# Riggins v. The State of Arkansas

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · May 15, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10012628

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** May 15, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
KENNETH RIGGINS PLAINTIFF
V. CASE NO. 3:24-CV-3001
STATE OF ARKANSAS DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court is Defendant State of Arkansas’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 7) and Brief in Support (Doc. 8). Plaintiff Kenneth Riggins filed a Response in
Opposition (Doc. 9) and Brief in Support (Doc. 10). For the reasons stated herein, the
Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Mr. Riggins alleges in his Complaint (Doc. 2) that he was constructively discharged
from his job as Area Livestock Inspector Supervisor for the Livestock and Poultry
Commission, which he asserts is an entity existing under the Arkansas Department of
Agriculture. Though the State asserts that Mr. Riggins should have sued the Livestock
and Poultry Commission and not the State itself, Mr. Riggins disagrees and maintains
that his true employer was the State. The Court will assume the facts as Mr. Riggins
pleads them and consider the State to have been his employer for purposes of evaluating
this Motion."

' The Complaint would require amendment if Mr. Riggins’s true employer were the
Livestock and Poultry Commission. However, even if that were the case, it is likely the
Commission would qualify as an arm or instrumentality of the State—and the Court's
Eleventh Amendment analysis below would apply equally to the Commission. See Webb
v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (‘The Eleventh Amendment
protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court.”).

Mr. Riggins brings the following causes of action against the State: (1) gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act (“ACRA’); (2) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) and the Arkansas Age Discrimination Act (“AADA’); (3) failure to pay overtime
in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act
(“AMWA"); (4) violations of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and the Arkansas Wage
Discrimination Act (“AWDA’); and (5) breach of contract for failing to pay a promised 10%
salary raise. In terms of relief, Mr. Riggins seeks compensatory and punitive damages,
reinstatement to his previous position, and reimbursement of his attorney's fees and
costs.
|. Dismissal of Certain Claims Under Rule 12(b)(1)
The State argues that it cannot be sued in federal court for violations of most of
the statutes cited in the Complaint due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. As a result, the
State requests dismissal of these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such motions “may be resolved either on the face
of the pleadings or upon factual determinations made in consideration of matters outside
of the pleadings.” Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div. of Intern. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834-35 (N.D. lowa 2007) (citing Titus v. Sullivan, 4
F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir.
1990)). Here, the 12(b)(1) issues may be resolved on the face of the Complaint.
“[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another state.” Emps. v. Mo. Pub Health & Welfare

Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973). “[T]he Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal
judicial power is based in large part on ‘the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other.’”” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984) (quoting Mo. Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at
294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring)). According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity may be waived and a “State may consent to
suit against it in federal court.” /d. at 99. However, a waiver of sovereign immunity by a
State must be “unequivocally expressed.” /d.
Alternatively, Congress may require a State to submit to suit in federal court for
violations of the U.S. Constitution or violations of federal statute. “Congress has power
with respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” /d. However, once again, such abrogation of State
immunity “require[s] an unequivocal expression of intent [by Congress] to overturn the
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.” /d. (internal quotation and
citation omitted). “The [Eleventh] Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against
hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.” /d. at 120 (emphasis in original); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“But, although a case may arise under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to
be prosecuted by a State without her consent, by one of her own citizens.”).

Even pendent state law claims are barred from proceeding in federal court if the
State has not consented to be sued in that forum—regardless of the relief that has been
requested. The Supreme Court clarified this point in Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120.
[P]Jendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency
derived from the general Art. III language conferring power to hear alll
“cases” arising under federal law or between diverse parties .. . . The
Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force to
this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power
to hear federal claims. The history of the adoption and development of the
Amendment . . . confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises
of Art. Ill power: “the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does
not embrace authority to entertain suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given,” Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S.
490, 497, 41 S.Ct. 588, 589, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921). If we were to hold
otherwise, a federal court could award damages against a State on the
basis of a pendent claim.
With those principles in mind, the Court now turns its attention to the State’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity claims as to each cause of action listed in the Complaint.
A. Federal Claims
1. ADEA and FLSA
Mr. Riggins admits in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss that his ADEA and
FLSA claims are barred by to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Doc. 10, p. 4. The
Court agrees.
The Supreme Court determined in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents that private
citizens could not sue the States in any court—federal or state—for violations of the ADEA
because “Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits” for
violations of this federal statute. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). The Court further noted that state
employees were not without any avenue to sue for age discrimination, as most “are

