# Eric Jerome Phillips Jr. v. County of Riverside

> District Court, C.D. California · October 22, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10039359

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** October 22, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that right 13 to bodily privacy was not violated because female officers did not “regularly or 14 frequently observe unclothed inmates without a legitimate reason for doing so”; 15 specifically, (1
- concluding that search procedures— 9 which required mentally ill inmates to be shackled and unclothed, without food, 10 water, or access to a toilet for hours at a time—were not entitled to deference
- applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to 28 U.S.C. § Section 1915A

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 ERIC JEROME PHILLIPS, JR., Case No. 5:19-cv-01518-VAP (MAA)
12
Plaintiff,

13
v. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
14 ORDER REGARDING THIRD
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al.,
15 AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendants.
16
17

18 I. INTRODUCTION
19 On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff Eric Jerome Phillips, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a state
20 inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights
21 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) That same
22 day, Plaintiff also filed a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2), which
23 the Court granted on August 15, 2019 (ECF No. 4). On August 20, 2019, the Court
24 dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25 8 (“Rule 8”), with leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.)
26 On September 23, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a First Amended Complaint
27 (“FAC”). (FAC, ECF No. 8.) On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a Request
28 to Submit Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 9.) The Court denied
1 this request as unnecessary per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and ordered
2 Plaintiff to file a SAC no later than December 23, 2019. (ECF No. 10). On
3 December 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Submit Supplemental Complaint (ECF
4 No. 12), which the Court also denied as unnecessary (ECF No. 13). On December
5 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter to the Clerk of Court requesting the Court’s
6 assistance. (ECF No. 14.) On January 9, 2020, the Court issued a notice to the
7 warden and extended Plaintiff’s SAC deadline to February 10, 2020. (ECF No. 16.)
8 On February 25, 2020, the Court issued an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause by
9 March 26, 2020 why the Court should not recommend that the case be dismissed for
10 want of prosecution (“OSC”). (OSC, ECF No. 27.) On March 25, 2020, Plaintiff
11 submitted a response to the OSC, stating, inter alia, that Plaintiff believed a SAC
12 was optional. (ECF No. 33.) On March 30, 2020, the Court discharged the OSC
13 and deemed the FAC as the operative complaint. (ECF No. 34.) On April 2, 2020,
14 the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s FAC (ECF No. 8) for failure to comply with Rule 8,
15 with leave to amend. (ECF No. 35.)
16 On April 2, 2020, the Court received a complaint, which was docketed as a
17 SAC. (ECF No. 38.) On April 16, 2020, the Court dismissed the SAC with leave to
18 amend. (ECF No. 42.) The Court subsequently received Plaintiff’s Motion/Request
19 to Submit a SAC, which stated that Plaintiff had not yet filed a SAC in this lawsuit,
20 and Plaintiff’s recent complaint was intended as a separate class action lawsuit.
21 (ECF No. 43.) On April 20, 2020, the Court ordered ECF Nos. 38 and 42 stricken
22 from the docket and ordered Plaintiff to file a SAC no later than June 19, 2020.
23 (ECF No. 44.) On June 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a SAC (SAC, ECF No. 48), which
24 the Court screened and dismissed with leave to amend on July 24, 2020 (“Order
25 Dismissing SAC”) (Order Dismiss. SAC, ECF No. 58).
26 On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”).
27 (TAC, ECF No. 59.) The Court has screened the TAC as prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
28 § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons stated below, the TAC is
1 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff is ORDERED to, within
2 thirty days after the date of this Order, either: (1) file a Fourth Amended Complaint
3 (“4AC”); or (2) advise the Court that Plaintiff does not intend to pursue this lawsuit
4 further and will not file a 4AC.
5
6 II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS1
7 A. Defendants
8 The TAC is filed against: (1) Riverside County; (2) Riverside County
9 Sheriff’s Department (“RCSD”); and (3) Deputy Senior Landry (individual capacity)
10 (each, a “Defendant,” and collectively, “Defendants”). (TAC 4.)2
11
12 B. Claims 1–3 - Religious Claims
13 Claims 1–3 asserts violations of the following rights: (1) Claim 1: First
14 Amendment Free Exercise Clause; (2) Claim 2: Fourteenth Amendment Equal
15 Protection Clause; and (3) Claim 3: Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
16 Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Id. at 6.)
17 Practices and policies throughout Defendant RCSD’s jail facilities—which
18 have been in practice since Plaintiff entered Defendant RCSD’s custody on July 13,
19 2016—prohibit Plaintiff from exercising his Islamic religion: (1) Muslim detainees
20 are not allowed to congregate together, (2) Muslim detainees are not permitted to
21 receive religious materials due to posing a security threat, (3) Muslim detainees must
22 pass a series of tests and inquiries to receive an Arabic Quran, (4) it is not the
23 responsibility of Defendants RCSD and Riverside County to provide congregation
24

25 1 The Court summarizes the allegations and claims in the TAC. In doing so, the
Court does not opine on the veracity or merit of Plaintiff’s allegations and claims,
26
nor does the Court make any findings of fact.
27
2 Pinpoint citations of docketed documents refer to the page numbers in the ECF-
28 generated headers.
1 services with an Islamic religious advisor, and (5) Muslim detainees may have a
2 phone call with an Islamic religious advisor only once a year. (Id. at 6–7.)
