# Daniel Turner v. City of Los Angeles

> District Court, C.D. California · July 24, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10038576

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 24, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10038576

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding tasing constituted excessive force when suspect was face down, with two officers on top of him, with his hands underneath him and having already been shocked twice with the 20 || Taser

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 DANIEL TURNER, ) Case No. CV 18-03405 DDP (KSx)
)
12 Plaintiff, )
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
13 v. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
14 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., )
) [Dkt. 51]
15 Defendants. )
)
16
17 Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment
18 filed by Defendants City of Los Angeles and Stephanie Johnigan,
19 Veronica Padilla, Antonio Ramirez, Lidia Leon, Gloria Velez, and
20 Juan Gonzalez. Having considered the submissions of the parties
21 and heard oral argument that court grants the motion with respect
22 to the failure to train claim alleged against the City of Los
23 Angeles, denies the motion in all other respects, and adopts the
24 following Order.
25 I. Background
26 In the afternoon of March 22, 2017, Los Angeles Police
27 Department Officers Kong and Johnigan were dispatched to an office
28 building in downtown Los Angeles. (Dkt# 51-4, Declaration of Lynn
Partial Summary Judgment, (“Carpenter Decl.”) Ex. D at 44:23-45:6.)
21) Building security officers reported that a “homeless-looking” white
man in a black hoodie and khaki pants attempted to rob and
4] threatened to rape a female passerby earlier in the morning. (Id.
at 44:25-45:3; Carpenter Decl., Ex. L at 44:9-14.) One of the
security guards showed the officers a photo of the suspect.
7] (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 29:14-16; Ex. Lat 44:5-8.) Officers Kong
and Johnigan then proceeded to 3rd and Hill Streets. (Carpenter
9]}Decl., Ex. E at 29:12-19.) As Officers Kong and Johnigan approached
3rd Street, they saw Plaintiff Daniel Turner, who matched the
description of the earlier report and the photo. (Carpenter Decl.,
12) Ex. E at 30:24-31:7; 31:18-21.) When Turner saw the officers, he
began to back away. (Id. at 34:24-35:6.) Officer Kong testified
14} that he told Turner to “come here,” to which Turner responded,
15] “no,” and then attempted to walk away. (Id. at 35:7-15.)
16 Officer Kong grabbed Turner’s hands and attempted to handcuff
him. (Id. at 35:14-20.) Turner attempted to bring his hands toward
the front of his body to prevent Officer Kong from handcuffing him.
19] (Id. at 36:4-14.) When Turner attempted to pull away, Officer Kong
20 pushed Turner onto a vehicle and used the vehicle to “stabilize”
Turner. (Id. at 36:14-17.) The two then ended up on the ground.
22 (Id. at 37:11-15.) Turner alleges that Officer Kong “tackled” him
to the ground. (Id. at 37:16-17.) Officer Kong testified that
2411 because he believed one of Turner’s hands came loose, he used a
25] “twisting motion” to bring Turner to the ground. (Id. at 37:16-17.)
Both Turner and Officer Kong were on their sides in the street.
27} (Id. at 38:6-8.) Officer Kong then put his body weight on top of
28] Turner to prevent him from moving. (Id. at 38:8-10.)

1 Officer Johnigan started to request an additional unit, as she
saw Officer Kong was “winded.” (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 57:1-4.)
3} Officer Kong overheard Officer Johnigan requesting the additional
unit and yelled out “backup,” known to officers as a higher
5] priority call. (Id. at 57:4-11; Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 40:1-3.)
6] Officer Kong testified that he believed he was losing the struggle
with Turner. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 39:18-24.) As the two
8 || continued struggling, they gradually moved toward the curb. (Id. at
39:1-5.) Turner was on top of a metal grate surrounding tree roots,
with Officer Kong on top of him. (Id.) Before backup arrived,
11] Officer Kong gave Turner verbal commands such as, “Put your hands
behind your back... stop resisting.” (Id. at 40:10-12.) Turner
replied, “No.” (Id.)
14 Officer Johnigan then told Officer Kong that she would deploy
her taser, and Officer Kong agreed. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at
59:5-11.) Officer Kong warned Turner that if he refused to comply,
he would be tased and that it would hurt. (Id. at 59:12-13.)
18} Officer Johnigan, within seven feet of Turner, then deployed her
taser in Probe/Dart mode. (Id. at 59:14-19.) The taser darts
20] attached to Turner’s body on the back of his right leg and upper
21]} thigh buttocks area. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 59:22-60:1.) The
22\| first taser deployment lasted five seconds. (Carpenter Decl. Ex.
23||N.) Officer Johnigan stated that she did not see the taser darts
24])/make contact with Turner’s skin, but that Turner yelled out “as if
he was in pain.” (Id. at 60: 6-7; 109:14-16.)
26 During the struggle, Turner managed to grab and hold onto the
metal tree grate with his left hand. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at
28 |} 65:20-25.) Officer Leon, one of the responding backup officers,

