# Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

> District Court, C.D. California · August 20, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10038829

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** August 20, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

Present: The Honorable Pedro V. Castillo, United States Magistrate Judge

Marlene Ramirez None
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder
Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Respondent:
None None
PROCEEDINGS: [IN CHAMBERS] ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT
THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE
YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE, OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE PETITIONER’S CLAIMS ARE
UNEXHAUSTED
Pending before the Court is a habeas petition filed by pro se petitioner Todd
Vincent Davie, a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 (“Petition,” Dkt. No. 1 at 2). Petitioner
states that he has been charged with assault likely to produce great bodily injury under
California Penal Code § 245(a)(4), and has been awaiting trial since November 26, 2019.
1 The Petition is presented on a habeas form ostensibly under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
However, § 2254 applies only to persons in custody as a result of a state court judgment.
Id. § 2254(a). Because Petitioner has not yet been convicted, § 2254 does not apply.
Therefore, the Court will construe the Petition as arising under § 2241. See Dominguez v.
Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2018) (pretrial detainees “may avail themselves of
habeas relief under § 2241(a) and (c)(3) without regard to the additional requirements
imposed on petitions under § 2254”).
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

(Id.). Although the Petition is not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioner’s trial may have
been delayed because he has been declared incompetent. (Id. at 3).
The Petition purports to raise five grounds for federal habeas relief: (1) the
criminal charges against Petitioner should be dismissed because Petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated; (2) the state’s denial of Petitioner’s speedy trial rights is
arbitrary and capricious; (3) the incompetency finding was not based on convincing
evidence and Petitioner’s seven Marsden motions were improperly denied;2 (4) state
regulations negligently fail to protect Petitioner because he prepares “the foods” in close
contact and is “susceptible of contracting the flu & [corona]virus”; and (5) Petitioner’s
bail is excessive. (Id. at 5-6). However, it appears that Petitioner’s claims are subject to
dismissal pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, or, in the alternative, because they
are unexhausted.3
The Younger Abstention Doctrine
As a general proposition, federal courts must abstain from enjoining a state
2 In California, a criminal defendant’s motion to have his counsel relieved and substitute
counsel appointed “in shorthand is called a Marsden motion,” pursuant to People v.
Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Schell v. Witek, 2018 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 Although Petitioner filed the instant Petition pro se, he states that he is represented by
the County Public Defender in his pending superior court criminal action. (Petition at 8).
As a general matter, a “defendant does not have a constitutional right to ‘hybrid’
representation.” United States v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 684 (2000) (no constitutional right for
represented prisoner to file additional brief pro se). However, because it appears that
dismissal of this action may be warranted under the Younger abstention doctrine, or,
alternatively, because Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, it is unnecessary for the Court
to address the propriety of Petitioner’s self-representation in this habeas action while he
continues to be represented by counsel in his underlying criminal proceedings.
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

prosecution except in exceptional circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is
both great and immediate. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); Sprint
Commc’n., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). This concept is referred to as the
doctrine of abstention or the Younger doctrine. Although “application of Younger does
not lead to the determination that the federal courts have no basis for jurisdiction in the
first instance” while state proceedings are pending, “the federal courts have bound
themselves pursuant to principles of comity to voluntarily decline to exercise jurisdiction
that they have and would otherwise exercise.” Canatella v. State of California, 404 F.3d
1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted).
Younger abstention in favor of a state proceeding is appropriate if three criteria are
met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the
plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331-32
(9th Cir. 1992). However, federal courts will not abstain if the movant can establish that
the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, or
that some other “extraordinary circumstances” exist, such as where proceedings are being
conducted pursuant to a “flagrantly” unconstitutional statute. Younger, 401 U.S. at 49,
53-54. When a federal court determines that the Younger doctrine applies, it must
dismiss the pending action without prejudice. See Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777,
782 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district court cannot
refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits
after the state proceedings have ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires
dismissal of the federal action.”) (emphasis omitted).
It is undisputed that Petitioner’s criminal proceedings in state court are still
pending. It is further beyond serious debate that state criminal proceedings involve
important state interests. See, e.g., Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294,
333 (1984) (J. Stevens, concurring) (“One of the weightiest of state interests is that
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

favoring speedy, efficient, and uninterrupted disposition of criminal cases.”).
Accordingly, application of the Younger abstention doctrine in this case turns on whether
the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate Petitioner’s federal
constitutional claims, or, if they do, whether “extraordinary circumstances” warrant an
exception to the doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit has expressly found that pretrial detention in alleged violation of
the Speedy Trial Clause is not, by itself, an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting an
exception to Younger. Accordingly, as the Ninth Circuit explains, the Younger abstention
doctrine will typically require dismissal of a federal habeas action when a pretrial
detainee seeks dismissal of state charges against him under the Speedy Trial Clause:
[T]he rule of this circuit is that abstention principles generally require a
federal district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a habeas
petition in which the petitioner raises a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause
as an affirmative defense to state prosecution. The only exceptions are
“cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in
bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or “in other
extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.”
Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Carden v. Montana, 626
F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,
410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special
circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal
charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.”) (citation omitted). In sum, in
the vast majority of cases, a pretrial detainee “must wait to bring a Speedy Trial claim in
federal court until after trial and conviction.” Brown, 676 F.3d at 901 (Younger
abstention applies where the pretrial detainee can “prove no injury independent of the
Speedy Trial violation itself”).
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