3 Plaintiff has submitted multiple requests, slips, and grievances, and spoken to
4 multiple deputies regarding his needs to exercise Islam and requesting the following
5 religious items and services: (1) khuffi, (2) Islamic prayer rug, (3) Arabic Quaran,
6 (4) sunnah, (5) hadith, and (6) the ability to congregate with other Muslims and an
7 Islamic religious advisor in private. (Id. at 7.) Such requests were denied pursuant
8 to the policies and practices of Defendants Riverside County and RCSD because
9 they either posed a security threat, or due to refusal to provide and allow such
10 requests. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff has addressed the foregoing requests with four
11 chaplains employed by Defendants Riverside County and RCSD, who have denied
12 Plaintiff’s requests. (Id.) The chaplains told Plaintiff: “You should of [sic] chose to
13 be a Christian instead of Muslim”; “Now you know you better not come to jail a
14 Muslim”; “Be grateful we are letting you practice Allah”; and “Muslims are not
15 really accepted here.” (Id.)
16 Defendants Riverside County and RCSD gave Plaintiff a used towel covered
17 in blood, urine, and feces in lieu of a prayer rug to conduct his prayers. (Id. at 9.)
18 Defendants Riverside County and RCSD forced Plaintiff to read a full page of
19 Arabic Quran, which Plaintiff refused due to feeling harassed. (Id.) Plaintiff’s
20 religious reading materials were confiscated on three occasions, due to Defendants
21 Riverside County and RCSD’s policy allowing only one religious book to be in a
22 detainee’s possession. (Id. at 9–10.)
23 Defendants Riverside County and RCSD provide private Christian and
24 Catholic congregation services for detainees who choose to participate
25 approximately one to two times a month. (Id. at 8.) Defendants Riverside County
26 and RCSD provide Christian and Catholic detainees with religious materials, such as
27 different versions of the Bible and other reading materials, and they are allowed to
28 ///
1 possess as many religious books as desired. (Id. at 9.) Jewish detainees are allowed
2 to wear Yarmulkes. (Id.)
3 In its entirety, Defendants Riverside County and RCSD’s policies deny
4 Plaintiff an equal opportunity to pursue his faith as other detainees of different
5 religious faiths, and caused severe psychological injuries to Plaintiff. (Id. at 10, 13.)
6
7 C. Claim 4 - Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
8 During all day room and cell extractions, all detainees are considered highly
9 dangerous and it is the policy and practice that deputies may use as much force as
10 wanted to extract a detainee. (Id. at 15.) In the “mental health/ad seg unit,” deputies
11 will use explosives (tear gas) and however much force wanted on a detainee who
12 does not respond to a question or order fast enough, and will “beat on” mentally
13 unstable detainees. (Id.)
14 On approximately May 14, 2019, at RPDC Jail3 in the “mental health/ad seg
15 unit,” two classification unit deputies came to Plaintiff’s cell and ordered Plaintiff to
16 come out of the cell to be re-housed in the general population. (Id.) Plaintiff refused
17 the order out of fear for his life and due to exercising a court order. (Id. at 15–16.)
18 Plaintiff told both deputies that he was in fear for his life and could not function in
19 that environment, and begged them for help. (Id. at 16.)
20 Both deputies disregarded Plaintiff’s statements and concerns and left to
21 summon the “goon squad”—ten to fifteen deputies dressed in all black with riot gear
22 and weapons. (Id.) Once the “goon squad” arrived, they threw two canisters of
23 military grade tear gas—which emitted tear gas for two minutes each—and three
24 military concussion grenades—two of which exploded in Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.)
25 Approximately ten deputies then entered Plaintiff’s cell with a riot shield, shoved the
26 riot shield on top of Plaintiff in a corner of the cell, and punched him repeatedly in
27

28 3 Presumably, this refers to Robert Presley Detention Center.
1 the face for approximately forty-five seconds. (Id.) They threw Plaintiff to the
2 ground to cuff his hands and feet together as a “hog tie.” (Id.) Plaintiff vomited,
3 urinated and defecated on himself, and lost consciousness due to the explosives and
4 tear gas used on him. (Id. at 17.)
5 The “goon squad” carried Plaintiff into a safety cell by his hands, feet, and
6 clothes. (Id.) During the transfer, multiple deputies verbally berated Plaintiff. (Id.)
7 One deputy rapidly pulled on Plaintiff’s left distal phalange of his first toe so that it
8 could break. (Id.) Plaintiff was screaming and asked the deputy to stop. (Id.) The
9 deputy ignored this request and continued to pull Plaintiff’s toe back and verbally
10 berated him. (Id.) Once Plaintiff was in the safety cell, a sergeant overseeing the
11 event told Plaintiff that next time they would kill him and if he submitted any
12 grievances, they would make sure “you end up dead.” (Id.) Plaintiff remained in the
13 safety cell for approximately two days, where he laid on feces, blood, urine, and spit;
14 and was deprived of sleep the entire time due to excessive lights and freezing cold
15 temperatures. (Id.) Multiple deputies overseeing Plaintiff humiliated and degraded
16 him about the situation and defecating on himself. (Id. at 18.) From the safety cell,
17 Plaintiff returned back to the same housing unit—“mental health/ad seg”—where he
18 remained for approximately one year. (Id.)
19 As a result of the incident, Plaintiff suffered the following physical and
20 psychological injuries: (1) multiple blood vessels exploded in the left eye,
21 preventing Plaintiff from seeing out such eye for approximately four days; (2) legs
22 and feet were swollen for approximately three months; (3) fractures in left toe;
23 (4) daily self-urination; (5) daily nightmares and sleep deprivation; (6) daily panic
24 attacks; and (7) chains cut into wrists and ankles. (Id.)
25 Plaintiff made no threats and showed no aggression before or during the
26 assault. (Id.) Before the incident, Plaintiff received a superior court order to remain
27 housed in the “mental health/ad seg unit” on April 2, 2019. (Id.) Plaintiff addressed
28 his order and need to stay in the “mental health/ad seg unit” for his safety with two
1 high-ranking classification unit deputies approximately one-a-half weeks before the
2 assault. (Id. at 19.) Both deputies told Plaintiff that they did not have to follow the
3 court order. (Id.) Before the event, Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances and
4 talked with multiple deputies about being housed in ad seg for his safety, but his
5 concerns were disregarded. (Id.)
