# (PC) Haynes v. Orel

> District Court, E.D. California · September 24, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10030473

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** September 24, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10030473

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the interest in a simplified food service may allow 12 a prison to provide a pork-free diet, instead of a fully kosher diet, to an Orthodox Jewish inmate
- finding Native American prisoner’s free exercise rights were likely 19 violated where he was punished for refusing to cut his hair due to his religious beliefs; the 20 punishments were “designed ... to coerce him into compliance.”

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 LELAND HAYNES, No. 2:19-cv-1988 AC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 DAVID OREL, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11, is before the court for screening.
19 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
20 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
21 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
22 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
23 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[]
24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
25 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
26 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
27 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal
28 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639,
1 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as
2 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a
3 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
4 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted).
5 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
6 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
7 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
8 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
9 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context
10 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman,
11 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure
12 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
13 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
14 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “‘[T]he pleading must contain
15 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally
16 cognizable right of action.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
17 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
18 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
19 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
22 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this
23 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg.
24 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the
25 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor,
26 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted).
27 ////
28 ////
1 II. The First Amended Complaint
2 Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
3 and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) were violated by a 2018 dispute regarding his
4 compliance with the requirements of Folsom State Prison’s religious diet program. The
5 complaint presents three claims, all involving alleged interference with plaintiff’s religious
6 practice, against the following defendants: David Orel, Folsom prison chaplain; Karl Seigler,
7 Community Resource Manager; L. Cahayla, former Program Associate Warden; and Rick Hill,
8 Warden. All three claims are based on alleged violation of plaintiff’s right to a religious diet.
9 ECF No. 11 at 3, 6, 8. All three claims arise from the same events, but each emphasizes a
10 somewhat different dimension of the dispute.
11 The FAC alleges in sum as follows. Plaintiff, an adherent of the Ifa religion,1 was a
12 participant in Folsom’s Religious Alternative Meat Program (RAMP) from 2010 to 2018. ECF
13 No. 11 at 4. Participants are required to limit their purchase and consumption of food items to
14 those that are part of their approved religious diet. Id. Plaintiff twice purchased ramen soups
15 from the canteen; ramen soups are not approved for RAMP participants because they are not halal
16 (complaint with Islamic dietary law). Pursuant to the institution’s religious diet policy, plaintiff
17 was issued a written warning of program non-compliance after the first purchase, and he was
18 removed from the program after the second purchase. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff purchased the ramen
19 for the purpose of making offerings to the spirits recognized by his religion, not for his personal
20 consumption. Id. at 9.
21 Liberally construing the allegations, plaintiff contends that the policy conditioning his
22 participation in the religious diet program on forgoing certain canteen purchases violates his
23 rights because it forces him to choose between the independent Ifa religious obligations of diet
24 and sacrifice (making offerings). See id. at 4 (Claim One); id. at 9 (Claim Three). Claim Two
25 alleges that the policy as applied to him is unconstitutional because it prohibits certain purchases
26 based on the items’ designation as halal, even though he is Ifa and not Muslim. Id. at 7 (“Plaintiff
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28 1 Ifa is a spiritual belief system of the Yoruba people of Nigeria. ECF No. 1 at 20.
1 was compelled to conform to Islamic dietary law and standards, which is contrary to ‘his’
2 religious diet.”).
3 III. Failure to State a Claim
4 Incarcerated persons do not forfeit the right to the free exercise of religion, which is
5 guaranteed by the First Amendment. See McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987);
6 Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2013). In the
7 religious diet context, incarcerated persons “have the right to be provided with food sufficient to
8 sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea, 833 F.2d at
9 198.
10 To state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must plausibly allege that a
11 prison official’s actions (a) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate’s exercise of a sincerely-held
12 religious belief; and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner—i.e., the official’s actions were not
13 “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
14 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015); Shakur
15 v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). A substantial burden places more than an
16 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting
17 contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
18 behavior and to violate his beliefs. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32. Plaintiff must demonstrate that
19 prison officials prevented him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is required
20 by his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. The underlying religious belief must be “sincerely
21 held.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85
22 (noting that the “sincerity test,” not the “centrality test,” applies to a free exercise analysis). The
23 First Amendment substantial burden requirement also applies to claims under RLUIPA. See
24 Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
25 Here, plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of a substantial burden on his religious
26 practice. Plaintiff participated in the religious diet program for many years apparently without
27 incident, being provided food for his own consumption that was undisputedly consistent with his
28 religious beliefs. Access to this religious diet was always available to him. After plaintiff’s first