1 activated her body-worn video camera and went to the location.
2 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. F at 60:7-9.) When Officer Leon arrived, she
3 saw Turner and Officer Kong on the metal grate. (Id. at 50:5-10.)
4 Officer Leon approached and attempted to free Turner’s left hand
5 from the metal grate. (Id. at 50:25-51:9.) Officer Kong maintained
6 a “firm grip” on Turner’s right hand, but not Turner’s left hand,
7 which Officer Kong was still attempting to control to handcuff.
8 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 41:23-42:3.) Bodycam video shows, and
9 Officer Leon testified, that Officer Johnigan’s taser wires were
10 still attached to the taser device when Leon arrived at the scene.
11 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. F at 48:1-21; Carpenter Decl., Ex. O – VIDEO
12 at 1:29-1:48.) At this point, at least six officers were present,
13 and at least four, including Leon and Johnigan, were attempting to
14 restrain Turner.
15 Officer Johnigan then told Officers Leon and Kong, “Watch out,
16 I’m gonna drive-stun him.” (Carpenter Decl. Ex. O – VIDEO at 1:39-
17 1:40.) Officer Leon told Johnigan to “stun him.” (Id. at 2:10.)
18 Officer Johnigan then used her taser in drive-stun mode on various
19 areas of Turner’s body. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 61:10-14.)
20 Someone yelled out indistinctly and grunted several times, but the
21 bodycam video does not clearly indicate who made those noises.
22 Turner, with his hood over his ears, repeatedly said “I don’t trust
23 you,” then turned his head around to the officers and said, “Will
24 nobody say something?” (Carpenter Decl., Ex. O – VIDEO at 1:54-
25 1:58.) Turner also pled with the officers, “Promise you won’t take
26 me to jail,” amidst indistinct sounds of scuffling and multiple
27 officers’ voices. (Id. at 2:04-2:36.) Turner’s hand was eventually
28 freed from the metal grate and Turner was handcuffed. (Id. at 2:06-
1 2:42.) His legs were also hobbled. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. H at
2 39:5-10.) Including the first taser deployment in Probe mode,
3 Officer Johnigan activated her taser eleven times over a period of
4 two minutes and eight seconds. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. N.) The
5 aggregate time the taser was activated amounted to fifty-three
6 seconds. (Id.)
7 Once Turner was handcuffed and seated upright on the curb, he
8 cooperated with officers and answered questions. Officer Leon
9 began to wipe her hands because, as she stated, she had blood all
10 over her hands. (Carpenter Decl., Ex O – VIDEO at 4:32.) Turner
11 was later transported to a nearby hospital, where he was treated
12 for scrapes to his hands and face and the taser darts were removed
13 from his body. (Dkt #53-2, Declaration of Andrew T. Magaline in
14 Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
15 Judgment, (“Magaline Decl.”), Exs. 7, 12.).
16 Subsequently, Turner was charged with and pleaded no contest
17 to a felony for making criminal threats, in violation of Penal Code
18 §422(a) and a misdemeanor for resisting arrest by Officer Kong, in
19 violation of California Penal Code section 148(a). (Dkt #53-2,
20 Declaration of Andrew T. Magaline in Support of Plaintiff’s
21 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (“Magaline
22 Decl.”), Ex. 13.; Carpenter Decl., Ex. M at 119-20.)
23 Pursuant to Los Angeles Police Department policy, the
24 department conducted an investigation into officers Kong and
25 Johnigan’s use of force during the incident. (Magaline Decl. Ex.
26 8.) The report approved of Officer Kong’s use of force, but found
27 that Officer Johnigan’s use of the taser was “OUT OF
28 POLICY/TRAINING.” (Id.) The report determined that Johnigan’s use
1 of the taser in probe mode, “to gain the compliance of the suspect
2 for the purpose of ta[]king him into custody . . . appeared not to
3 be an objectively reasonable option.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at
4 37.) The report found each of Johnigan’s eleven taser deployments
5 “OUT OF POLICY,” warranting “Administrative Disapproval” of each
6 use. (Id. at 38.) Officer Johnigan received “additional training”
7 following the investigation. (Id.) Johnigan later testified that
8 the purpose of the training was to “ensure an understanding of the
9 functions of the taser itself,” and the training she received
10 included guidance that her “use of the Taser for this matter was
11 not that it was improper.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 2 at 24:4-13.)
12 Turner brings four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) an
13 excessive force claim against Officer Johnigan and the other
14 individual defendants; (2) a municipal liability claim against the
15 City of Los Angeles on a ratification theory(3) a municipal
16 liability claim against the City of Los Angeles for failure to
17 train; and (4) a custom, policy, or practice claim against the City
18 of Los Angeles. Turner also alleges a state law battery claim
19 against the six individual officers. Defendants now move for
20 summary judgment on all of Turner’s claims.
21 II. Legal Standard
22 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
23 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
24 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
25 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
26 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party
27 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
28 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
1]}of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from
4] the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See
5] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). If the
moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is
7! entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
10 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a
14] party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
17] 477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
19] party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
20]}/of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
23 ])/nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
24]| Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
25 It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
26|| genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,
271278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel have an obligation to lay out their
28 |) support clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d