protected by state age discrimination statutes and may recover money damages from
their state employers, in almost every State of the Union.” Id.
The Supreme Court has also made clear that “Congress did not lift the sovereign
immunity of the States under the FLSA” Mo. Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 285; see
also id. (“But we have found not a word in the history of the 1966 amendments to indicate
a purpose of Congress to make it possible for a citizen of that State or another State to
sue the State in the federal courts.”). State employees are not entirely without recourse,
however, when their employer fails to pay them adequate minimum wages and overtime
compensation. The Supreme Court observed that the federal government is empowered
to bring suit against the individual States. Consequently, the U.S. Secretary of Labor may
bring suit against a State for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
and enjoin violations of the FLSA. /d. at 285-86.
Accordingly, Mr. Riggins’s ADEA and FLSA claims are DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
2. Title Vil of the Civil Rights Act
Arkansas is not immune from suit in federal court for claims arising under Title VII.
See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Since Congress
expressed its unequivocal intent to abrogate immunity and acted pursuant to its
constitutional authority, it validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment for claims of
disparate treatment and impact on the basis of gender and race.”). Therefore, the Court

maintains valid subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Riggins’s gender discrimination claim
under Title VII, which means the claim is not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).
3. EPA
The Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Riggins’s EPA claim.
“Congress properly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted the EPA.”
O’Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1999). This claim is similarly not
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).
B. State Law Claims
It was Mr. Riggins’s burden to prove that the State consented to suit in federal
court for violations of state common law and state statute. See Buckler v. United States,
919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019). He failed to do this, and the Court is not aware that
the State waived or abrogated its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any state law
claims alleged in the Complaint.?

2 In particular, the Court located case law holding that employment-related contract
claims brought by state employees are barred from litigation in federal court pursuant to
Arkansas’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark.
State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1995) (dismissing state employee’s contract
claim). Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that ACRA claims for damages
against the State are barred by state sovereign immunity (also known as common-law
sovereign immunity). See Short v. Westark Comm. Coll., 347 Ark. 497, 504 (2002).
With all that said, however, Mr. Riggins is not likely to be left without any remedy at all
against the State once the Court dismisses his pendent claims. The Arkansas State
Claims Commission has jurisdiction over “[a] claim or action that is barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity under Arkansas Constitution, Article 5, § 20, from being litigated in
a court of general jurisdiction, except as otherwise provided by law.” Ark. Code Ann. § 19-
10-204(a)(1). And the Arkansas Supreme Court has suggested that wage and hour claims
and contract claims should be brought before the Claims Commission. See, e.g., Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at *11-12.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Arkansas is immune from suit in federal court as
to all state statutory and common-law claims, and they are DISMISSED under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
ll. Dismissal of Certain Claims Under Rule 12(b)(6)
As discussed above, the only two claims that are subject to the Court's
jurisdiction are Count |, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII, and Count IV,
alleging a violation or violations of the EPA. Arkansas argues that both claims should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court must therefore consider whether either claim,
as pleaded in the Complaint, “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d.
Arkansas's only criticism of the Title VII claim is that the wrong defendant was
named. As indicated previously, the Court declines to wade into this factual dispute on a
Rule 12 motion and suggests that if Arkansas has proof that it is not Mr. Riggins’s former
employer, it should submit such proof in the context of a Rule 56 motion.
As for the EPA claim, Arkansas contends that the Complaint fails to adequately
allege that the wage disparity between Mr. Riggins and his female counterpart was
because of sex. The Court disagrees and finds Mr. Riggins has stated a plausible claim
under the EPA. Accordingly, the 12(b)(6) Motions as to the Title VIl and EPA claims are
DENIED.

lll. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant State of Arkansas’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 7) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Counts II, Ill, V, VI, VII,
VIII, and IX are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Counts | and IV will remain
for further adjudication. Plaintiff Riggins is DIRECTED to file an amended complaint that
conforms to these rulings by no later than May 28, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 1e', of May, 2024.

ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10012628. Public record. Not legal advice.