# The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Idexx Laboratories, Inc.

> Texas Supreme Court · June 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10033929

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 14, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10033929

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “‘ambiguous’ and ‘ambiguity’ . . . are often used to denote a simple lack of clarity in language but that is not the sense in which we use them [for determining whether instruments are ambiguous]”

## Opinion text

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 22-0844
══════════

The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System,
Petitioner,

v.

IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued January 10, 2024

CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

A contract is a written expression of the parties’ intent. When that
intent is in question, the text must be read “as a whole in light of the
circumstances present when the contract was entered.” 1 In this case, the
court of appeals concluded that two royalty provisions in the parties’
licensing agreement, one for 1% and the other for 2.5%, considered
separately and in the abstract, could logically be read to apply to the

1 Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d

587, 589 (Tex. 1996).
same sales of goods. Viewing both interpretations as “equally
reasonable”, the court held the agreement to be ambiguous. 2
But obviously, in negotiating their agreement, the parties must
have intended that the provisions, for very different royalties, would
apply in different and mutually exclusive situations. The differing
interpretations are, as we recently described in another context, “merely
the competing theories that the parties advanced about how to read the
text”. 3 Examining the royalty provisions in context and in light of the
circumstances that produced them, we find no ambiguity. We therefore
reverse and remand to the court of appeals to address the remaining
issues.
I
Lyme disease in humans is caused by the bacterium Borrelia
burgdorferi, which is carried by certain ticks. A skin rash near the tick
bite may indicate infection. Early symptoms include joint and muscle
pain, headaches, fever, and fatigue. The disease isn’t contagious; it’s
spread only through a tick bite. Most cases can be treated successfully
with antibiotics. Without treatment, the disease can worsen and result
in severe pain and impairment. Dogs can contract Lyme disease, but
most cases are routine and asymptomatic, not requiring treatment.
Heartworm is a serious and often fatal disease in pets, mostly
dogs, caused by a parasitic worm, Dirofilaria immitis, carried by
mosquitoes. When an animal is infected, the worm resides in blood

2 683 S.W.3d 108, 110-111 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022).

3 U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp., 681 S.W.3d 383, 385

(Tex. 2023).

2
vessels near the heart and lungs and multiplies, inhibiting breathing
and blood flow. The disease isn’t contagious; it’s spread only through a
mosquito bite.
Regularly administered prescription preventives can protect an
animal from the parasite, but if given after the animal is infected, the
medication can itself result in impairment and death. So it’s important
to determine whether a dog has heartworm disease before giving the dog
a preventive, like a heartworm pill. The parasite’s presence can be
detected with a blood test.
IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (“Labs”) has long been involved in
developing, manufacturing, and selling veterinary diagnostic tests,
products, and services. Labs invented heartworm tests in the 1980s and
in 1992 offered its first “SNAP” product, a single-use device to test a
dog’s blood quickly and easily for heartworm without laboratory
processing. A small sample of blood is placed in one part of the device
and a chemical solution in another. Then at the press of a button, the
device snaps them together (hence the name). Within eight minutes, the
result shows whether the dog has the antigen for heartworm.
The SNAP product was a success and quickly made Labs an
industry leader in the market for heartworm tests. But its success and
the seriousness of heartworm disease encouraged others to develop
competing tests, prompting Labs to look for ways to distinguish its
SNAP product. At one point, it added a test for a tickborne pathogen, E.
canis, which causes ehrlichiosis, 4 calling the product the SNAP Canine

4 Ehrlichiosis is an infection that affects cells of the immune system in

dogs, cats, and people.

3
Combo. Continuing its diversification efforts, Labs sought to obtain an
exclusive license to use a peptide newly discovered at Tulane University
to test for Lyme disease. In the process, Labs learned that The
University of Texas (“the University”) had applied for a patent on the
same peptide. To assure its exclusive use, Labs also obtained an
exclusive license of the University’s patent.
In determining the royalties it would pay, Labs discussed with
the University the sorts of products it might develop by combining the
Lyme disease test with tests for other tickborne diseases and Labs’
flagship heartworm test. The parties attempted to assess what test
combinations could be most profitably and successfully marketed. After
much discussion and many proposals back and forth, the parties signed
a lengthy patent license agreement in 2000 calling for royalties on three
types of products depending on what tests were included. Boiled down
to its essentials, paragraph 5.1(b) obligated Labs to pay quarterly, on
net sales for products sold
(i) “to detect Lyme disease alone” — 4%;
(ii) “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one other
veterinary diagnostic test . . . (for example, but not limited to, a
canine heartworm diagnostic test . . .)” — 1%; and
(iii) “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one or more
veterinary diagnostic products . . . to detect tick-borne disease(s)”
— 2.5%. 5