6 Defendants RCSD and Riverside County were negligent to Plaintiff’s safety
7 and concerns by exercising this custom on Plaintiff and placing him in “reckless
8 endangerment.” (Id.)
9
10 D. Claim 5 - Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Privacy and Bodily
11 Integrity
12 Defendants RCSD and Riverside County have practices of sexually harassing
13 and assaulting detainees. (Id. at 20.) As a practice: (1) deputies sexually harass and
14 humiliate detainees; (2) deputies choose detainees they want to strip naked and
15 sexually degrade; (3) deputies monitor detainees on camera naked and sexually
16 humiliate them; (4) female deputies sexually harass and humiliate male detainees in
17 safety cells; (5) deputies will use as much force as necessary to strip a detainee
18 naked; and (6) deputies will force mentally unstable detainees to strip naked and
19 sexually degrade themselves. (Id. at 20–21.)
20 While Plaintiff was housed at RPDC Jail, on approximately July 25, 2017,
21 Defendant Landry conducted a random cell search on Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at 21.)
22 Before he conducted the search, Defendant Landry forced Plaintiff to strip naked and
23 proceeded to sexually assault Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Landry ordered Plaintiff to
24 masturbate in front of him and forced Plaintiff to stick his hands inside his anus, to
25 which Plaintiff complied for fear of his life. (Id.) For approximately two minutes,
26 Plaintiff was naked and performed Defendant Landry’s orders. (Id.) Defendant
27 Landry laughed at Plaintiff while sexually degrading him. (Id.) Defendant Landry
28 called Plaintiff “sexy” multiple times and made sexual comments about Plaintiff’s
1 body. (Id.) Defendant Landry said to Plaintiff that he could have sex with him, and
2 then sexually assaulted Plaintiff. (Id. at 22.)
3 On approximately January 18, 2019 at CBDC Jail; 4 January 25, 2019 at SCF
4 Jail; 5 and February 19, 2020 at RPDC Jail, Defendants RCSD and Riverside County
5 exercised policies and practices where Plaintiff was forced naked into a safety cell
6 for approximately three days on each occasion. (Id.) Each time, female and male
7 deputies sexually humiliated and degraded Plaintiff due to his nakedness. (Id.)
8 Deputies made sexual comments to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was using the restroom
9 and eating his food naked. (Id.)
10
11 E. Request for Relief
12 For the foregoing violations, Plaintiff requests:
13 (1) Declaratory relief declaring the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
14 of Plaintiff against Defendant RCSD;
15 (2) Permanent injunctions against Defendants Riverside County and
16 RCSD:
17 (a) directing Defendants to provide to Plaintiff: (i) two hadiths,
18 (ii) two sunnahs, (iii) kufi, (iv) Islamic prayer rug, and
19 (v) Arabic/English Quran;
20 (b) ordering Defendant RCSD to cease: (i) unnecessary bodily
21 invasions, (ii) sexual harassment, and (iii) forcing detainees to
22 strip naked in safety cells;
23 (3) Damages in the following amounts: (a) $750,000 in punitive,
24 compensatory, and nominal damages from Defendants Riverside
25
26
27
4 Presumably, this refers to the Cois M. Byrd Detention Center.

28 5 Presumably, this refers to the Larry Smith Correctional Facility.
1 County and RCSD; and (b) $250,000 in punitive and compensatory
2 damages against Defendant Landry;
3 (4) A jury trial; and
4 (5) Any further relief in the interests of justice. (Id. at 24.)
5
6 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
7 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening of any case in which a
8 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
9 governmental entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A), or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma
10 pauperis (28 U.S.C. § Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). The court must identify cognizable
11 claims and dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, that is: (1) frivolous or
12 malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks
13 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
14 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
15 When screening a complaint to determine whether it fails to state a claim
16 upon which relief can be granted, courts apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) standard. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121
18 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to 28 U.S.C. § Section 1915A);
19 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6)
20 standard to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a
21 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
22 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
23 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
24 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
25 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
26 alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although “detailed factual allegations” are not
27 required, “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”; “labels
28 and conclusions”; “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement”; and
1 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
2 conclusory statements” are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id.
3 (quotations omitted). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
4 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable
5 legal theory.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122
6 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,
7 1104 (9th Cir. 2008)).
8 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts will accept factual
9 allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Park
10 v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, where a plaintiff is
11 appearing pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, courts construe pleadings
12 liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at
13 1121. “If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the
14 other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff’s complaint
15 survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
16 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the liberal pleading standard “applies only to a
17 plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989),
18 superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Courts will not “accept
19 any unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the
20 form of factual allegations.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir.
21 2003). In giving liberal interpretations to complaints, courts “may not supply
22 essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Chapman v. Pier 1
23 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976
24 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)).
25 ///
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1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 A. Section 1983
3 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “every person who, under
4 color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
5 citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
6 Constitution and laws . . . .” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (alteration in
7 original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors
8 from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
9 guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Id. To
10 state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a right secured by the
11 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) the alleged violation
12 was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
13 42, 48 (1988).
14 Here, the TAC asserts violations of the following rights: (1) First Amendment
15 Free Exercise Clause; (2) Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause;
16 (3) RLUIPA; (4) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protection against
17 punishment of pretrial detainees; and (5) Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy
18 and bodily integrity. (TAC 6, 14.) Mindful of the liberal pleading standards
19 afforded pro se civil rights plaintiffs, the Court also examines Claims 4–5 pursuant
20 to the Fourteenth Amendment protection against excessive force and Fourth
21 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. See Fontana v. Haskin,
22 262 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Specific legal theories need not be pleaded so
23 long as sufficient factual averments show that the claimant may be entitled to some
24 relief.”); Ellis v. Brady, Case No. 16cv1419 WQH (NLS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25 203458, at *15–16 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017) (concluding that court could address
26 plaintiff’s claim asserted under the wrong constitutional amendment, as “it is the
27 factual allegations, not the legal labels attached, which determine the issue”).
