# Gantt v. Everett

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · June 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10034820

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** June 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10034820

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that in the first method “we look at precedent that is tied to facts” while in the second method we look for “broad statements of principle in case law [that] are not tied to particularized facts” (emphasis omitted

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RACHEAL GANTT, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
v. Case No.: 2:23-CV-648-RDP
}
DEPUTY MONICA EVERETT, }
}
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendant Deputy Monica Everett’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 34). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
(Docs. # 36, 41, 43). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion (Doc. # 34) is due to be
granted in part and denied in part.
I. Factual Background
On or around February 4, 2023, Plaintiff Racheal Gantt was arrested, transported to the
Jefferson County Jail, and booked as a pretrial detainee. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 6-7). All female inmates at
the jail are housed on the fifth floor. (Doc. # 35-3 at 5). The fifth floor has seven total “blocks,”
each identified by a different letter from “A” to “G.” (Id. at 38).
Within a few days of being at the jail, Plaintiff disclosed to a mental health worker that
she was thinking of harming herself and was placed on suicide watch. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 11; 35-4 at
29-30). As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to “A Block,” one of the blocks on the fifth floor
designated for prisoners who pose a suicide risk. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 12; 35-3 at 8). The facility’s A
Block contains two stories of cells that open to a common area referred to as the “day space.”
(Docs. # 35-3 at 8; 35-4 at 16). For safety reasons, inmates on suicide watch are traditionally
housed in a cell by themselves on the bottom level of A Block, although occasionally they may
be housed on the top level as well. (Doc. # 35-3 at 8). Plaintiff was placed in Cell A11, which
was on the bottom level. (Id. at 9). In addition, because Plaintiff was on suicide watch, she had
her uniform taken and was issued a “suicide smock” – a green, thick Velcro blanket worn as
clothes so that an inmate cannot rip or tear it to hang herself. (Id.).
On February 8, 2023, Deputy Niyasmine Morgan and Deputy Jamie Yunker were the two

deputies assigned to the jail’s fifth floor for the morning shift. (Doc. # 35-6 at 5). In addition,
Control Room Operator Jamesanna Lovell (“CRO Lovell”) was stationed as the control room
operator (“CRO”) on that floor. (Doc. # 35-5 at 4-5). The control room, which is located at the
center of the fifth floor with glass windows overlooking each block, houses a large computer that
can remotely lock and unlock each individual cell door. (Docs. # 35-4 at 19; 35-3 at 7). When a
cell door is unlocked from the control room, it automatically swings open in the block. (Doc. #
35-4 at 25). Because the control room has an intercom system that connects to each block,
deputies can verbally request a certain cell door be unlocked while stationed in a particular block
and the CRO can remotely open it. (Id. at 9). Alternatively, deputies can travel between the

individual blocks and the control room by walking through a sliding glass door and down a
hallway. (Id. at 19-20; Doc. # 35-3 at 21).
Defendant Deputy Monica Everett (“Everett”) was assigned duties on the first floor of the
jail on the morning of February 8, 2023. (Id. at 10-11). Around mid-morning, Everett was
ordered to go up to the fifth floor to assist Deputies Morgan and Yunker with a shakedown in F
Block. (Id. at 12). During the shakedown, Everett and Deputy Jasmine McCants were instructed
to escort one of the female inmates in F Block to an individual cell in A Block. (Id. at 13).
When Everett and Deputy McCants entered A Block, Everett heard Plaintiff “screaming
and crying hysterically” from her cell. (Id. at 14). Everett, who had never met Plaintiff before
this point, walked over to Plaintiff’s cell and asked her what was wrong. (Id.; Doc. # 35-1 at
13:56:04-13:56:16). Plaintiff responded that she had hit her head.1 (Doc. # 35-3 at 14). Everett
asked to see Plaintiff’s head; although she saw no bleeding, she saw a large knot on the side of
her head. (Id.). In addition, Everett noticed that Plaintiff had a suicide smock instead of a
uniform, and realized at this point that she was on suicide watch. (Id. at 10). The video evidence

shows that Plaintiff was not actually wearing her suicide smock but was naked when the events
giving rise to this matter transpired. (Doc. # 35-2). Therefore, although Everett testified that she
noticed Plaintiff “wearing” a suicide smock, the court infers from the undisputed Rule 56
evidence that Everett actually noticed that Plaintiff had a suicide smock present with her in her
cell.
Everett left Plaintiff in her cell and walked from A Block to the control room to contact
the jail nurse and inform her of Plaintiff’s head injury. (Id. at 19). The nurse instructed Everett to
bring Plaintiff down to the third level. (Id.). A few other officers, including CRO Lovell and
Deputy Yunker, were present in the control room during this interaction. (Id.; Doc. # 35-6 at 6).