1 non-compliant canteen purchase, he was issued a written warning and thus provided the
2 opportunity to comply with program rules and continue to receive religious meals. His
3 subsequent removal from the program was based on violation of generally applicable program
4 rules, not on an institutional refusal to recognize or honor his religious diet needs. The question
5 becomes whether the restriction on plaintiff’s canteen purchases itself imposed a substantial
6 burden on his religious observance.
7 There is no suggestion here that the prison prohibited plaintiff from making offerings to
8 the spirits generally, or from performing any other religious rite. Plaintiff’s inability to purchase
9 ramen (or other prohibited items) with which to make such offerings cannot reasonably be
10 construed as imposing a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.2 It is the making of
11 offerings, not the purchase of ramen per se, that is the religious obligation at issue here. A
12 reasonable limitation on the items with which offerings can be made does not substantially
13 burden the making of offerings itself. Accordingly, such limitation cannot reasonably be
14 construed as having any coercive effect on plaintiff’s religious practices. See Jones, 791 F.3d at
15 1031-32 (to qualify as substantial burden, restriction must “have a tendency to coerce individuals
16 into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to
17 modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs”); compare Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,
18 995-96 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding Native American prisoner’s free exercise rights were likely
19 violated where he was punished for refusing to cut his hair due to his religious beliefs; the
20 punishments were “designed ... to coerce him into compliance.”). Absent facts demonstrating a
21 substantial burden, plaintiff fails to state either a First Amendment claim or a claim under
22 RLUIPA. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32 (First Amendment free exercise); Greene v. Solano
23 County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (RLUIPA).
24 Moreover, infringement on an inmate’s free exercise rights is “judged under a
25 reasonableness test,” and the “challenged conduct is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
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2 The complaint does not allege that Ifa (a Nigerian religious tradition) specifically and
27 affirmatively requires offerings of ramen (a Japanese-style noodle dish), and such an allegation
would not be sufficiently plausible to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (claim must
28 be “plausible on its face”).
1 penological interests.” Jones, 791 F.3d at 1032 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Turner
2 v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Here, plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish that the limitation
3 on his canteen purchases lacked penological justification. It is well established that requiring
4 compliance with reasonable policies that support the orderly operation of a prison’s religious
5 meals program does not violate the First Amendment rights of inmates. See Resnick v. Adams,
6 348 F.3d 763, 768-71 (9th Cir. 2003). The limitations imposed by Folsom’s Religious Diet
7 Program Agreement3 on its participants are, on their face, reasonably related to legitimate
8 penological interests and therefore permissible under Turner v. Safley. See Resnick, 348 F.3d at
9 768-71 (upholding prison’s religious diet program application policy because reasonably related
10 to the prison’s interest in the orderly administration of the program); see also Ward v. Walsh, 1
11 F.3d 873, 877-879 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the interest in a simplified food service may allow
12 a prison to provide a pork-free diet, instead of a fully kosher diet, to an Orthodox Jewish inmate).
13 Folsom’s Religious Diet Program is not constitutionally defective on grounds that it
14 prohibits plaintiff, a non-Muslim, from purchasing halal items at the canteen. The prison’s
15 legitimate interests in simplified food service and the orderly administration of its program are
16 plainly served by providing meal options that are acceptable to inmates of multiple faiths, and by
17 restricting purchases to those comestibles that are encompassed by the common religiously
18 acceptable diet(s).4 Any over-inclusiveness of the canteen limitations as to plaintiff is the
19 consequence of the prison’s obvious need for simple rules that can be applied equally to
20 participating inmates of all faiths, while providing all participants with a healthful diet that meets
21 their core religious requirements. This approach easily satisfies the reasonableness test. See
22 Jones, 791 F.3d at 1032; Resnick, 348 F.3d at 768-71; Ward, 1 F.3d at 877-879.
23 Although plaintiff contends he was “compelled to conform to Islamic dietary law,” the
24 facts do not show that he was affirmatively compelled to do anything—he challenges a limitation
25 on his purchases, not a requirement that he eat or do something that is required of Muslims but
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3 Plaintiff provided a copy of the Agreement with his initial complaint. ECF No. 1 at 14.
27 4 The Religious Diet Program provides three options: Jewish/Kosher, Vegetarian, and the
Religious Meat Alternate Program in which plaintiff participated. See ECF No. 1 at 14
28 (Religious Diet Program Agreement).
1 forbidden to adherents of Ifa. Accordingly, there is no coercion within the meaning of free
2 exercise jurisprudence. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32 (First Amendment violation by
3 restrictions that “have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
4 beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
5 beliefs”).
6 For all these reasons, the allegations fail to state a claim for violation of plaintiff’s
7 religious rights.
8 IV. Further Leave to Amend Is Not Warranted
9 Leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile. Hartmann v.
10 CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). Prior failure to cure deficiencies by amendment
11 supports the denial of further leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In
12 this case, plaintiff has already amended his claims in response to the information and instructions
13 provided when his initial complaint was rejected on screening. The First Amended Complaint
14 clearly sets forth plaintiff’s claims, clarifies their factual and legal bases, and appears to include
15 all facts relevant to this dispute. For the reasons explained above, those facts do not state a claim
16 for relief as a matter of law. Accordingly, further amendment would be futile.
17 CONCLUSION
18 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall
19 randomly assign a district judge to this action.
20 It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:
21 1. The first amended complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
22 without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and
23 2. This case be CLOSED.
24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14)
26 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written
27 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
28 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that
1 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District
2 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
3 | DATED: September 23, 2021 ~
4 ttt0n—
ALLISON CLAIRE
5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10030473. Public record. Not legal advice.