28 ///
1 B. Claims Against Municipalities/Local Government Entities
2 “A municipality or other local government [including counties and their
3 sheriff’s departments] may be liable under [Section 1983] if the governmental body
4 itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be
5 subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)
6 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). However, “a
7 municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself
8 causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
9 385 (1989). “A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
10 tortfeasor—or in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under Section
11 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; accord
12 Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 (“[U]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible only
13 for their own illegal acts. They are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their
14 employees’ actions.” (quotations and citations omitted)).
15 “In order to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy
16 or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
17 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Official
18 municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its
19 policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically
20 have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. A rule or regulation “promulgated,
21 adopted, or ratified by a local governmental entity’s legislative body” constitutes a
22 municipal policy. Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.
23 1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595
24 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). “A policy has been defined as ‘a deliberate
25 choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the
26 official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
27 subject matter in question.’” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707,
28 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Long v. County of Los Angeles,
1 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[I]n addition to an official policy, a
2 municipality may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
3 governmental custom even though such custom has not received formal approval
4 through the [governmental] body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Navarro v.
5 Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted) (citing Monell, 436
6 U.S. at 690–91). However, liability for a custom will attach only if a plaintiff pleads
7 that his or her injury resulted from a “permanent and well-settled” practice.
8 Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444. Allegations of random acts or isolated events are
9 insufficient to establish a municipal custom. Navarro, 72 F.3d at 714.
10 Furthermore, there must be a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or
11 custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385.
12 Municipal policy “‘causes’ an injury where it is the ‘moving force’ behind the
13 constitutional violation, or where ‘the [municipality] itself is the wrongdoer.’”
14 Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The
15 municipal policy “need only cause a constitutional violation; it need not be
16 unconstitutional per se.” Jackson v. Gates, 975 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 Below the Court examines whether the TAC successfully states any claims
18 against Defendants Riverside County and RCSD.
19
20 C. First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion
21 The First Amendment prohibits the government from making laws
22 “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; Hartmann, 707
23 F.3d at 1122 (noting that the free exercise guarantee is applicable to state action
24 through the Fourteenth Amendment). “The right to exercise religious practices and
25 beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is
26 necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to
27 achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v.
28 Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
1 A religious belief must satisfy two criteria to merit protection under the Free
2 Exercise Clause of the First Amendment: (1) “the claimant’s proffered belief must
3 be sincerely held; the First Amendment does not extend to so-called religions which
4 . . . are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of
5 religious sincerity”; and (2) “the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in
6 purely secular philosophical concerns.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir.
7 1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
8 addition, “[a] person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government
9 action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.” Jones
10 v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “A substantial burden . . . place[s]
11 more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce
12 individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure
13 on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. (alteration in
14 original) (quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013)).
15 “[A] prisoner’s Free Exercise Clause claim will fail if the State shows that the
16 challenged action is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”
17 Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482
18 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Four factors are balanced in determining whether an action is
19 reasonably related to legitimate penological interests:
20 (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between a state
21 interest and the prison regulation; (2) whether prisoners have an
22 alternative method of engaging in religious practice; (3) the impact
23 accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on
24 guards and other inmates; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives to
25 the challenged regulation.
26 Walker, 789 F.3d at 1138–39 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90).
27 Taken as a whole, the TAC sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff holds a
28 sincerely-held belief in the Islamic religion. (See TAC 6–13.) The TAC alleges
1 that since July 13, 2016, Defendants Riverside County and RCSD have practices
2 that hinder and discourage Plaintiff from practicing his Islamic religion— including
3 repeated denials of Plaintiff’s requests for five Islamic religious items (kufi, Islamic
4 prayer rug, Arabic translated Quran, hadith, and sunnah), confiscation of Plaintiff’s
5 Islamic reading materials, denial of Plaintiff’s numerous requests for congregation
6 services, and denial of Plaintiff’s requests to meet with an Islamic advisor—all due
7 to Defendants RCSD and Riverside County’s stance that the Islamic religion poses
8 a security threat. (Id. at 6–10.) The TAC alleges that these denials prevent Plaintiff
9 from performing his “fundamental obligations” under Islam. (Id. at 12.) These
10 allegations potentially state a First Amendment free exercise claim against
11 Defendants RCSD and Riverside County.
12
13 D. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection
14 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
15 ‘[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
16 the laws.’” Angelotti Chiropractic v. Baker, 791 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2015)
17 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “The Equal
18 Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally.”
19 Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
20 classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating
21 differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
22 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
23 “The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee ensures that prison officials
24 cannot discriminate against particular religions.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,
25 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878,
26 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to ‘a
27 reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded
28 ///
1 fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d
2 at 891 (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam)).
3 A plaintiff states an equal protection claim by alleging “facts plausibly
4 showing that ‘the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against
5 [them] based upon membership in a protected class.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123
6 (alteration in original) (quoting Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166
7 (9th Cir. 2005)). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff in a section
8 1983 claim must show that officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner.”
9 Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. As with First Amendment free exercise claims, courts
10 apply the Turner four-factor reasonableness test—that is, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
11 Amendment equal protection claim will fail if the challenged action is reasonably
12 related to legitimate penological interests. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891.