Everett asked one of the officers to grab Plaintiff a uniform to wear while she was being
transported. (Doc. # 35-3 at 19). She then unlocked the door to Plaintiff’s cell from the computer
in the control room, before heading down the hallway to A Block to retrieve her. (Id. at 20; Doc.
# 35-1 at 14:00:43). No deputies were present in A Block when Everett unlocked Plaintiff’s cell
door. (Doc. # 35-1 at 14:00:43).

1 The parties dispute how Plaintiff told Everett that she had injured herself. Everett testified that Plaintiff
told her she injured her head by falling and hitting it on the toilet. (Doc. # 35-3 at 14). CRO Lovell testified that
Everett told her the same when she came into the control room to call the nurse. (Doc. # 35-5 at 8). But, according to
Deputy Morgan, Everett told her she was taking Plaintiff to the nurse because she had been hitting her head against
the wall of her cell. (Doc. # 35-4 at 16). And, the reports from the emergency room and the paramedics say that
Plaintiff’s head injuries came from “[b]anging head against wall.” (Docs. # 39-3 at 2; 39-4 at 2).
When her cell door unlocked and swung open, Plaintiff immediately sprinted out of her
cell and across the day space toward a set of stairs leading to the upper level of A Block. (Docs.
# 35-3 at 21; 35-1 at 14:00:50-14:01-00). As Everett entered A Block, she saw Plaintiff run in
front of her and up the stairs. (Docs. # 35-3 at 21; 35-1 at 14:01:02). Everett instructed her to
come back down; however, Plaintiff ignored the order. (Doc. # 35-3 at 21-22). Everett then

realized that Plaintiff had her hand on the second story railing and was planning to jump. (Id. at
22). Everett ran up the stairs and attempted to grab Plaintiff from the railing, but before she could
do so, Plaintiff jumped from the balcony and landed at the bottom level of the day space. (Id.;
Doc. # 35-1 at 14:01:02-14:01:06). A total of 23 seconds elapsed from the time Plaintiff’s cell
door was unlocked until the time she jumped from the second level railing. (Doc. # 35-1 at
14:00:43-14:01:06).
Other deputies saw Plaintiff jump from afar and issued a “Code White,” the jail’s signal
for a medical emergency. (Doc. # 35-3 at 26). While the deputies were waiting on the
paramedics to arrive on the scene after Plaintiff’s suicide attempt, a deputy emerged from

Plaintiff’s cell holding her suicide smock and used it to cover Plaintiff’s body. (Doc. # 35-1 at
14:03:06-14:03:15). Birmingham Fire and Rescue arrived on the scene and transported Plaintiff
from the jail to the emergency room, where she was treated for ankle fractures from her jump as
well as the injury to her head. (Id. at 26-27; Doc. # 39-10 at 2). Plaintiff was released from the
custody of the Jefferson County Jail after this incident. (Doc. # 35-3 at 31).
Plaintiff filed the current action on May 22, 2023. (Doc. # 1). The Complaint asserts a
single cause of action against Everett under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (Id.).
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if … there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion

and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden,
Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts
and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub.
Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at
249.
When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving
party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere
allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson
teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on his allegations made in the
complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with
at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at trial. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be
granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”
Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250-51). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Although the court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-movant, this
does not mean the court cannot rely on objective videotape evidence. “When opposing parties
tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Thus, if a
videotape clearly depicts events and leaves no material factual disputes, the “view[s] the facts in
the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380-81.
III. Discussion
On January 18, 2024, Everett filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 34). In the
Motion, Everett argues that summary judgment in her favor is proper because she is entitled to
qualified immunity. In addition, she argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. The court examines both arguments, below.
A. Qualified Immunity Analysis
Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The court determines whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity by engaging in a three-step analysis. See Skop v. City
of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2007). The initial burden is on the official claiming
qualified immunity to establish that she was acting within her discretionary authority. Id. at 1136.
When the plaintiff does not dispute the defendant was operating within her discretionary
authority (and that is the case here), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
“defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right,” id. at 1137 (citing Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)), which was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
violation. Id. If the plaintiff cannot satisfy both prongs, the defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).

