# Estate of Antonio Thomas v. County of Sacramento

> District Court, E.D. California · July 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10028480

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** July 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10028480

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 10 articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 Estate of Antonio Thomas, et al., No. 2:20-cv-00903-KJM-DB
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER
13 Vv.
14 County of Sacramento, et al.,
1S Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s March 21, 2021 order
18 | denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery and granting defendants’ motion for a protective
19 | order. As explained in more detail below, the motion is denied.
20 | I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
21 Antonio Thomas, a 39-year-old man, suffering from mental-illness, was taken into
22 | custody of defendant Sacramento County Sheriff's Department at the Sacramento County Main
23 | Jail where he was housed in the jail’s general population. See Compl. 4] 20-23. Mr. Thomas
24 | was assigned to share a cell with another inmate. Jd. 24. On December 10, 2019, Mr. Thomas
25 | was brutally assaulted by his cellmate, and discovered later by jail staff. Id. §J§] 24-25. He was
26 | hospitalized, see id. | 31; medical staff observed he had no brain activity, id. Mr. Thomas
27 | remained comatose for approximately 42 days before he was taken off life support and died. Jd.
28 | 9 31-34.

1 Soon after Mr. Thomas’s death, plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
2 alleging: (1) defendants’ failure to protect Mr. Thomas and intentionally refusing to transfer
3 Mr. Thomas to a mental health facility that could provide him with the necessary treatment, and
4 (2) not taking reasonable measures to abate Mr. Thomas’s risk of suffering serious harm when
5 placing him with a dangerous cellmate. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs also assert a
6 Rehabilitation Act claim and an Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Id. ¶¶ 64–70; id. ¶¶ 71–
7 77. Plaintiffs also assert four state law claims against defendants: (1) Right to Medical
8 Care/Treatment, Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6, (2) Bane Act, Cal Civ. Code § 52.1, (3) Negligence,
9 and (4) Wrongful death, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60. See generally id. Plaintiffs seek actual,
10 nominal, compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 23 (Prayer for Relief).
11 On January 27, 2021, defendants produced certain custody file documents to plaintiffs in
12 response to discovery requests, after extended meet and confer sessions and conferences with the
13 court. ECF Nos. 15, 28, 33, 36. On January 29, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel
14 production of the remainder of the documents, including “Antonio Thomas’s custody file” dated
15 August 27, 2020. Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 30. Defendants have withheld these documents,
16 taking the position they require a blanket protective order first. Jt. Statement at 4, ECF No. 34.
17 In resolving plaintiffs’ motion to compel, the magistrate judge concluded defendants made the
18 necessary good cause showing for the court to issue a protective order covering discovery
19 documents containing information that implicate the safety and security of the prison. MJ Order
20 at 3, ECF No. 30 (citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206,
21 1211 (9th Cir. 2002)). The magistrate judge declined plaintiffs’ request for unredacted
22 disclosures and denied their motion to compel. Id. At the same time, the magistrate judge
23 granted defendants’ January 29, 2021 renewed motion for a protective order. See id.
24 Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s ruling. Mot. for Recon., ECF
25 No. 41. Defendants oppose the motion, which is fully briefed. See Opp’n, ECF No. 42.
26 Plaintiffs then filed a request to consider new authority, ECF No. 46, to which defendant
27 responded, Reply, ECF No. 48. On April 27, 2021, the court submitted the matter without oral
28 argument. See Minutes, ECF No. 50. The court addresses the motion here.
1 II. LEGAL STANDARD
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) requires that district judges consider timely
3 objections to nondispositive pretrial orders issued by magistrate judges and “modify or set aside
4 any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see
5 also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); E.D. Cal. R. 303(f). A magistrate judge’s decision is “‘contrary to
6 law’ if it applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to consider an element of [an] applicable
7 standard, or fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.”
8 Martin v. Loadholt, No. 1:10-cv-00156, 2014 WL 3563312, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2014);
9 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3069 (3d ed.) (noting “‘contrary to law’ appears to invite plenary
10 review,” though “many matters such as discovery scheduling or disputes might better be
11 characterized as suitable for an abuse-of-discretion analysis”). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
12 when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left
13 with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe and
14 Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (alteration in original)
15 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[R]eview under
16 the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly deferential . . . .” Id. at 623.
17 III. ANALYSIS
18 Plaintiffs contend the magistrate judge’s factual finding that Lt. Mark Lopez’s declaration
19 “provides a specific demonstration of fact and concrete examples” sufficient to satisfy Federal
20 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)’s “good cause” standard to grant the protective order is clearly
21 erroneous. Mot. for Recon. at 12; see MJ Order at 2 (citing Lt. Lopez Decl. at 1, ECF No. 31-2).
22 Defendants argue the instant motion misrepresents the record, see Opp’n at 5; in addition to
23 Lt. Lopez’s declaration, defendants produced an index specifying the documents comprising
24 Mr. Thomas’s custody and classification files that they say need protection, including “how
25 records of cell checks are kept, and what kinds of notes are maintained regarding inmates,” id. at
26 6. In light of the magistrate judge’s order explaining the law she applied, the evidence she
27 considered, the reasoning underlying her decision and the process she contemplates, the court
28 denies plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.
1 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd, Rule 26(c) provides that