13 The TAC alleges that Defendants Riverside County and RCSD have practices
14 that hinder and discourage Plaintiff from practicing his Islamic religion, including
15 denial of Plaintiff’s requests for five Islamic religious items (kufi, Islamic prayer
16 rug, Arabic translated Quran, hadith, and sunnah); confiscation of Plaintiff’s Islamic
17 reading materials; denial of Plaintiff’s requests for congregation services; and denial
18 of Plaintiff’s requests to meet with an Islamic advisor. (TAC 6–10.) The TAC
19 alleges that in contrast to Muslim detainees, Christian and Catholic detainees receive
20 religious and advisor congregation services approximately one to two times per
21 month, are provided the Bible and other religious reading materials, and are
22 permitted to possess as many religious books as desired. (Id. at 8–9.) The TAC also
23 alleges that Jewish detainees are permitted to wear Yarmulkes and are allowed to
24 possess as many religious books as desired. (Id. at 9.) The TAC asserts that in its
25 entirety, Defendants Riverside County and RCSD’s policies deny Plaintiff an equal
26 opportunity to pursue his faith as other detainees of different religious faiths. (Id. at
27 10.) These allegations potentially state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
28 claim against Defendants RCSD and Riverside County.
1 E. RLUIPA
2 “RLUIPA . . . protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to
3 attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s
4 permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson,
5 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). RLUIPA provides that: “No government shall impose a
6 substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
7 institution, . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
8 the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person,’ first,
9 ‘furthers a compelling governmental interest,’ and second, ‘is the least restrictive
10 means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” Id. at 732 (alteration in
11 original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2)). RLUIPA provides more
12 “expansive protection” for inmates’ “religious liberty” than the First Amendment.
13 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888 (RLUIPA
14 “mandates a stricter standard of review for prison regulations that burden the free
15 exercise of religion than the reasonableness standard under Turner.”).
16 “To state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must show that: (1) he takes part
17 in a religious exercise, and (2) the State’s actions have substantially burdened that
18 exercise.” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1134 (internal quotations omitted). “RLUIPA
19 protects any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
20 system of religious belief, but, of course, a prisoner’s request for an accommodation
21 must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.” Holt,
22 574 U.S. at 360–61 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “To constitute a
23 substantial burden, a limitation of religious practice ‘must impose a significantly
24 great restriction or onus upon such exercise.’” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1135 (quoting
25 San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.
26 2004)). “A substantial burden need not actually force a litigant to change his
27 practices; a violation may occur ‘where the state . . . denies [an important benefit]
28 because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial
1 pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id.
2 (alteration in original) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418, F.3d 989, 995 (9th
3 Cir. 2005)). If the inmate satisfies his initial burden, then the State must “prove its
4 actions were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
5 interest.” Id. at 1134.
6 The TAC alleges that since July 13, 2016, Defendants Riverside County and
7 RCSD have practices that hinder and discourage Plaintiff from practicing his Islamic
8 religion— including repeated denials of Plaintiff’s requests for five Islamic religious
9 items (kufi, Islamic prayer rug, Arabic translated Quran, hadith, and sunnah),
10 confiscation of Plaintiff’s Islamic reading materials, denial of Plaintiff’s numerous
11 requests for congregation services, and denial of Plaintiff’s requests to meet with an
12 Islamic advisor—all due to Defendants RCSD and Riverside County’s position that
13 the Islamic religion poses a security threat. (Id. at 6–10.) These allegations
14 potentially state a RLUIPA claim against Defendants Riverside County and RCSD.
15
16 F. Fourteenth Amendment Protection Against Punishment
17 Pretrial detainees possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners. Stone v.
18 City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
19 Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1246 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Eighth
20 Amendment protections apply only once a prisoner has been convicted of a crime,
21 while pretrial detainees are entitled to the potentially more expansive protections of
22 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” ). The Due Process Clause
23 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees—who have not been
24 adjudged guilty of any crime—from any conditions or restrictions that amount to
25 punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979); see also Valdez v.
26 Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pretrial detainees have
27 a substantive due process right against restrictions that amount to punishment.”).
28 ///
1 “This right is violated if restrictions are ‘imposed for the purpose of punishment.’”
2 Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535).
3 For a particular governmental action to constitute punishment, first the “action
4 must cause the detainee to suffer some harm or ‘disability.’” Demery v. Arpaio, 378
5 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]o constitute punishment, the harm or disability
6 caused by the government’s action must either significantly exceed, or be
7 independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.” Id. at 1030. Second, “the
8 purpose of the governmental action must be to punish the detainee.” Id. at 1029. To
9 determine whether a condition is unconstitutional punishment, a court asks “whether
10 there was an express intent to punish, or ‘whether an alternative purpose to which
11 [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
12 appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” Id. at 1028
13 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). “[I]f a particular condition or
14 restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
15 objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘”punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at
16 539. “Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a
17 legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that
18 the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally
19 be inflicted upon detainees . . . .” Id. “A reasonable relationship between the
20 governmental interest and the challenged restriction does not require an exact fit, nor
21 does it require showing a least restrictive alternative.” Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046
22 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
23 The TAC alleges that on July 25, 2017, Defendant Landry conducted a
24 random cell search of Plaintiff’s cell, during which Defendant Landry forced
25 Plaintiff to strip naked, forced Plaintiff to perform his orders—including to
26 masturbate and to stick his hands inside his anus—called Plaintiff “sexy” multiple
27 times, made sexual comments about Plaintiff’s body, and sexually assaulted
28 Plaintiff. (TAC 21–22.) The TAC does not provide sufficient details of Defendant
1 Landry’s actions, including in particular his “sexual assault” of Plaintiff. It is
2 unclear whether Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Landry physical assaulted him or
3 whether he is characterizing Defendant Landry’s verbal abuse as “sexual assault.”