5 Paragraph 5.1(b) stated:

In consideration of rights granted by Board [of Regents of The
University of Texas System] to IDEXX under this Agreement,
IDEXX agrees to pay . . . a running royalty as follows:

4
The 1% royalty under (b)(ii) was to be shared equally with Tulane. The
2.5% royalty under (b)(iii) was not. The University’s patent was to expire
in 2017.
Shortly after executing the agreement, Labs introduced its first
SNAP product testing for Lyme disease, adding that test to its SNAP
Canine Combo. SNAP3Dx tested for Lyme disease and E. canis, two
tickborne diseases, as well as mosquito-borne heartworm. Over the
years, Labs marketed two other SNAP products. The first added a test
for another tickborne disease and the second added tests for two more. 6
Thus, these three SNAP products test for Lyme disease with one, two,
or four other tickborne diseases, and all test for mosquito-borne
heartworm. None of the products test for a non-tickborne disease other

i. Four percent (4.0%) of Net Sales for all Licensed Products Sold
to detect Lyme disease alone.
ii. One percent (1.0%) of Net Sales for all Licensed Products Sold
to detect Lyme disease in combination with one other veterinary
diagnostic test or service (for example, but not limited to, a
canine heartworm diagnostic test or service). Such royalty rate
shall be reduced by a percentage rate equal to the percentage
rate paid to a third party, other than sublicensees and Affiliates,
for products or components used by IDEXX exclusively in the
production or Sale of the Licensed Product, However, the total
reduction of the royalty rate shall not exceed one-half percent
(0.5%).
iii. Two and one-half percent (2.5%) of Net Sales for all Licensed
Products Sold as a product or service to detect Lyme disease in
combination with one or more veterinary diagnostic products or
services to detect tick-borne disease(s).
6 SNAP4Dx added a test for tickborne E. equi, which also causes
ehrlichiosis. SNAP4Dx Plus added tests for tickborne E. ewingii, another cause
of ehrlichiosis, and A. platys, which causes anaplasmosis, a disease in the
ehrlichiosis family.

5
than heartworm.
From the beginning, Labs paid, and the University accepted, a
0.5% royalty under (b)(ii) on sales of all three SNAP products. 7
Accompanying each quarterly payment was a report detailing the name
of the product, the included tests, the number of sales, the royalty rate,
and the royalty amount. In 2010, several years into the arrangement,
Labs recognized that (b)(iii) could be read to apply to the SNAP products
and require a much higher royalty because they all contained tests for
Lyme disease and one or more other tickborne diseases. But (b)(iii)
doesn’t mention heartworm—(b)(ii) does—and (b)(ii)’s limitation to
“Lyme disease in combination with one other . . . test” could be read to
mean one or more. Labs never raised the issue with the University.
As the University’s patent was expiring, it commissioned an audit
of Labs’ thirteen years of royalty payments. The audit found that net
sales of SNAP products totaled more than $912 million and that Labs
had paid 0.5% in royalties, some $4.5 million. The audit concluded that
the royalty rate should have been 2.5% under (b)(iii) and that Labs owed
over $18 million. In early 2018, the University sued Labs for unpaid
royalties plus interest.
The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on
the applicable royalty rate, each maintaining that the licensing
agreement was clear and unambiguous. The trial court granted the
University’s motion and denied Labs’. In a series of summary-judgment

7 Labs also sold a product, Lyme Quant C6 to test for Lyme disease

alone and paid the 4% royalty under (b)(i). That product isn’t at issue in this
case.

