits, three requirements must be met:
26 (1) the Court must conclude that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons
27 for rejecting evidence; (2) the Court must conclude that the record has been fully
developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; and
28 (3) the Court must conclude that if the improperly discredited evidence were credited
1 || The Court finds that as to Plaintiff's SSI claim, the ALJ erred in considering the
2 || medical opinion evidence in assessing her RFC. On remand, the ALJ shall solicit the
3 || expertise of a medical advisor to interpret the medical evidence generated after
4 || Plaintiff's date last insured. The ALJ shall then reassess Plaintiff's RFC as to
5 || Plaintiffs SSI claim and proceed to step four and, if necessary, step five. This order
6 || does not preclude the ALJ from considering, on remand, any other arguments raised
7 || by Plaintiff.
g | Vv. CONCLUSION
9 IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of
10 || the Commissioner denying benefits as to Plaintiffs Title XVI SSI claim, and
11 || REMANDING the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this
13 || Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
14 .
Rayeeis, QA. QC
15 || DATED: July 6, 2021
16 ROZELLA A. OLIVER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
17
18
19 NOTICE
20 || THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,
5 LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.

22
23
24
25 | ———_—————___ oo
as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. /d.
26 (citations omitted). Even if all three requirements are met, the Court retains
27 || flexibility to remand for further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates
serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of
28 || the Social Security Act.” /d. (citation omitted).
13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10041256. Public record. Not legal advice.