4 “[V]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional
5 deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139
6 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Hill v. Chilmegan, No. CV 17-01674-PHX-GMS
7 (DKD), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209199, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2017) (dismissing
8 pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment punishments claim based solely on
9 allegations of inappropriate sexual comments where plaintiff did not allege any
10 physical contact). If Plaintiff includes Defendant Landry in any amended complaint,
11 he must provide additional factual allegations regarding Defendant Landry’s actions,
12 including any actions taken beyond verbal harassment.
13 With respect to Defendants RCSD and Riverside County, the TAC alleges
14 that Defendants have a policy and practice of allowing deputies to use as much force
15 as wanted to extract a detainee. (TAC 15.) The TAC also alleges that Defendants
16 RCSD and Riverside County have the following customs, policies, and practices:
17 (1) deputies sexually harass and humiliate detainees; (2) deputies choose the
18 detainees they want to strip naked and sexually degrade; (3) deputies monitor
19 detainees on camera naked and sexually humiliate them; (4) female deputies
20 sexually harass and humiliate male detainees in safety cells; (5) deputies will use as
21 much force as necessary to strip a detainee naked; and (6) deputies will force
22 mentally unstable detainees to strip naked and sexually degrade themselves. (Id. at
23 20–21.)
24 These allegations fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment punishments claim
25 against Defendants RCSD and Riverside County because such Defendants cannot be
26 liable for the actions of their employees under a respondeat superior theory.
27 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Rather, Defendants RCSD and Riverside County can
28 only be liable where Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations were caused by
1 such Defendants’ policy, custom, or practice. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444. The Court
2 details the requirements to plead a policy, custom, or practice claim against local
3 government entities such as Defendants RCSD and Riverside County in Section
4 IV.B, supra. However, other than the conclusory use of the words “custom,”
5 “policy” or “practice,” there are no factual allegations that support the existence of a
6 policy, custom, or practice. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01
7 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal where complaint “lacked any factual allegations
8 . . . demonstrating that [the] constitutional deprivation was the result of a custom or
9 practice . . . or that the custom or practice was the ‘moving force’ behind [the]
10 constitutional deprivation”). Rather, the TAC appears to allege discrete acts of
11 deputies, and attempts to attribute them to Defendants Riverside County and RCSD,
12 which is not permitted.
13 For these reasons, the TAC does not state a Fourteenth Amendment
14 punishments claim. If Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment punishments claim
15 in any amended complaint, he must correct these deficiencies or risk its dismissal.
16
17 G. Fourteenth Amendment Protection From Excessive Force
18 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee
19 from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor,
20 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To prevail on an excessive force claim, “a pretrial
21 detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him
22 was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473
23 (2015). “[I]t does not matter whether the defendant understood that the force used
24 was excessive, or intended it to be excessive, because the standard is purely
25 objective.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1069 (discussing Kingsley).
26 “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each
27 particular case.’” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
28 “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer
1 on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision
2 of hindsight.” Id. “A court must also account for the ‘legitimate interests that stem
3 from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is
4 detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’
5 of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
6 institutional security.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540).
7 The following non-exclusive factors may bear on the reasonableness or
8 unreasonableness of the force used: “the relationship between the need for the
9 use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any
10 effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of
11 the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
12 whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id.
13 The TAC alleges that Defendants Riverside County and RCSD have a policy
14 and practice of allowing deputies to use as much force as desired to strip a detainee
15 naked and extract a detainee from a cell, and specifically details an incident of
16 alleged excessive force on May 14, 2019. (TAC 15.) Defendants Riverside County
17 and RCSD cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of their employees, but instead
18 can only be liable if Plaintiff’s injury is caused by their policy or custom. See
19 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1073; see also supra Section IV.B (discussing the requirements
20 to plead a Section 1983 claim against local government entities). The conclusory
21 statement that Defendants Riverside County and RCSD have a policy and practice is
22 not sufficient to plead a policy and practice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining
23 that “labels and conclusions”; “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
24 enhancement”; and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
25 supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a claim).
26 Furthermore, the Court previously advised Plaintiff that a single incident is not
27 sufficient to impose liability to a municipal entity such as Defendants Riverside
28 County and RCSD. (See Order Dismiss. SAC 24.) Thus, the TAC does not state a
1 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Riverside County
2 and RCSD.
3 Nonetheless, Plaintiff potentially could state a Fourteenth Amendment
4 excessive force claim against the officers involved in the May 14, 2019 incident, in
5 their individual capacities. If Plaintiff would like to do so, he should name the
6 specific individuals involved in the May 14, 2019 incident, and allege the specific
7 actions taken by each such individual. If Plaintiff does not know the officers’
8 names, he may designate them as numbered Doe Defendants—i.e., Doe Defendant
9 1, Doe Defendant 2, etc.—until their identity is discovered.
10 For these reasons, the TAC fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment excessive
11 force claim. If Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim in an
12 amended complaint, he must correct these deficiencies or risk its dismissal.
13
14 H. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Bodily Integrity
15 “Most cases that involve unwanted sexual contact or harassment by public
16 officials have been analyzed under the substantive due process right to be free from
17 violations of bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Vazquez v. County
18 of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fontana, 262 F.3d at 881–82
19 n.6). Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process prong, allegations
20 must “shock the conscience.” Id. “The threshold question is ‘whether the behavior
21 of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said
22 to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v.
23 Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998)). Specifically, a sexual assault on an inmate by
24 a guard “is deeply offensive to human dignity” and “is simply not part of the penalty
25 that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Schwenk v. Hartford,
26 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted) (quoting Farmer v.