6
rulings, the trial court rejected Labs’ affirmative defenses 8 and
concluded that the University was entitled to recover the unpaid
royalties claimed plus $27 million in accrued interest at 18%, with
interest continuing to accrue at $9,002 per day.
On appeal, Labs shifted its position on the royalty rate, arguing
for the first time that the licensing agreement is ambiguous. In a brief
opinion, the court of appeals agreed, reasoning as follows. All three
SNAP products tested for heartworm, Lyme disease, and one or more
other tickborne diseases. Thus, neither (b)(ii) nor (b)(iii) fit the SNAP
products perfectly.
Subparagraph (b)(ii) would apply to all three if “Lyme in
combination with one other test” means at least one or one or more, but
not if the phrase means one and only one. Meanwhile, (b)(iii) would
apply if “Lyme in combination with one or more tick-borne disease tests”
doesn’t exclude a heartworm test by not mentioning it—but would not
apply if the phrase means tickborne tests and nothing else (i.e., no
heartworm test). The court of appeals concluded that both
interpretations are reasonable and conflicting, and therefore the royalty
provisions are ambiguous. It reversed and remanded without reaching
Labs’ arguments that the licensing agreement didn’t call for 18%
interest on unpaid royalties and that its affirmative defenses shouldn’t
have been rejected as a matter of law. 9
We granted the University’s petition for review.

8 Labs asserted several defenses, including limitations, estoppel, laches,

waiver, and ratification.
9 683 S.W.3d at 111.

7
II
“When a contract’s meaning is disputed, our primary objective is
to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the
instrument.” 10 This venerable rule has long been part of the law’s
Decalogue. But achieving the objective can seem difficult. “Since the
Tower of Babel, expression is inexact.” 11 After all, “words are simply
implements of communication, and imperfect ones at that. Oftentimes
they cannot be assigned a rigid meaning, inherent in themselves.
Rather, their meaning turns upon use, adaptation, and context as they
are employed to fit various and varying situations.” 12 In recognition of
these truths,
we have long allowed that words must be construed in the
context in which they are used. Context is not, however,
confined to the two-dimensional contractual environs in
which the words exist but may also encompass the
circumstances present when the contract was entered. This
is so because words are the skin of a living thought, and
our quest is to determine, objectively, what an ordinary
person using those words under the circumstances in
which they are used would understand them to mean. 13
Contractual text is not ambiguous in a legal sense merely because

10 URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018).

11Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 582 (Tex. 2014)
(Hecht, C.J., dissenting); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282
S.W.3d 433, 445-446 (Tex. 2009) (Hecht, J., concurring); cf. GENESIS 11:1-9.
12 URI, 543 S.W.3d at 764 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v. Bank

of Sw. Nat’l Ass’n, 354 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1962)).
13 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Columbia

Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589; Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,
425 (1918)).

8
it is unclear 14 and certainly not because the parties disagree about how
to interpret it. The latter is irrelevant; 15 after all, issues of intent and
proper interpretation arise only when there is disagreement.
Disagreement over the meaning of a contract does not mean that it is
ambiguous, legally. Lack of clarity is commonplace. Not every unclear
text is legally ambiguous. Despite the deficits inherent in the use of
language, “[w]henever possible, courts must assess adverse arguments
and resolve a text’s meaning as a matter of law.” 16
We have often stated that if contractual text “is subject to two or
more reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous.” 17 That statement
should not suggest that the dichotomy between reasonable and
unreasonable is merely semantic. Chief Justice Calvert first announced
the rule for the Court in 1951:
a contract is ambiguous only when the application of
pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the
instrument leaves it genuinely uncertain which one of two
or more meanings is the proper meaning. . . . In other
words, if after applying established rules of interpretation
to the contract it remains reasonably susceptible to more

14 Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.

1951) (stating that “‘ambiguous’ and ‘ambiguity’ . . . are often used to denote a
simple lack of clarity in language but that is not the sense in which we use
them [for determining whether instruments are ambiguous]”).
15 See, e.g., U.S. Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 385 (stating that “parties’
‘disagreement’ about [contract words’] intent is irrelevant to whether that text
is ambiguous”); URI, 543 S.W.3d at 763 (“A contract is not ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree about its meaning . . . .”).
16 U.S. Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 389.

17 See, e.g., Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234, 257

(Tex. 2023) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus.,
Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995)).