Because the parties do not dispute that Everett was acting in her discretionary authority at
the time of Plaintiff’s attempted suicide, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove that Everett
violated one of her constitutional rights and that the constitutional right was clearly established at
the time of the violation. Everett argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff cannot satisfy either requirement. That is, she argues that (1) Plaintiff cannot show that
any violation of a constitutional right occurred, and (2) even if she could, Plaintiff cannot show
that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. (Doc. # 36 at 9). The court examines
each argument, in turn, below.
1. Whether Everett Violated a Constitutional Right
The court first analyzes “whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a
constitutional violation.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)). Plaintiff alleges that Everett’s actions violated her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees have a due

process right to be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide. Greenway v. So.
Health Partners, Inc., 827 F. App’x 952, 958 (11th Cir. 2020).
Everett first argues that, because Plaintiff did not actually succeed in taking her own life
during her suicide attempt, there can be no constitutional violation. This argument misses the
mark. It is well-established that a detainee does not actually have to succumb to her self-inflicted
injuries to advance a Fourteenth Amendment claim; instead, a prisoner may succeed on a
Fourteenth Amendment claim involving injuries short of death so long as she can show that an
official “ha[d] subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and ‘deliberately disregard[ed] a
strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm [would] occur.’”

Garner on behalf of R.C. v. Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023)
(quoting Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005)); see
also Schmeltz v. Monroe Cnty., 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1992) (analyzing a Fourteenth
Amendment claim under an unsuccessful suicide attempt).
“In a prisoner suicide case, to prevail under section 1983 for violation of substantiative
rights, under the…[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, the plaintiff must show that the jail official
displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s [attempted] taking of [her] own life.” Jackson
v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,
1274-75 (11th Cir. 1989)). “To establish a defendant’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiff
[must] show that the defendant had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)
disregard[ed] … that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Snow, 420 F.3d at
1268 (quoting Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092,
1115 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Absent knowledge of a detainee’s suicidal tendencies, … failure to
prevent suicide has never been held to constitute deliberate indifference.” Greenway, 827 F.

App’x at 958 (internal citations omitted). But, “[w]here prison personnel directly responsible for
inmate care have knowledge that an inmate has … threatened … suicide, their failure to take
steps to prevent that inmate from committing suicide can amount to deliberate indifference.”
Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (quoting Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 935-36 (11th Cir.
1990)).
Here, a reasonable juror could find that Everett had subjective knowledge that Plaintiff
was suicidal and posed a risk of seriously harming herself if given the opportunity. To be sure,
Everett was not one of the deputies assigned to Block A, nor had she ever met Plaintiff before
she approached her cell on the afternoon of the suicide attempt. But, Everett admitted that she

was made aware that Plaintiff was on suicide watch as soon as she walked up to her door and
noticed her suicide smock. (Doc. # 35-3 at 10). Further, Everett understood that Plaintiff must
have threatened to commit suicide for her to have been placed on suicide watch. (Id. at 23) (“I
knew that at some point, she had to have told somebody she wanted to kill herself to be on
suicide watch.”). And, although Everett states that Plaintiff told her she injured her head by
falling and hitting it on the toilet, other evidence in the Rule 56 record supports a finding that
Everett knew Plaintiff had been banging her head against the wall of her cell. For example,
Deputy Morgan remembers Everett saying that she was taking Plaintiff to get medical attention
because “she was hitting her head on the wall.” (Doc. # 35-4 at 16). This evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could allow a reasonable juror to find that Everett had
subjective knowledge that Plaintiff posed a serious risk of attempting to harm herself.
A reasonable juror could similarly find that Everett disregarded the risk of Plaintiff
attempting to harm herself when she unlocked her cell door from the control room – without a
deputy being present in Block A. This allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to gain access to the