27 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
28 ///
1 Here, the TAC alleges that on July 25, 2017, Defendant Landry conducted a
2 random cell search of Plaintiff’s cell, during which Defendant Landry forced
3 Plaintiff to strip naked, forced Plaintiff to perform his orders—including to
4 masturbate and to stick his hands inside his anus—called Plaintiff “sexy” multiple
5 times, made sexual comments about Plaintiff’s body and Defendant Landry’s desire
6 to have sex with Plaintiff, and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. (TAC 21–22.) The TAC
7 does not detail Defendant Landry’s “sexual assault” of Plaintiff and it is unclear
8 whether Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Landry raped or otherwise physically
9 assaulted Plaintiff. (See id.) As explained in Section IV.F, supra, verbal harassment
10 or abuse is not sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim. If Plaintiff includes
11 Defendant Landry in any amended complaint, he must provide additional factual
12 allegations regarding Defendant Landry’s actions, including any actions taken
13 beyond verbal abuse.
14 With respect to Defendants Riverside County and RCSD, the TAC alleges
15 that such Defendants have the “practice” of deputies sexually harassing and
16 humiliating detainees, stripping detainees naked and degrading them, monitoring
17 detainees on camera naked and humiliating them, and sexually harassing detainees
18 in safety cells. (TAC 20.) However, Defendants Riverside County and RCSD
19 cannot be vicariously liable for their deputies’ actions, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–
20 91, and these allegations are not sufficient to plead the existence of a custom or
21 policy. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also supra Section IV.B (detailing the
22 requirements to allege a policy, custom, or practice). Moreover, even if the
23 allegations of sexual harassment and humiliation were sufficient to plead the
24 existence of a custom or policy—which they do not—they do rise to the level of
25 shocking the conscience.
26 For these reasons, the TAC does not state a Fourteenth Amendment bodily
27 integrity claim. If Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment bodily integrity claim
28 in any amended complaint, he must correct these deficiencies or risk its dismissal.
1 I. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Bodily Privacy
2 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects a sphere of privacy, and the most
3 ‘basic subject of privacy . . . the naked body.’” Vazquez, 949 F.3d at 1165
4 (alteration in original) (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 1000 (9th Cir.
5 2007)). “[P]risoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy,” and pretrial detainees
6 have “at least the same right to bodily privacy as a prisoner.” Byrd v. Maricopa
7 Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
8 “[C]asual, restricted, and obscured viewing of a prison inmate’s naked body is
9 constitutionally permitted if it is justified by legitimate government interests such as
10 prison security needs.” Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 957 (9th Cir. 2019)
11 (discussing Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492, 494–95 (9th Cir. 1985)); see
12 also Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that right
13 to bodily privacy was not violated because female officers did not “regularly or
14 frequently observe unclothed inmates without a legitimate reason for doing so”;
15 specifically, (1) female guards observing male prisoner body cavity searches from a
16 control booth that provided limited view of the searches was reasonable because the
17 female guards were “not routinely present for strip searches” and observation from
18 video monitors “would provide at most an indistinct, limited view” and (2) female
19 guards conducting male prisoner shower duty was reasonable where evidence did
20 not establish an inappropriate amount of contact with disrobed prisoners).
21 Conversely, the right to bodily privacy may be violated if, for example, the viewing
22 of an inmate’s naked body while showering and/or using the toilet is “frequent[]”
23 and “up close” or “neither obscured nor distant.” Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of
24 Supervisors, 845 F.3d at 922–24.
25 Here, the TAC alleges that Defendants Riverside County and RCSD have the
26 following practices: (1) deputies choose the detainees they want to strip naked and
27 sexually degrade; (2) deputies monitor detainees on camera naked and sexually
28 humiliate them; (3) female deputies sexually harass and humiliate male detainees in
1 safety cells; (4) deputies will use as much force as necessary to strip a detainee
2 naked; and (5) deputies will force mentally unstable detainees to strip naked and
3 sexually degrade themselves. (TAC 20–21.) The TAC also alleges that on
4 approximately January 18, 2019 at CBDC Jail; January 25, 2019 at SCF Jail; and
5 February 19, 2020 at RPDC Jail, Defendants RCSD and Riverside County exercised
6 policies and practices where Plaintiff was forced naked into a safety cell for
7 approximately three days on each occasion. (Id. at 22.) Each time, female and male
8 deputies sexually humiliated and degraded Plaintiff due to his nakedness, and
9 deputies made sexual comments to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was using the restroom
10 and eating his food naked. (Id.)
11 These allegations fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment bodily privacy claim
12 against Defendants Riverside County and RCSD for the following reasons. First,
13 Defendants Riverside County and RCSD cannot be vicariously liable for their
14 employees’ acts. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. If Plaintiff wishes to assert a
15 Fourteenth Amendment bodily privacy claim against any of the deputies—for
16 example, the deputies who viewed his naked body while he was using the restroom,
17 or the deputies who monitored Plaintiff’s naked body—he should name the specific
18 deputies and allege the specific acts by each individual deputy. If Plaintiff does not
19 know the officers’ names, he may designate them as numbered Doe Defendants—
20 i.e., Doe Defendant 1, Doe Defendant 2, etc.—until their identity is discovered.
21 Second, the TAC does not sufficiently allege that these actions were the result of
22 policies or practices, and therefore can be attributed to Defendants Riverside County
23 and RCSD. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“Official municipal policy includes the
24 decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and
25 practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”); see
26 also supra Section IV.B (detailing the requirements to state a claim against local
27 government entities such as Defendants Riverside County and RCSD). Third, even
28 if the TAC properly asserted a policy, custom, or practice, the TAC does not contain
1 sufficient detail to demonstrate that the viewing of detainees’ and Plaintiff’s naked
2 body was “frequent,” “up close” and “neither obscured nor distant,” and therefore
3 potentially violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of
4 Supervisors, 845 F.3d at 922–24. If the viewing of Plaintiff’s naked body was
5 “casual,” “restricted,” or “obscured,” it would not violate the Fourteenth
6 Amendment if it is justified by legitimate government interests such as prison
7 security needs. See Ioane, 939 F.3d at 957.