9
than one meaning it is ambiguous, but if only one
reasonable meaning clearly emerges it is not ambiguous. 18
The interpreting court must decide whether the meaning of the text read
in context is genuinely uncertain or whether one reasonable meaning
clearly emerges.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Pulsifer v.
United States, 19 illustrates the point well.
The “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law
exempts certain defendants from mandatory minimum
penalties, thus enabling courts to give them lighter prison
terms. To qualify for safety-valve relief, a defendant must
meet various criteria, one of which addresses his criminal
history. That criterion, in stylized form, requires that a
defendant “does not have A, B, and C”—where A, B, and C
refer to three ways in which past criminality may suggest
future dangerousness and therefore warrant a more severe
sentence. 20
In the abstract, the phrase “does not have A, B, and C” can have virtually
opposite meanings. It could mean that a qualifying defendant doesn’t
have A, doesn’t have B, and doesn’t have C—a checklist. A defendant
with any one of the three doesn’t qualify, making the qualifying criteria
for the safety valve very stringent.
But the phrase could also mean that a defendant qualifies as long
as he doesn’t have the combination of A, B, and C—all three—making
the safety valve more easily available. Both readings are grammatically
correct, and each would readily be understood to be the intended

18 Universal C. I. T., 243 S.W.2d at 157 (emphases added).

19 144 S. Ct. 718 (2024).

20 Id. at 723.

10
meaning in various contexts. The Court gives this example: don’t
(A) drink and (B) drive means don’t do them both together; don’t
(A) eat and (B) drink before surgery means don’t do either one at all. 21
It gives many more.
Words aren’t ambiguous merely because they can be read
differently in the abstract. They must be read in context, another
fundamental rule. As the Court states, the choice between the two
possible meanings “can sensibly be made only . . . by reviewing text in
context.” 22 Analyzing the federal sentencing guidelines, 23 the Court
reasoned that requiring A, B, and C, each, provides a safety valve for
otherwise stricter sentences, while requiring only one or two of the three
would allow more violent criminals to be released sooner and seriously
rupture the sentencing system. Thus, the Court held that the safety
valve was available only for a defendant meeting each of the three
requirements.
Another rule is that words be read together so that none is
rendered meaningless. Our decision in Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v.

21 Id. at 727-728.

22 Id. at 726.

23 As the Court explained, “[i]n general, the severity of Guidelines
sentencing recommendations increases with the number of criminal-history
points the defendant has (often called his criminal-history score). And the
Guidelines assign more points to more serious prior offenses.” Id. at 724. One
qualification for the safety valve is that a defendant not have (A) more than 4
criminal history points, (B) a prior 3-point offense, and (C) a prior 2-point
violent offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). Pulsifer had been convicted of two 3-
point offenses, so he failed to satisfy (A) and (B). Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 724-
725. But because he hadn’t been convicted of a 2-point offense, he argued that
he qualified for the safety valve since he hadn’t failed to meet (A), (B), and (C),
together. Id.

11
Daniel provides the classic example. 24 A car dealer sold its buyers’ notes
to a credit company. The dealer agreed, however, that it would
repurchase certain vehicles repossessed by the credit company. The
contract provided that the dealer would endorse the notes to be with
recourse on certain types of vehicles but without recourse on others. It
further stated that “in such cases”, the credit company would “make any
necessary correction in [the] endorsement and [the dealer’s repurchase
obligation] shall not apply.” 25 The contract left unclear whether “such
cases” were endorsements with recourse or those without. 26
Read grammatically and standing alone, the phrase could apply
to both types of endorsements. But if so, the dealer’s repurchase
obligation would never apply because all the endorsements were either
with or without recourse. We rejected that interpretation because it
would “render [the repurchase obligation] meaningless and . . . read [it]
out of the contract entirely.” 27
To construe the phrase, we instead examined the parties’ contract
in their business context. The contract could be read to authorize the
credit company to “correct” the dealer’s non-recourse endorsement on a
note to make it with full recourse, thereby unilaterally changing the
dealer’s liability. “Surely the parties had no such intent”, we said,
reflecting our conclusion that in the circumstances, the interpretation

24 243 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1951).