Similarly, courts in this Circuit have routinely found that excessive bail claims
may be subject to Younger abstention. For example, in Robinson v. Sniff, 2009 WL
1037716 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2009), the court dismissed Petitioner’s habeas petition
raising an excessive bail claim upon finding that “all the prerequisites to the application
of abstention under Younger have been met.” Id. at *1. The court explained:
First, petitioner is currently the subject of a criminal proceeding in state
court, which is ongoing and has not reached final adjudication. Second, the
State undeniably has an important interest in protecting the public by the
filing and prosecuting of criminal proceedings. Third, the state court
criminal proceedings afford an opportunity for petitioner, who is the
defendant, to raise constitutional claims regarding the lack of probable
cause, excessive bail and lack of discovery, such as petitioner raises herein.
Finally, the remedy the petitioner seeks, the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, would clearly interfere with the ongoing state criminal proceeding,
and petitioner has not identified any “extraordinary circumstances”
warranting an exception to the Younger doctrine.
Id. (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). The Robinson court further concluded
that because petitioner was “seeking federal court review of a state criminal proceeding
. . . before he has exhausted his state court remedies regarding his conviction and
sentence,” his “habeas petition [was] premature” and “comity and the interest of judicial
economy” would be served by affording the state courts the first opportunity to examine
the lawfulness of petitioner’s detention. Id. at *2; see also Lazarus v. Baca, 2010 WL
1006572, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), aff’d, 389 F. App’x 700 (9th Cir. 2010)
(dismissing excessive bail claim on habeas review under Younger).
However, in Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Younger abstention was not appropriate where: the state conceded that
petitioner had been held for six months without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing;
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

success on the claim would not interfere with petitioner’s state court proceedings; and
petitioner had “properly exhausted his state remedies as to his bail hearing” in the
superior court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court before
bringing his habeas claim to federal court. (Id. at 767).
Finally, Petitioner will clearly be able to raise the federal nature of his remaining
claims in state court, including any challenge to his incompetency finding and the denial
of his Marsden motions. Petitioner does not clearly develop his “failure to protect claim”
in Ground Four and it is unclear what specific relief he is seeking. However, to the
extent that he is seeking release on zero or reduced bail prior to trial due to health
concerns arising from the coronavirus pandemic, this claim overlaps with his excessive
bail claim. Furthermore, state courts can and do offer an adequate forum to litigate such
claims. See, e.g., In re Kalvin Ung, 2020 WL 4582595, at *3-*5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10,
2020) (unpublished) (granting in part pretrial detainee’s habeas petition seeking release
on bail and ordering trial court to hold a hearing to “consider entering a new and different
order setting bail consistent with the [county’s] June 23, 2020 amended bail order,”
which was adopted to address inmate overcrowding during the COVID-19 pandemic).
Accordingly, it appears that Petitioner’s claims may be subject to the Younger
abstention doctrine because his state criminal action is still pending and the other criteria
for abstention appear satisfied. In response to this Order, Petitioner must explain why the
elements for Younger abstention are not present here, or identify any “extraordinary
circumstances” that would warrant an exception to Younger.
Exhaustion in State Court
Even if some or all of Petitioner’s claims are not subject to dismissal under
Younger, it appears that they may be dismissed on the alternate ground that they are
unexhausted. Petitioner admits that his claims have not been exhausted in the state
courts. (Petition at 5-6). Although habeas petitions challenging pretrial detention under
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

28 U.S.C. § 2241 are not subject to a statutory exhaustion requirement, principles of
federalism and comity require federal courts to abstain from hearing pretrial habeas
challenges unless the petitioner has first exhausted available state judicial remedies. As
the Ninth Circuit has explained,
As an exercise of judicial restraint, however, federal courts elect not to
entertain habeas corpus challenges [under § 2241] to state court
proceedings until habeas petitioners have exhausted state avenues for
raising federal claim.
Where a petitioner seeks pre-conviction habeas relief, this exhaustion
prerequisite serves two purposes: (1) to avoid isolating state courts from
federal constitutional issues by assuring those courts an ample opportunity
to consider constitutional claims; and (2) to prevent federal interference
with state adjudication, especially state criminal trials.
Carden, 626 F.2d at 83. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “fairly
present” his claims to the state courts in accordance with the state’s procedures. See
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (habeas petitioner must give the state
courts “one full opportunity” to decide a federal claim by carrying out “one complete
round” of the state’s appellate process). The petitioner must present his claims, including
their federal basis, to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider them or
demonstrate that no state remedy remains available. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d
1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Accordingly, it appears that Petitioner’s claims are subject to dismissal for the
independent reason that they are unexhausted. In response to this Order, Petitioner must
explain why his claims are exhausted, despite his representation in the Petition that they
are not, or show why they should be exempt from the exhaustion requirement.
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-6580 MWF (PVC) Date: August 20, 2020
Title Todd Vincent Davie v. Sheriff Alex Villanueva

Conclusion and Order
Because Petitioner’s criminal proceedings are still pending in state court and
implicate important state interests, and because those proceedings would appear to
provide an adequate opportunity for Petitioner to litigate his federal constitutional claims,
it appears that the instant claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to the Younger
abstention doctrine. Furthermore, it appears that all of Petitioner’s claims are
unexhausted because he did not present them to the state courts. Petitioner is therefore
ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order,
why this action should not be dismissed under Younger or, in the alternative, because
Petitioner’s claims are uniformly unexhausted. After the Court receives a response to the
OSC, the Court will prepare a Report and Recommendation for submission to the District
Judge. This Order is not dispositive of any of Petitioner’s claims.
Instead of filing a response to the instant Order to Show Cause, Petitioner
may request a voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a). A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Petitioner’s
convenience. However, Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may be later
subject to the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by
AEDPA, which provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.”
Petitioner is expressly warned that the failure to timely file a response to this
Order will provide a ground for a recommendation that this action be dismissed
with prejudice for his failure to comply with Court orders and failure to prosecute.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order
on Petitioner at his current address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10038829. Public record. Not legal advice.