1} 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The court “need not examine the entire
file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the
evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate
4] references so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.
III. Discussion
6 A. Excessive Force Claim
7 1. Injury to Plaintiff
8 Defendants argue first, and very briefly, that they are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force
claim because Plaintiff “sustained no injury, damage, loss or harm
11] from Officer Johnigan’s use of Taser on Plaintiff.” (Motion at
10:1-2.). This argument fails.
13 In Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, the question is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, police officers’
actions are objectively reasonable. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d
16] 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). This analysis requires a balancing of
the governmental interests at stake against the intrusion upon an
individual’s rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97
(1989). Of course, “[n]ot every push or shove” violates the Fourth
Amendment, and plaintiffs cannot recover for “provably accidental
or de minimis” bodily intrusions. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Fontana
22\|v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). A use of force may
be constitutionally unreasonable, however, “even without physical
blows or injuries,” and a plaintiff may be able to recover nominal
damages “even if the plaintiff suffered no actual damage.” Bryan,
630 F.3d at 824; Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1993).
Although some circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, require a
plaintiff to show “significant injury,” there is no such

requirement in this circuit. Wilks, 4 F.3d at 416; Wilenchik v.
Ryan, No. CIV10-541TUCDCBGEE, 2010 WL 5644812, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec.
6, 2010).
4 Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d
5] 912 (9th Cir. 2001) is not to the contrary. There, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment where the plaintiff
71 “failed to meet her burden of proof of providing specific facts to
show that the force being used was unreasonable or that she
sustained actual injuries.” Arpin, 261 F.3d at 922. The record
here suffers from no such evidentiary deficiencies. It is
undisputed that Johnigan tased Plaintiff eleven times, and heard
12] him scream out in pain. Audio from Officer Leon’s body camera also
includes screams of pain or distress. As the Ninth Circuit has
recognized, tasers inflict “high levels of pain,” possible
15] paralysis and loss of muscular control, and wounds from barbed
taser darts that require hospitalization. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 824-
25. Indeed, it is undisputed that here, Plaintiff was hospitalized
18}| for, in part, removal of taser barbs from his flesh. On such a
record, Defendants’ contention that there is no evidence to support
20]/a finding that Johnigan’s use of force was unreasonable has no
merit.
22 2. Qualified Immunity
23 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
24] officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks
28 |) omitted). Whether a government official is entitled to qualified

immunity depends on “(1) whether there has been a violation of a
constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.”
4] Lal _v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014). ™“{[W]jJhen
there are disputed factual issues that are necessary to a qualified
immunity decision, these issues must first be determined by the
7 jury before the court can rule on qualified immunity.” Morales v.
Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing commentary to Ninth
9} Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 9.34 (2017)); see also
Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th
Cir. 2010).
12 a. Constitutional Violation
13 Defendants argue that Officer Johnigan is entitled to
14] qualified immunity claim on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
because Johnigan’s decision to tase Plaintiff eleven times was
objectively reasonable. (Mot. at 11.) Whether a use of force was
reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case,
including, but not limited to, whether the suspect posed an
immediate threat to anyone, whether the suspect resisted or
attempted to evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.
211 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Of these factors, whether the suspect
posed an immediate threat to anyone is the most important. Mattos
□□ Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011). The Graham factors
are not exclusive, however, and courts analyzing objective
reasonableness must consider the totality of the circumstances.
26] Id.
27 Here, Defendants devote approximately one page of their
28 initial briefing to the Graham factors. There is no dispute that
10