25 Id. at 156.

26 Id. at 158.

27 Id.

12
was unreasonable. 28
And if an endorsement could be changed from non-recourse to
recourse, giving the credit company the right to sue the dealer directly,
the repurchase obligation would provide nothing. There would be no
reason to excuse it. In our view, such an “interpretation [could] hardly
be said to be reasonable.” 29
The only reasonable interpretation of the contract, we concluded,
was that the credit company was authorized to correct an endorsement
intended to be with recourse to show that it actually was with recourse,
thereby assuring a direct remedy against the dealer and excusing the
then-unnecessary repurchase obligation. That left the repurchase
obligation as the credit company’s remedy when an endorsement was
without recourse and excused it when the credit company already had a
direct remedy against the dealer. 30
The teaching of these authorities is that in interpreting a
contract, we ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent expressed in
the text, read without rendering any portion meaningless, and not in the
abstract but in the context in which the words appear and were
written—the realities they were meant to address. A limited
examination may yield reasonable, conflicting interpretations, but only
when one interpretation does not clearly emerge as correct after a full
examination is a contract ambiguous and the determination of its
meaning left to a jury.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 159.

13
III
Applying these principles to this case, we begin where the court
of appeals left off. Royalty provisions (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) of the parties’
licensing agreement can both reasonably be read, separately and in the
abstract, to apply to all three SNAP products. Subparagraph (b)(ii)
applies to a product “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one
other veterinary diagnostic test . . . (for example, but not limited to, a
canine heartworm diagnostic test . . . )”. All three SNAP products test
for Lyme disease and heartworm. Subparagraph (b)(iii) applies to a
product “to detect Lyme disease in combination with one or more
veterinary diagnostic products . . . to detect tick-borne disease(s).” All
three SNAP products test for Lyme disease and one or more other
tickborne diseases.
But the analysis cannot end there. If (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) can both
apply to all three SNAP products, then one or the other is meaningless
surplusage and needn’t have been included in the agreement. That
interpretation is unreasonable because the two provisions call for very
different royalty amounts: 1% (reduced to 0.5% when Tulane is also
entitled to a royalty) and 2.5% (not reduced for Tulane’s royalty). The
parties couldn’t have intended different royalty rates on the same
product sales. So, we must examine the provisions more closely.
Subparagraph (b)(ii) renders (b)(iii) meaningless only if “one”
means one or more or at least one. If “one” means only one, then (b)(ii)
applies only to a product with two tests—for Lyme disease and one
other. The three SNAP products all include more than two tests.
Subparagraph (b)(iii) applies to products with more than two tests.

14
Reading “one” restrictively keeps (b)(ii) from making (b)(iii) surplusage.
Also, (b)(iii)’s “one or more” and paragraph 2.1’s “at least one” indicate
that when the parties didn’t intend “one” to mean only one, they said so
expressly.
Labs argues that the term “other” in (b)(ii) means
“non-tickborne”. This, Labs continues, suggests that the phrase “not
limited to . . . canine heartworm” means that the “one” other test of
(b)(ii) can be tickborne, since heartworm, the given example, is a
mosquito-borne disease. Were that reading adopted, Labs argues, “one
other” wouldn’t foreclose the inclusion of tickborne tests, and (b)(ii)
wouldn’t be limited to two products.
But that reading again allows (b)(ii) to render (b)(iii) superfluous
and is a self-defeating argument. If “one other” indeed refers to tests
that detect non-tickborne diseases, then that’s another reason (b)(ii)
shouldn’t apply, since each SNAP product detects multiple tickborne
diseases. Labs’ insistence that “other” literally means “non-tickborne”
also results in the nonsensical phrase, “one non-tickborne veterinary
diagnostic test or service”. It’s safe to conclude that the parties didn’t
need to specify that Labs’ veterinary diagnostic tests and services
weren’t being delivered or administered by ticks. Finally, like “one
other”, “one non-tickborne” can be read restrictively, so Labs’ argument
does little to move the ball forward.
However, a broad reading of “one other” in (b)(ii) wouldn’t render
(b)(iii) meaningless if (b)(iii) applies only to products with tests for
tickborne diseases—if it’s what Labs calls a tick panel. All three SNAP
products contain tests for heartworm, so (b)(iii), while not surplusage,