second story balcony. A prison guard disregards a risk of suicide when she gives a known
suicidal inmate access to something that could be used to do self-harm. See Turner v. Phillips,
547 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1205 (N.D. Ala. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 458238 (11th Cir. 2022)
(concluding officers were deliberately indifferent to the strong likelihood that an inmate would
harm himself when they witnessed him attempt to hang himself and allowed him to be placed in
an isolated cell with bedsheets that same day); see also Cole v. Jones, 2024 WL 1601210, at *7
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2024) (finding that an officer disregarded a risk by giving a suicidal inmate
access to a razor).
That is precisely what occurred here. Officers at the Jefferson County Jail were trained to

always accompany an inmate on suicide watch when she was out of her cell because “they’re
liable to hurt themselves if they’re out in the day space….” (Doc. # 35-4 at 6). In fact, Everett
testified that an inmate jumping off the second-floor balcony in the day space was an “obvious”
suicide risk, and that, for this reason, inmates under suicide watch were typically assigned to
cells on the bottom floor of A Block. (Doc. # 35-3 at 8). Further, in the time she had been
working at the facility, Everett was aware of at least two other occasions where inmates had
jumped off the top level of their units. (Id. at 24). Finally, Everett understood that she personally
did not have to unlock Plaintiff’s cell door from the control room, but instead could have used
the intercom to call for the CRO to do it when she was safely stationed outside the cell door. (Id.
at 26). Despite this knowledge, Everett made the choice to remotely unlock the cell of an inmate
she knew was on suicide watch and allow her access to an “obvious” suicide risk even though no
deputies were near her (or even present in A Block).
Finally, a reasonable juror could find that Everett’s conduct was not mere negligence, but
instead rose to the level of deliberate indifference. The court acknowledges that deliberate

indifference is an “exacting standard” that requires showing more than gross negligence. See
McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted). “Under this circuit’s precedent, in a prison suicide case, deliberate
indifference requires that the defendant deliberately disregard a strong likelihood rather than a
mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Cook, 402 F. 3d 1115 (emphasis in
original) (internal citations omitted). To be deliberately indifferent to a “strong likelihood” that
the prisoner will commit suicide, “the official must be subjectively aware that the combination of
the prisoner’s suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of suicide in the context of the prisoner’s
surroundings creates a strong likelihood that the prisoner will commit suicide.” Gish v. Thomas,

516 F.3d 952, 954 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
As discussed above, a reasonable juror could find that Everett was subjectively aware of
Plaintiff’s suicidal tendencies. She knew Plaintiff was on suicide watch. And, although Everett
maintains that Plaintiff told her she injured herself by accidentally slipping and hitting her on her
toilet, other evidence in the Rule 56 record supports a finding that Everett told officers that she
was taking Plaintiff to get medical attention because “she was hitting her head on the wall.”
(Doc. # 35-4 at 16). Of course, a jury could accept as true Everett’s testimony that she believed
Plaintiff’s head injuries were accidental and that she was not aware of the extent of Plaintiff’s
suicidal tendencies. But, at this stage of the case, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff – not Everett. In doing so, the court concludes that a reasonable juror could
find that Everett was subjectively aware that Plaintiff was actively trying to harm herself mere
moments before she unlocked her cell door. This is especially true when considering that Everett
herself testified that inmates on suicide watch regularly bang their heads against their cell walls
in efforts to harm themselves. (Doc. # 35-3 at 26).

Similarly, a reasonable juror could find that a suicide attempt was more than feasible if
Plaintiff was left alone in A Block. “When analyzing the likelihood of suicide, courts look at the
inmate’s environment at the time the suicide or the attempt occurred and what tools [she] had
that could make suicide likely.” Cole, 2024 WL 1601210, at *5. In doing so, courts in this circuit
have made clear that when an officer gives a suicidal inmate access to an obvious instrument of
suicide, it creates a strong likelihood -- not just a mere possibility -- that a suicide attempt will
follow. Id. (giving razors to a suicidal inmate created a strong likelihood of attempted suicide);
Allen v. Freeman, 2013 WL 3356040, at *10 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (giving an inmate access to a bar
and a sheet “strengthens the likelihood of suicide”).

