# (PC) Ramsey v. Dickerson

> District Court, E.D. California · July 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10020883

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** July 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10020883

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing “under color of 5 state law”

## Opinion text

1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 DAVID BRANDON RAMSEY, 1:19-cv-00666-DAD-GSA-PC

12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER

13 vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF RULE 8(a)(3), WITH
14 C/O A. DICKERSON, et al., LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 1.)
15 Defendants.
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE TO FILE
16 AMENDED COMPLAINT
17
18
19 I. BACKGROUND
20 David Brandon Ramsey (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
21 pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff
22 filed the Complaint commencing this action at the Sacramento Division of the U.S. District Court
23 for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On May 16, 2019, the case was transferred
24 to this court. (ECF No. 5.)
25 The Complaint is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (ECF No. 1.)
26 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
27 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
1 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
4 “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
5 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim
6 upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
7 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
8 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken
12 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
13 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state
14 a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
15 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,
16 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal
17 conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this
18 plausibility standard. Id.
19 III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
20 Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California. The
21 events at issue in the Complaint allegedly took place at North Kern State Prison in Delano,
22 California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of
23 Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff names as defendants Sergeant A. Jimenez, Correctional
24 Officer (C/O) A. Dickerson, C/O S. Borlina, and C/O J. Santiago (collectively, “Defendants”).
25 A summary of Plaintiff’s allegations follows:
26 On May 21, 2017, Plaintiff experienced a seizure. During evaluation by medical staff
27 defendant Sgt. Jimenez grabbed Plaintiff’s pinkie finger, bent it back and broke it. Plaintiff
28 pulled his hand away and was forced onto his stomach. He pulled his hands up to his chest
1 protecting his hand. Defendant C/O Dickerson grabbed Plaintiff in a three-finger choke hold
2 bruising his trachea and neck as he was being taken out of the exam room in handcuffs. Plaintiff
3 was body-slammed on the floor causing him to hit the side of his face and his ear. He felt wind
4 go into his ear and heard a pop. He was then brought to his feet and as he was being placed in
5 the observation cage, defendant Jimenez grabbed him by the hair and slammed his forehead into
6 the cage. The officers left him in handcuffs that were so tight they caused swelling and required
7 special assistance to have them removed. Officers made false statements to cover up their
8 actions. The medical team requested to send Plaintiff to an outside hospital, but the request was
9 denied delaying proper medical care. Plaintiff suffered a broken finger, cuts, bruises, abrasions,
10 head trauma, ear and hearing damage, wrist damage, mental trauma, and ongoing psychological
11 harm.
12 Plaintiff has not requested any relief in the Complaint except a jury trial.
13 IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
14 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

15 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
16 be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
17 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
18

19 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
20 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a
21 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
22 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v.
23 Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d
24 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v.
25 Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). “To the extent that the violation of a state law
26 amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the
27 federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id.
28 ///
1 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under
2 color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him or her of rights secured by the Constitution
3 or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
4 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of
5 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983,
6 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act
7 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’”
8 Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
9 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be
10 established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or
11 reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479
12 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles
13 the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
14 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010,
15 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
16 A. Rule 8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
17 Plaintiff has not included a request for relief in the Complaint. Rule 8(a)(3) requires that
18 a complaint include a request for relief:
19 A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
20 (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
21 court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
22 (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
23 relief; and
24 (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
25 different types of relief.
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
27 ///
28 ///
1 Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed for violation of Rule 8(a)(3), with leave to file
2 an amended complaint including a request for relief. Plaintiff shall be granted thirty days in
3 which to file the First Amended Complaint.
4 In the paragraphs that follow the court shall set forth the legal standards for the claims it
5 appears Plaintiff wishes to bring.
6 1. Excessive Force -- Eighth Amendment Claim
7 “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and
8 responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)
9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause
10 harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant
11 injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth
12 Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis
13 injuries)). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in
14 violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether
15 force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
16 sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and
17 unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship
18 between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the
19 responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id.
20 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant
21 to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id.
22 2. Retaliation
23 Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to
24 petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 5527, 532 (9th
25 Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.
26 Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First
27 Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some
28 adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that
1 such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action
2 did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
3 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012);
4 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).
5 3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
6 Plaintiff indicates in the Complaint that he wishes to bring a claim under the Fourteenth
7 Amendment. However, Plaintiff has not indicated what type of Fourteenth Amendment claim
8 he wishes to bring. Without more information from Plaintiff, the court cannot offer a legal
9 standard for this claim.
10 4. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Claim
11 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
12 of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
13 programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
14 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public
15 entities, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006), and state prisons “fall squarely
16 within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,’” Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524
17 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
18 In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a
19 plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) he was either excluded
20 from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities,
21 or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of
22 benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d
23 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir.
24 2001) (“If a public entity denies an otherwise ‘qualified individual’ ‘meaningful access’ to its
25 ‘services, programs, or activities’ ‘solely by reason of’ his or her disability, that individual may
26 have an ADA claim against the public entity.”). The ADA, as amended in 2008, defines a
27 disability, with respect to an individual, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
28 ///
1 limits one or more major life activities of such an individual.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2 12102(1)(A)).
3 5. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim
4 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate
5 must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,
6 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for
7 deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by
8 demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury
9 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need
10 was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,
11 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,
12 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown
13 by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm
14 caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference
15 may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical
16 treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id.
17 Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to
18 further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical
19 needs. McGuckin at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,
20 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).
21 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,
22 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the
23 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but
24 that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
25 825, 837 (1994)). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the
26 official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting
27 Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of
28 medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under
1 the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1060. “[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a
2 constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)).
3 “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities
4 regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337,
5 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, a plaintiff “must show that the course
6 of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . .
7 that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.”
8 Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
9 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
10 The court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint violates Rule 8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of
11 Civil Procedure for failing to include a request for relief in the Complaint. Plaintiff shall be
12 granted leave to amend the Complaint to cure this deficiency found by the court. Plaintiff is
13 granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446,
14 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).
15 The First Amended Complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what
16 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal
17 rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff
18 must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at
19 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each
20 defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must
21 demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones,
22 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the
23 opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of adding new defendants for unrelated issues.
24 Plaintiff should also note that he has not been granted leave to add allegations of events occurring
25 after the initiation of this suit on May 10, 2019.
26 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey
27 v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012), and it must be complete in itself
28 without reference to the prior or superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended
1 complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore,
2 in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each
3 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly
4 titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed
5 under penalty of perjury.
6 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
7 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED for violation of Rule 8(a)(3), with leave to
8 amend;
9 2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
10 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order in which
11 to file a First Amended Complaint;
12 4. The First Amended Complaint shall be titled “First Amended Complaint” and
13 refer to the case number 1:19-cv-00666-DAD-GSA-PC; and
14 5. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order shall result in a recommendation that
15 this case be dismissed.
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
17

18 Dated: July 30, 2020 /s/ Gary S. Austin
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10020883. Public record. Not legal advice.