15
wouldn’t apply. And (b)(ii) would apply if “one other” doesn’t limit the
inclusion of tests for tickborne diseases, which all the products have.
But a tick panel was not part of the disease-testing market that
led to the licensing agreement. To the contrary, the market forces
prompting Labs to license the testing process for Lyme disease from the
University and Tulane were pushing Labs to add to its successful SNAP
heartworm test and differentiate it from competing tests, not to
substitute for the heartworm test altogether. 31
On the other side, the University’s reading of (b)(ii)’s “one other”
restrictively to mean only one is in some tension with its non-restrictive
reading of (b)(iii) to include heartworm though not mentioned and not a
tickborne disease. But again, Labs’ market reasons for licensing the
Lyme testing process, as discussed thoroughly with the University, were
to supplement the SNAP heartworm tests, not supplant them.
Labs argues that the royalty provisions aren’t comprehensive and
don’t cover products that might have been developed, such as one testing
for Lyme disease, heartworm, and one or more other non-tickborne
diseases. But Labs points to no rule that a contract be comprehensive to
be unambiguous. To the contrary, it would be unreasonable to require
parties, negotiating for particular situations, to provide for others
beyond their scope of interest.
Looking to the industry market for which the SNAP products
were developed, Labs argues that it makes no sense for the University

31 The market forces to which we refer here and below are the
“objectively determinable facts and circumstances that contextualize the
parties’ transaction”, not “extrinsic evidence of [the parties’] subjective intent”.
URI, 543 S.W.3d at 758, 767.

16
to agree to a lower (b)(ii) royalty on a product containing only its Lyme
disease test and Labs’ heartworm test (or potentially a different type of
test) but then insist on a much higher (b)(iii) royalty on a product
containing its Lyme disease test, Labs’ heartworm test, and several
other tests for tickborne diseases. The royalty should be higher, Labs
argues, when the University’s test is just one of two components in a
product rather than when its role is watered down by inclusion among
several others. The University counters that the inclusion of its Lyme
disease test with Labs’ heartworm test differentiated Labs’ SNAP
products from competitors and increased sales but also made possible
further diversification and greater profitability with the inclusion of yet
more tests for tickborne diseases, justifying a higher royalty. Even
though the Lyme test was a smaller component of a product covered by
(b)(iii), the University argues, it was responsible for driving greater
profits.
The context surrounding the parties’ agreement favors the
University’s reading; a restrictive reading of “one other” is closest to the
mark. The most natural reading of “one other” is only one other,
especially when the only alternative, one or more, results in the
problems discussed. As described, the product covered by (b)(ii) has
exactly two components, which test for Lyme disease and heartworm
respectively (although the heartworm component can be swapped out
for a component that tests for a different disease).
And notably, at the time the parties were negotiating, that
product description mirrored the format of an extant Labs product, the
Snap Canine Combo. The Snap Canine Combo tested for a tickborne

17
disease, E. canis, and only one other disease, heartworm. Subparagraph
(b)(ii) would cover a similar product, which tested for Lyme disease and
heartworm (or one other disease), and nothing else. However, it appears
that Labs soon determined that it would be more lucrative to create
products that test for heartworm and multiple tickborne diseases, i.e.,
in a “tick panel format”, as evinced by Labs’ continuing to release
products that tested for an increasing number of tickborne diseases.
Significantly, as Pulsifer reminds us, this reading gives “operative
significance” to all the provisions and ensures that “[e]ach . . . does
independent work”. 32 Subparagraph (b)(i) applies to products that test
for Lyme disease alone; 33 (b)(ii) was intended to apply to a contemplated
product similar to the SNAP Canine Combo, which was ultimately never
produced; and (b)(iii) applies to each of the disputed SNAP products.
Reading the royalty provisions together, not separately, giving
meaning to all, and considering them in the context of the licensing
agreement itself and the objective circumstances in which the license
agreement was produced, we conclude that the provisions are most
reasonably interpreted to require royalties on SNAP products at the
higher (b)(iii) rate.
Labs argues that the University shouldn’t be allowed to accept
royalties at the lower rate for more than 13 years, throughout the life of
the licensing agreement, and then after the agreement ended complain
for the first time that royalties were due at the higher rate. Labs
reported to the University—in detail, every quarter, for each SNAP

32 144 S. Ct. at 731.

33 See supra note 7.

18
product—the sales, royalty rates, and amounts paid. The University
doesn’t claim to have misunderstood or been misled. It claims only that
it was unaware of an issue that Labs purportedly recognized and didn’t
raise. Labs has defenses to the University’s claim that the court of
appeals must address on remand.
* * * * *
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

Nathan L. Hecht
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 14, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10033929. Public record. Not legal advice.