1 Plaintiff was resisting arrest and was suspected of serious crimes,
2 including a felony.1 These factors weigh in favor of objective
3 reasonableness.
4 The most important factor, however, whether Plaintiff posed a
5 danger to anyone, is in dispute. Defendants argue that Plaintiff
6 “posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and to
7 others by his . . . continuing active resistance . . . .” (Mot. at
8 13:25-14:2.) A reasonable trier of fact could, however, conclude
9 otherwise.2 Contrary to Johnigan’s later deposition testimony that
10 Plaintiff was “fighting so violently,” the police department’s own
11 investigation, based in large part upon Johnigan’s own report of
12 the incident, concluded that Plaintiff was not “violently resisting
13 or unsafe to approach.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at 37.) It is
14 undisputed that Johnigan tased Plaintiff eleven times. Only four
15 of those instances are clearly discernible from body camera
16 footage, which also reveals that, when Leon arrived on the scene,
17 Johnigan’s taser was still connected to wires leading from the
18 taser probe darts.3 The video footage also reveals that when Leon
19
1 The Ninth Circuit has observed, however, that even where a
20 person has committed a serious crime in the recent past, such
completed action does not, in and of itself, justify the use of
21 force where the suspect is no longer engaged in unlawful or
dangerous activities. See, e.g. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d
22 689, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d
1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997).
23
2 The court notes that some of the evidence cited by
24 Defendants simply does not support their assertions. The fact that
Johnigan and Kong testified, for example, that they parked their
25 car and walked up to Plaintiff slowly appears to have little
bearing on whether Plaintiff presented a threat to anyone. (Mot.
26 at 13:25.)
27 3 Defendants acknowledge that, as the Ninth Circuit has held,
use of a taser in probe or dart mode is “an intermediate,
28 (continued...)
1 arrived on the scene, three other officers were already partially
2 restraining Plaintiff, who was lying face down on the ground. By
3 the time Johnigan announced that she was going to “drive-stun”
4 Plaintiff, and tased him for the first time on video, at least six
5 officers, including Leon, were at the scene. The video also
6 clearly shows that by the time Johnigan tased Plaintiff for the
7 eleventh and final time, he was no longer grabbing the metal tree
8 grate. At no point are any bystanders visible anywhere in the
9 vicinity. On this record, a trier of fact could conclude, contrary
10 to Defendants’ assertion, that Plaintiff was not a threat to
11 officers or to anyone else.
12 b. Clearly Established Law
13 Even if Officer Johnigan’s use of a taser was objectively
14 unreasonable, she is entitled to qualified immunity if it was not
15 clearly established at the time of the incident that tasing a
16 suspect who posed no danger to anyone would qualify as a Fourth
17 Amendment violation.4 Lal v. California, 746 at 1116. Supreme
18
3(...continued)
19 significant level of force.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826. Although
Defendants contend that it is undisputed that the latter ten of
20 Johnigan’s uses of the taser were in drive-stun mode, the support
for that assertion is unclear. As discussed above, the probe wires
21 were still attached to the taser when Leon arrived on the scene,
and only four instances of tasing are clearly observable after
22 Johnigan states, “I’m going to drive-stun him.” The record does
not indicate whether it is possible to operate a taser in drive-
23 stun mode when the probe wires are still connected to the device.
But see Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443. (“When a taser is used in drive[-
24 ]stun mode, the operator removes the dart cartridge and pushes two
electrode contacts located on the front of the taser directly
25 against the victim. In this mode, the taser delivers an electric
shock to the victim, but it does not cause an override of the
26 victim's central nervous system as it does in dart-mode.”)
27 4 As discussed above, “when there are disputed factual issues
that are necessary to a qualified immunity decision, these issues
28 (continued...)
1 Court “caselaw does not requires a [prior] case directly on point
2 for a right to be clearly established, [but] existing precedent
3 must have placed the . . . question beyond debate.” Kisela v.
4 Hughes. 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). The “contours” of the right
5 must be “sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the
6 defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.”
7 Id. at 53. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “[G]eneral
8 statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair
9 and clear warning to officers,” but “do not by themselves create
10 clearly established law outside an “‘obvious case.’” Id. (internal
11 quotation marks and citation omitted).
12 As an initial matter, before looking to analogous cases, the
13 court notes that the police department’s own investigation
14 concluded that, notwithstanding Johnigan’s intent to “gain
15 compliance of the suspect for the purpose of ta[]king him into
16 custody,” her use of a taser in probe mode “appeared not to be an
17 objectively reasonable option.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at 37.)
18 Although not determinative of the state of the law at the time of
19 the incident, the report’s conclusions appear to reflect the police
20 department’s understanding of the applicable legal background.
21 The Ninth Circuit issued opinions regarding the use of tasers
22 in the Fourth Amendment context well before March 2017, when the
23 incident at issue here occurred. Plaintiff points to the court’s
24 2011 decision in Mattos. There, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an
25
26 4(...continued)
must first be determined by the jury before the court can rule on
27
qualified immunity.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d at 824. For
purposes of this discussion, therefore, the court draws all
28
evidentiary inferences in favor of Plaintiff.
incident in which an officer tased a pregnant woman three times in
drive-stun mode when she refused to exit her vehicle after being
3} pulled over for speeding. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 437. The woman was
not suspected of having committed a serious crime, nor did she pose
any threat to the officers. Id. at 445. Informed by those
factors, the court concluded that officers’ decision to tase the
7! women three times in less than one minute was objectively
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
9 Defendant argues that the circumstances here are more
analogous to those in Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167
11} (9th Cir. 2012). There, police forced their way through a
12] barricaded bedroom door and encountered walls and furniture smeared
with blood, a visibly injured naked woman screaming in the corner
14}/ of the room, and a heavy-set man holding a motionless three-year-
girl in a choke-hold. Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1171. Officers
tased the man twice in probe mode, with no effect. Id. The man
then attacked one of the officers, kicking him in the thighs and
groin, before the officer then deployed the taser in drive-stun
19])/mode. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officers’ use of
20 the taser was not objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1175.
21 Although neither of these cases is directly analogous to the
circumstances here, the facts of this case bear almost no relation
to the horrific circumstances in Marquez. The facts of the instant
24|| case bear a closer relationship to Mattos, insofar as Plaintiff was
25|/also resisting arrest while posing no danger to anyone. Although
Plaintiff’s active resistance to being handcuffed is
distinguishable from the pregnant woman’s passive refusal in
Mattos, there is a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff presented
14