That is essentially what occurred here. Everett personally knew of two other instances
where inmates had attempted to harm themselves by jumping from the second story of their cell
block areas. (Doc. # 35-3 at 24). Further, Everett was aware that opening the door of a suicidal
inmate’s cell without supervision would give the inmate access to the second story landing,
which she herself acknowledged was an “obvious suicide risk.” (Id. at 8, 20-21). Despite the
presence of this risk, a jury could conclude that Everett made a conscious -- and, as indicated by
this record, unnecessary -- decision to open the door of Plaintiff’s cell without any personnel in
that vicinity. Indeed, both Deputy Morgan and Deputy Yunker testified that they would not have
opened Plaintiff’s door from the control room if they had been in Everett’s shoes, but instead
would have requested the CRO unlock the cell while they were present in the block. See (Doc. #
35-4 at 12) (“I probably would just call, ‘Roll Cell 11,’ and I’ll be standing somewhere in the
block … where I could clearly see what [the inmate’s] doing”); (Doc. # 35-6 at 11) (Deputy
Yunker stating that standing by the cell of an inmate on suicide watch when it is unlocked is
“common sense” because “you don’t want them given the opportunity to be by themselves in

[an] area especially that has a second floor”).
In the court’s view, there is little difference between allowing a suicidal inmate 23
seconds of access to a razor or a rope and Everett’s conscious decision here to allow Plaintiff 23
seconds of unsupervised access to a staircase leading up to the second floor, which in her own
words was an “obvious suicide risk.” A reasonable juror could find the same. Therefore, Plaintiff
has carried her burden in proving that Everett “deliberately disregard[ed] a ‘strong likelihood
rather than a mere possibility’” that harm would occur if she let Plaintiff out of her cell
unsupervised, and she has satisfied the first prong of her burden of the qualified immunity
analysis. Snow, 420 F.3d at 1268.

2. Whether Everett Violated Clearly Established Law
Next, the court must examine whether Plaintiff has shown that Everett violated a
statutory or constitutional right that that was clearly established when the violation occurred. A
right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable official that his or her conduct was
unlawful. Leslie v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2013). As the
Eleventh Circuit recently summarized, there are three methods by which a right can be clearly
established:
Plaintiff[] can meet the clearly established requirement in one of three ways: (1)
by pointing to a materially similar decision of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or
of the supreme court of the state in which the case arose; (2) by establishing that
“a broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts” of the
case; or (3) by convincing us that the case is one of those rare ones that “fits
within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates th[e] constitution that
prior case law is unnecessary.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159
(11th Cir. 2005).

Under the first and second of these methods, the plaintiff must rely on decisional
law. See Vineyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that in
the first method “we look at precedent that is tied to facts” while in the second
method we look for “broad statements of principle in case law [that] are not tied
to particularized facts” (emphasis omitted). Under the second and third methods,
we look for “obvious clarity”: a principle or provision so clear that, even without
specific guidance from a decision involving materially similar facts, the
unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is apparent. Id. at 1350-51 (nothing that
“broad statements of principle in case law … can clearly establish law applicable
in the future to different sets of detailed facts” and that the “words of the pertinent
federal statute or federal constitutional provision in some cases will be specific
enough to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and
circumstances”); see also Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.
2019); Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1163 (11th Cir. 2016). In all three methods,
the “‘salient question’ is whether the state of the law at the time of the incident
gave [the officer] ‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unlawful.” Perez, 809 F.3d
at 1222 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 [] (2002)).

Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920-21 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 2022 WL 4652025 (2022).
In this circuit, “only Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and [state] Supreme Court
caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law…” Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955
(11th Cir. 2003).
The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk
of serious harm to a detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Snow, 420 F.3d at
1270 (citing McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)). For example, in Turner
v. Phillips, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the grant of qualified immunity was
appropriate for two officers who knew that an inmate was suicidal and nonetheless gave him
access to items that could be used to harm himself. 2022 WL 458238 (11th Cir. 2022).
Specifically, the officers witnessed the inmate trying to attempt suicide by making a noose out of
his clothes when in the shower. Id. at 3. However, instead of transferring the inmate to the
behavioral unit where he would be isolated from dangerous objects, the officers left him in a cell,
unsupervised, with access to the bed sheets he used to hang himself. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because “the officers were aware
that Turner had a high risk of suicide and nonetheless kept him in a dorm where he would have
dangerous items at his fingertips,” despite there being a safer alternative: transferring him. Id. at

