# (PC) Harding v. Sacramento County Sheriff Dept

> District Court, E.D. California · August 9, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10029324

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 9, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10029324

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and 16 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate 17 grievances
- finding that a retaliatory prison 18 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First 19 Amendment

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BRENT LEE HARDING, No. 2:21-cv-00964-CKD
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff is a county inmate proceeding pro se and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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636(b)(1) and plaintiff has consented to have all matters in this action before a United States
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Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a
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declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted.
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Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§
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1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the
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initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court.
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Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding
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month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by
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1 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account
2 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
3 I. Screening Requirement
4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
7 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
15 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
21 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
23 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
24 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
25 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
26 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
27 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
28 /////
1 II. Allegations in the Complaint
2 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in
3 the custody of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. While housed at the main jail,
4 plaintiff was placed in quarantine for a period of three weeks. During this period of time, plaintiff
5 was not allowed out of his cell for more than 45 minutes each week. Although the complaint
6 mentions being tested for COVID-19 and receiving a vaccine, it is not clear if plaintiff’s
7 placement in quarantine for this three week period of time was connected to containing the virus
8 or for disciplinary purposes. After he attempted to file a grievance, correctional officers
9 threatened to harm plaintiff or transfer him to more restrictive housing. Plaintiff was transferred
10 to the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center where he was also threatened if he filed a grievance.
11 By way of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and a probe of the
12 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.
13 III. Legal Standards
14 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as
15 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint.
16 A. Linkage
17 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
18 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
19 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
20 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
21 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
22 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
23 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
24 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must
25 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of
26 plaintiff's federal rights.
27 B. Eleventh Amendment
28 In his complaint plaintiff has named the State of California as one of the defendants. The
1 Eleventh Amendment serves as a jurisdictional bar to suits brought by private parties against a
2 state or state agency unless the state or the agency consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan,
3 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa,
4 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). In the instant case, the State of California has not
5 consented to suit.
6 C. Monell Claim
7 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
8 employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is
9 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
10 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
11 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered
12 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional
13 deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,
14 1185 (9th Cir.2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom,
15 practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which
16 he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate
17 indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the
18 constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438
19 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or
20 custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’”
21 Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
22 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)).
23 D. Conditions of Confinement
24 Conditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the
25 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v.
26 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998).
27 Nevertheless, comparable standards apply, with Fourteenth Amendment analysis borrowing from
28 Eighth Amendment standards. Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. “Jail officials have a duty to ensure that
1 detainees are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal
2 safety.” Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018). To prevail on a substantive due
3 process claim, plaintiff must establish that the restrictions imposed by his confinement constituted
4 punishment as opposed to being incident to legitimate governmental purposes. Bell, 441 U.S. at
5 538. If a particular jail condition is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, it
6 does not amount to punishment absent a showing of an express intent to punish. Id. at 538–39.
7 E. Retaliation
8 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five
9 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
10 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's
11 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
12 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
13 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351
14 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See
15 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and
16 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate
17 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison
18 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First
19 Amendment).
20 IV. Analysis
21 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
22 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff’s claims against the State of California
23 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed. Plaintiff has not alleged any
24 county policy, custom, or practice concerning his conditions of confinement while at the jail.
25 Therefore, he has not stated a Monell claim against either the Sacramento County Sheriff’s
26 Department or the County of Sacramento. Additionally, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to
27 state a retaliation claim against any defendant because he has not identified any adverse action
28 taken by defendants based on plaintiff's decision to file an inmate grievance. Plaintiff only
1 alleges that defendants threatened to beat and transfer him to a more restrictive location for filing
2 an inmate grievance against them. He does not clarify whether any such action was actually
3 taken. For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however,
4 grant leave to file an amended complaint.
5 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
6 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
7 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
8 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
9 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
10 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
11 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
12 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
13 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
14 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
15 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
16 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
17 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
18 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
19 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
20 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party
21 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not
22 intended as legal advice.
23 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not
24 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being
25 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.
26 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30
27 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular
28 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.
1 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
3 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees
4 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California
5 || Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
6 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
7 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
8 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
9 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
10 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
11 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
12 || be dismissed.
13 | Dated: August 9, 2021 / ae □□ / a Ly a
4 CAROLYN K DELANEY
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10029324. Public record. Not legal advice.