8 For these reasons, the TAC fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment bodily
9 privacy claim. If Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment bodily privacy claim in
10 any amended complaint, he must correct these deficiencies or risk its dismissal.
11
12 J. Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable Searches
13 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure . . .
14 against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Whether a
15 search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a case-by-case
16 ‘balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
17 rights that the search entails . . . .’” Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629
18 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559). “The required
19 factors for courts to consider include: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the
20 manner in which it is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating it, and (4) the
21 place in which it is conducted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 The Supreme Court has stated that “[m]aintaining safety and order” at
23 detention centers “requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have
24 substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”
25 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012). Thus,
26 “correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to
27 detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities,” and such a policy
28 “must be upheld ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id.
1 at 326, 328 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Specifically with respect to strip
2 searches of pretrial detainees, the Supreme Court has held that “in the absence of
3 substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
4 response to [legitimate security interests] courts should ordinarily defer to their
5 expert judgment in such matters.” Id. at 328 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
6 576, 584–85 (1982)). However, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that deference to
7 jail officials is unwarranted where search methods are unreasonable. See Shorter v.
8 Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1189 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that search procedures—
9 which required mentally ill inmates to be shackled and unclothed, without food,
10 water, or access to a toilet for hours at a time—were not entitled to deference). The
11 Ninth Circuit also has held that strip search procedures that are “excessive,
12 vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest” may violate
13 the Fourth Amendment. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332; see also Maricopa Cnty.
14 Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d at 1142 (holding that a cross-gender strip search was
15 unreasonable as a matter of law where there was no emergency and female officer
16 touched pretrial detainee’s inner and outer thighs, buttocks, and genitals).
17 Here, the TAC alleges that Defendants RCSD and Riverside County have the
18 practice of allowing deputies to do strip searches on pretrial detainees, that deputies
19 will use as much force as necessary to strip search detainees, and that deputies will
20 “sexually degrade” detainees during the strip searches. (TAC 20–21.) These
21 allegations fail to state a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants RCSD and
22 Riverside County because there are no allegations by which the deputies’ actions can
23 be attributed to Defendants RCSD and Riverside County’s policies and practices.
24 See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a
25 government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so
26 persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”). Further, even if
27 the TAC had sufficiently pled a policy or practice, the allegations of the strip
28 procedures are scant and do not lead to the reasonable inference that they were either
1 an exaggerated response to legitimate security needs, Florence, 566 U.S. at 328, or
2 “excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological
3 interest,” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332, and therefore violate the Fourth
4 Amendment.
5 For these reasons, the TAC fails to state a Fourth Amendment unreasonable
6 search claim. If Plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim in
7 any amended complaint, he must correct these deficiencies or risk its dismissal.
8
9 V. CONCLUSION
10 For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES the TAC WITH
11 LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may have another opportunity to amend and cure
12 the deficiencies given his pro se status. Plaintiff is ORDERED to, within thirty
13 days after the date of this Order, either: (1) file a 4AC, or (2) advise the Court that
14 Plaintiff does not intend to pursue this lawsuit further and will not file a 4AC.
15 The 4AC must cure the pleading defects discussed above and shall be
16 complete in itself without reference to the TAC. See L.R. 15-2 (“Every amended
17 pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete
18 including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseding
19 pleading.”). This means that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims in the
20 4AC again. Plaintiff shall not include new Defendants or new allegations that are
21 not reasonably related to the claims asserted in the TAC. If Plaintiff would like the
22 Court to order the 4AC to be served, Plaintiff may choose to limit the 4AC to
23 the allegations and claims the Court has concluded are adequately stated
24 (Plaintiff’s religion claims in Claims 1–3).
25 In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should confine his allegations to those
26 operative facts supporting each of his claims. Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to
27 Rule 8, all that is required is a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
28 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff strongly is encouraged to utilize the
1 standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a
2 copy of which is attached. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the
3 nature of each separate legal claim and make clear what specific factual allegations
4 support each of his separate claims. Plaintiff should clearly specify which claims
5 are being asserted against which specific Defendant. Plaintiff strongly is
6 encouraged to keep his statements concise and to omit irrelevant details. It is not
7 necessary for Plaintiff to cite case law, include legal argument, or attach exhibits at
8 this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff also is advised to omit any claims for which he
9 lacks a sufficient factual basis.
10 The Court explicitly cautions Plaintiff that failure to timely file a 4AC, or
11 timely advise the Court that Plaintiff does not intend to file a 4AC, will result in
12 a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or
13 failure to comply with court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
14 41(b).
15 Plaintiff is not required to file an amended complaint. Instead, Plaintiff may
16 request voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17 41(a). A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Plaintiff’s convenience.
18 Plaintiff is advised that this Court’s determination herein that the allegations
19 in the TAC are insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as
20 dispositive of the claim. Accordingly, although the undersigned Magistrate Judge
21 believes Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient factual matter in the pleading,
22 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, Plaintiff is not
23 required to omit any claim or Defendant in order to pursue this action. However, if
24 Plaintiff decides to pursue a claim in an amended complaint that the undersigned
25 previously found to be insufficient, then pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the
26 undersigned ultimately may submit to the assigned District Judge a recommendation
27 that such claim may be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, subject
28 ///
1 || to Plaintiffs right at that time to file objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); C.D. Cal
2 || L.R. 72-3.
3
4 || DATED: October 22, 2020 yet os —
5 ARIA A. AUDERO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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7 || Attachments
8 || Form Civil Rights Complaint (CV-66)
9 || Form Notice of Dismissal
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10039359. Public record. Not legal advice.