4.
The facts of Turner are materially similar to those here. Like in Turner, Everett knew that
Plaintiff was suicidal. Further, as discussed above, a material dispute of fact exists concerning
whether Everett was aware that Plaintiff had actively been trying to injure herself by banging her
head against her wall. Therefore, a reasonable juror could find that, like the officers in Turner,
Everett was aware that Plaintiff posed a high risk of suicide, knew that she was actively
attempting to harm herself, and nonetheless allowed her unsupervised access to a dangerous
item, despite there being a much safer alternative easily available. To be sure, the facts of the two
cases have a minor (but indistinguishable) difference: whereas the officers in Turner left the

suicidal inmate in a cell unsupervised with access to a dangerous object, Everett let Plaintiff out
of her cell unsupervised with access to a dangerous jumping spot. But, precedent “need not be
directly on point” to clearly establish a right; instead, it simply “must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” JW ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904
F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Turner placed beyond
debate that an officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment when he or she gives an inmate who
poses a high risk of suicide unsupervised access to something that the inmate could use to harm
herself.
Against this backdrop, the court concludes that, on this record, the Fourteenth
Amendment right in this context was clearly established at the time of the incident, and, as
discussed above, a reasonable juror could find that Everett violated that right. Therefore, Plaintiff
has carried her burden and Everett is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity.2

B. Injunctive Relief
In addition to her qualified immunity argument, Everett also argues that she is entitled to
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because Plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated at the Jefferson County Jail. (Doc. # 36 at 22). Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief consists of a single sentence in the Complaint seeking that the court “grant injunctive relief
as necessary to effect this Court’s judgment and prevent the recurrence of the harms alleged
herein.” (Doc. # 1 at 7).
“The general rule in [the Eleventh] [C]ircuit is that a transfer or a release of a prisoner
from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.” Smith v. Allen,

502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277 (2011). This general rule applies when the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking injunctive
relief to remedy an allegedly unconstitutional condition existing at his or her place of
confinement and names as a defendant an official who works at that institution. See e.g.,
McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); Wahl v. McIver, 773
F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (11th Cir. 1985); Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 799-800 (11th
Cir. 2019). This is so because an injunction directing a prison official to provide some sort of

2 Everett also spends a portion of her brief arguing that, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a claim
for deliberate indifference to serious medical need, that claim is due to be dismissed because Everett is entitled to
qualified immunity. (Doc. # 36 at 20-22). However, Plaintiff’s response makes clear that she is not pursuing relief
under this theory. (Doc. # 41 at 20 n.3). Therefore, this memorandum opinion need not address Everett’s arguments
for summary judgment on that claim.
relief to the released prisoner “would be an empty order” when the official no longer has the
ability to provide any relief to the prisoner. Robbins, 782 F. App’x at 800. However, this general
rule does not apply where a prisoner challenges allegedly unconstitutional conditions as they
exist generally throughout a prison system. Barnes v. Dunn, 2022 WL 10264034, at *7 (N.D.
Ala. 2022).

Everett argues that, to the extent Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is related to
Plaintiff’s conditions at the Jefferson County Jail, the request should be denied as moot because
Plaintiff has been released. (Doc. # 36 at 22-24). The court agrees. As the Complaint reads now,
it is unclear just what manner of injunctive relief Plaintiff is seeking – or can seek. The
Complaint merely requests injunctive relief “as necessary to effect this Court’s judgment and
prevent the recurrence of the harms alleged herein” without any specificity. (Doc. # 1 at 7).
Because Plaintiff is no longer in jail, any injunctive relief directing Everett to provide some sort
of relief to her would be an “empty order.” Robbins, 782 F. App’x at 800. As a result, Everett is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief

related to her conditions at the Jefferson County Jail. Having said that, if the court has
misunderstood Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief unrelated to her confinement at the jail, she
may clarify her contention and raise it with the court.
Therefore, Everett’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted and Plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief is due to be denied without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Everett’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34) is
due to be granted in part and denied in part. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion
will be entered contemporaneously.
DONE and ORDERED this June 17, 2024.

R! DAVID 24 2
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10034820. Public record. Not legal advice.