any danger to officers or bystanders. In both cases, officers
2\| tased plaintiffs repeatedly over a short period of time.
3 The facts here are also similar in many ways to those in
Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 713 F.3d 723, 728 (4th Cir. 2013).
There, officers reasonably tased a person who was menacing them
with a baseball bat. Meyers, 7013 F.3d at 728. After officers
71 took the suspect to ground, however, and even though three officers
were sitting on the suspect’s back, the tasing officer proceeded to
tase the suspect a further seven times. Id. In denying qualified
immunity to the tasing officer, the court observed not only that
the seven additional tasings were excessive, but that, even in
2007, it was clear that “[t]he use of any unnecessary, gratuitous,
13] and disproportionate force, whether arising from a gun, a baton, a
taser, or other weapon, precludes an officer from receiving
15] qualified immunity if the subject is unarmed and secured.” Id. at
735; see also Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.
17] 2010) (finding tasing constituted excessive force when suspect was
face down, with two officers on top of him, with his hands
underneath him and having already been shocked twice with the
20 || Taser); Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (llth Cir.2009)
21] (“Quite simply, though the initial use of force (a single Taser
shock) may have been justified, the repeated tasering . . . was
23|| grossly disproportionate to any threat posed and unreasonable under
the circumstances.”).
25 In sum, by 2017, it was sufficiently clear that the tasing,
let alone repeated tasing, of a suspect who was face down on the
ground with three officers on top of him was an excessive use of
force. Officer Johnigan is not entitled to qualified immunity.
15