2 “[u]pon motion by a party or by a person from whom discovery is sought . . . and for good cause
3 shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may make any order which justice requires to
4 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
5 expense.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir.
6 2002) (summarizing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)). For good cause to exist, the party seeking
7 protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective
8 order is granted. See Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.
9 1992) (holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or
10 articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”); see also San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v.
11 U.S. Dist. Ct.--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that to obtain
12 protective order party must make “particularized showing of good cause with respect to any
13 individual document”).
14 In denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel, the magistrate judge considered Lieutenant
15 Lopez’s explanation of how making public knowledge of the intake and jail cell check process
16 “would allow those entering the jail a greater ability to manipulate the system to their own
17 advantage . . . and could hamper proper placement in medical and psych cells, as well as effective
18 cell checks.” MJ Order at 3; see generally Lt. Lopez Decl. Plaintiffs argue the jail’s custody and
19 classification policies are public records, see Reply at 2 (citing Ex. A at 5, Holloway v. County of
20 Orange et al., C.D. Cal. Case No. 8:19-cv-01514 (April 2, 2021), ECF No. 46), and defendants’
21 longstanding practice has been to produce inmate’s custody and classification files in discovery
22 without a protective order, see Mot. for Recon. at 16. The court considers the record only in this
23 case, and defendants here effectively distinguish this case from Holloway. In Holloway,
24 defendants did not meet their “good cause” burden because information about “third parties . . .
25 and their names [were] in the public domain in the criminal complaint.” Holloway, No. 8:19-cv-
26 01514 at 4; Reply at 2. In contrast, defendants here have identified certain categories of
27 information by document name as confidential and not in the public record; the document names
28 themselves do not raise an obvious red flag regarding defendants’ characterization. See Lt. Lopez
1 Decl. ¶¶ 9-10 (custody file documents including intake classification and screening forms, special
2 needs form and jail locator card), ¶ 11 (classification file documents including address and email
3 address lists, phone numbers, contact information, medical providers and treatment information);
4 see also id. Ex. A (custody and classification file index). At the same time, defendants have
5 identified documents in the custody file that are not confidential; even if these documents contain
6 some sensitive information defendants represent that information can be redacted prior to
7 disclosure and the court assumes they have produced these documents. In sum, on this record, the
8 magistrate judge could reasonably find that defendants have shown “good cause” exists for
9 protecting certain information in Antonio Thomas’s custody and classification files, which are not
10 fully in the public domain, taking account of the institutional concern that harm could result from
11 exposing all the contents of his files to the public. See Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd, 307 F.3d at
12 1211 (“If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the
13 public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is
14 necessary.”); MJ Order (citing Lt. Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 13–16).
15 Importantly, at the motion hearing she held, the magistrate judge explained the protective
16 order “lays the groundwork for then [sic] disputes over specific documents where [plaintiffs]
17 could say, ‘No, this shouldn’t be subject to a protective order,’” March 5 Hr’g Tr. at 5:8–19, ECF
18 No. 40; see id. at 6:5–15 (noting plaintiffs refer to list they received from defendants, which
19 undercuts their “very own argument that there’s been no . . . showing of individual documents
20 that could be subject to a list.”). “Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide
21 when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times
22 Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). Rule 26 specifically permits a court to “limit[] the
23 scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). Once the
24 magistrate judge was satisfied defendants cleared the good cause hurdle, she acted within her
25 authority in designing a process whereby plaintiffs will be able to view the particular documents
26 defendants have withheld once the protective order is entered.
27 Ultimately, if plaintiffs’ suspicions are correct, that some or all of the documents do not
28 qualify for the protection defendants have sought, they may move before the magistrate judge to
1 lift the limitations imposed by the protective order and in doing so seek sanctions as provided for
2 by the applicable rules. See generally, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. In the face of such a motion, the
3 magistrate judge at that point will be in a position to review the documents themselves in camera
4 before making a decision. See, e.g., Est. of Neil v. Cty. of Colusa, No. 2:19-CV-02441, 2020 WL
5 5535448, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (applying Rule 26(c) and determining that “[t]o
6 establish good cause, a party must show for each particular document it seeks to protect . . . that
7 specific prejudice or harm will result’ absent sealing” (internal quotations and citation omitted));
8 Bangert v. Cty. of Placer, No. 2:17-CV-1667, 2019 WL 358518, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019)
9 (same). Even if the magistrate judge could have exercised her discretion to require defendants to
10 submit the disputed documents for her review in camera before granting the request for a
11 protective order, the court does not find on this record that it was error for her not to do so.
12 Specifically, the magistrate judge did not commit clear error in finding good cause exists to grant
13 a protective order to facilitate plaintiffs’ discovery of the remainder of Mr. Thomas’s files.
14 IV. CONCLUSION
15 Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied. This matter is referred back to the
16 assigned magistrate judge for further handling.
17 This order resolves ECF No. 41.
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 DATED: June 30, 2021.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10028480. Public record. Not legal advice.