1
2 D. Heck bar
3 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under
4) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The “Heck bar” requires
5] dismissal of any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that, if successful,
would imply or demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction based
upon the same facts as the § 1983 claim. Beets v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012). Of course, a § 1983
9] claim is not Heck-barred simply because it is somehow related to a
10} conviction. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014).
Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his
excessive force claims without invalidating his conviction for
resisting arrest by Officer Kong. That argument is not well taken.
14} Plaintiff does not take the position that he did not resist Officer
Kong’s attempts to arrest him. At most, Plaintiff attempts to
16] distinguish “active resistance” from “violent resistance.” Other
courts have made similar distinctions. See, e.g., Cyrus, 624 F.3d
at 863. The nature of a suspect’s resistance is only one factor,
however, in an analysis of whether a use of force is objectively
reasonable. “Force is reasonable only when exercised in proportion
to the threat posed.” Id. Put simply, police officers are not
22\| free to use unlimited force simply because a suspect resists
arrest. Plaintiff can succeed on his $ 1983 claims without
24|| demonstrating or imolying that he did not resist arrest.
25|| To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff is barred from
bringing any excessive force claim because he pled no contest to
resisting arrest, the argument is baseless.
28 BE. Defendant City of Los Angeles
16

1 Defendants argue Defendant City of Los Angeles is entitled to
summary judgment on all claims against it.”® A plaintiff alleging
31 civil rights violations under § 1983 may not state a claim against
4i!/a government entity for the actions of the entity’s employees; only
the actions of the entity itself give rise to liability. Monell v.
Dep’ of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
71 A municipality or local agency is only liable for constitutional
violations perpetrated by its employees if the government entity
officially adopted and promulgated a “policy, custom, or practice
10] that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.”
11}| Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)
12] (internal quotation and citation omitted). Defendants main
13] contention is that there can be no Monell violation where there is
no underlying constitutional violation. Defendants are correct, in
principle. See, e.g., Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n,
541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). As discussed above, however,
triable issues remain as to whether Officer Johnigan’s eleven taser
deployments constituted an objectively unreasonable use of force in
violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
20 Defendants also argue, briefly, that Plaintiff has presented
21]}/ no evidence to support a ratification theory of Monell liability,
and that Plaintiff cannot succeed on a failure to train theory
based on only a single instance of inappropriate force. (Mot. at
19:28-20:3, 20:7-9.) A plaintiff may establish Monell liability by
proving “that an official with final policy-making authority
26
27 ° Defendants’ initial briefing in support of this argument,
28 which applies to three of Plaintiff’s claims, spans approximately
one page.
17

1 ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and
2 the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47
3 (9th Cir. 1992). “[R]atification of conduct . . . can be shown by a
4 municipality’s post-event conduct, including its conduct in an
5 investigation of the incident.” Dorger v. City of Napa, No.
6 12-CV-440 YGR, 2012 WL 3791447, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012).
7 Here, it is undisputed that the Los Angeles Police Department found
8 each of Johnigan’s taser deployments “out of policy,” and
9 administratively disapproved of her actions. Although such a
10 conclusion might often prove dispositive of a ratification claim,
11 there is also evidence in the record that, despite the department’s
12 conclusions, Johnigan received only “informal” re-training in the
13 “functions” of a taser, without any training as to whether, why, or
14 how her use of the taser was “improper.” A finder of fact could,
15 therefore, conclude that Johnigan’s supervisors ratified Johnigan’s
16 conduct.
17 Plaintiff provides no substantive opposition to Defendants’
18 single-incident argument. Generally, a plaintiff can only succeed
19 on a failure to train theory of Monell liability by showing a
20 pattern of violations. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70
21 (2011). Contrary to Defendant’s argument, however, a failure to
22 train can be shown by a single incident that demonstrates a
23 “patently obvious” failure to train. Id. at 64; see also Dillman
24 v. Tuolumne Cty., No. 1:13-CV-00404 LJO, 2013 WL 1907379, at *14
25 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013). Nevertheless, Plaintiff has presented no
26 argument or evidence that this is such a case. Accordingly, the
27 City of Los Angeles is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
28 Third Claim for failure to train.
1 F. State Law Battery
2 Lastly, Defendants argue that they are all entitled to summary
3 judgment on Plaintiff’s state law battery claim because excessive
4 force tort claims are coextensive with Fourth Amendment claims.
5 Although Defendants’ battery arguments are premised upon the
6 conclusion that any use of force against Plaintiff was objectively
7 reasonable, triable issues remain with respect to Plaintiff’s
8 Fourth Amendment claims, as explained above. Accordingly,
9 Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
10 state law battery claim.
11 IV. Conclusion
12 For the reasons stated above Defendants’ Motion for Summary
13 Judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The motion is
14 granted with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to train claim against
15 Defendant City of Los Angeles. The motion is denied with respect
16 to all other claims.
17
18
19

20
IT IS SO ORDERED.
21
22 Dated: July 24, 2020
DEAN D. PREGERSON
23 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10038576. Public record. Not legal advice.
