# Golding v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · June 2, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10012251

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 2, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10012251

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding a claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective allegations]”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

LISA GOLDING PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 4:22-cv-04116

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lisa Golding (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for
a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability applications on September 28, 2020. (Tr. 11-24).
In these applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to occipital nerve damage, fibromyalgia,
neuropathy in her hands and arms, a bulging disc, bone degeneration, and anxiety. (Tr. 340).

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document
filed at ECF No. 10. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF
page number.

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Plaintiff alleges an onset date of October 15, 2018. (Tr. 11). These applications were denied
initially on December 17, 2020, and these applications were denied again on reconsideration on
April 1, 2021. Id.
After these denials, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request

was granted. (Tr. 31-55). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on December 6, 2021, and
this hearing was held in Shreveport, Louisiana. Id. Plaintiff was present and was represented by
Greg Giles at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Christina Beatty-Cody
testified at this hearing. Id.
On December 13, 2021, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully
unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 8-30). The ALJ found Plaintiff met the
insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2020. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since October 15,
2018, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following
severe impairments: degenerative disc disease/spondylosis of the lumbar/thoracic spine;

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with headaches; neuropathy; a right shoulder injury;
obesity; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 13-14, Finding 3). Despite being severe,
the ALJ also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 14-15, Finding 4).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff was forty-eight (48) years old on her alleged disability onset
date. (Tr. 22-23, Finding 7). Such an individual is defined as a “younger individual” under 20
C.F.R § 404.1563(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) on her alleged disability onset date. Id. The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education. (Tr. 23, Finding 8). In this decision, the
ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and determined her Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”). (Tr. 15-22, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can stand/walk for a total combined time of
four hours in a workday. She can occasionally push/pull with the dominant right
upper extremity and frequently push/pull with the left upper extremity. She can
occasionally climb ramps/stairs but never ladders/ropes/scaffolds. In addition, the
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch but cannot crawl. She
can frequently perform reaching, handling, and fingering bilaterally. Furthermore,
the claimant can maintain attention and concentration for noncomplex, routine
tasks. She can have occasional public contact and cannot perform teamwork-related
tasks. She can tolerate occasional supervision except for periods of instruction.
Finally, the claimant can maintain a work routine consistent with noncomplex tasks
with explanation provided for changes.

Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff was
unable to perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 22, Finding 6). The ALJ then considered whether Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Tr. 23-24, Finding 10). In making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the
testimony of the VE. Id. Based upon the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform the following occupations: (1) collator operator (light, unskilled) with
39,800 such jobs in the nation; (2) router (light, unskilled) with 31,400 such jobs in the nation; and
(3) tabber (light, unskilled) with 10,300 such jobs in the nation. Id. Because Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined by the Act, from October 15, 2018 through the date of her decision or through December
16, 2021. (Tr. 24, Finding 11).
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability
determination. (Tr. 1-5). On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1.
The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on December 1, 2022. ECF No. 5. This
case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir.
2001).As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case
differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the
record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those
positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young

v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff
must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only
considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final
stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raised the following three arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ’s
RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ erred in
discrediting her subjective complaints; and (3) the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment was inadequate.
ECF No. 14 at 1-21. Because the Court finds the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations and in assessing her RFC, the Court will only address Plaintiff’s second argument for
reversal.
The Court notes that in assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is
required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.
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1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,
983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the
duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See

Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective
allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as
the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective
allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly
applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations are not entirely reliable, the ALJ’s determination of subjective allegations is entitled to
deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot
discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not
fully support them [the subjective allegations].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s subjective allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific
determination regarding that claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for
discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See
Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or
discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for
relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve
your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour,
sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not
yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983
(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes
the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th
Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In her opinion, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s
subjective complains for the following reasons:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can stand/walk for a total combined time of
four hours in a workday. She can occasionally push/pull with the dominant right
upper extremity and frequently push/pull with the left upper extremity. She can
occasionally climb ramps/stairs but never ladders/ropes/scaffolds. In addition, the
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch but cannot crawl. She
can frequently perform reaching, handling, and fingering bilaterally. Furthermore,
the claimant can maintain attention and concentration for noncomplex, routine
tasks. She can have occasional public contact and cannot perform teamwork-related
tasks. She can tolerate occasional supervision except for periods of instruction.
Finally, the claimant can maintain a work routine consistent with noncomplex tasks
with explanation provided for changes.

(Tr. 19).
Indeed, the only Polaski factor the ALJ referenced involves Plaintiff’s daily activity of
caring for her disabled child. (Tr. 19). Upon review of the hearing transcript in this mater,
however, Plaintiff testified her child goes to school and “a lot of the day he’s at school.” (Tr. 43).
Plaintiff also testified that she has help with her son: “One of my friends will come over a couple
of times a week and hand him to me in a sitting down position in the bathtub because I can’t hold
him.” Id.
Accordingly, despite the ALJ’s attempt to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations based
upon this finding, Plaintiff’s daily activities are hardly extensive and do not provide a basis for
discounting her subjective allegations. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1989)
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(recognizing “a claimant need not prove she is bedridden or completely helpless to be found
disabled”).
Based upon this review, and because the ALJ’s discussion of the one Polaski factor
regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities was superficial at best, the Court finds the ALJ improperly

discounted Plaintiff’s subjective allegations based upon her medical records. See Polaski, 739
F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective allegations cannot be discounted “solely because the
objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective allegations]”).
Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations, this case must be reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s analysis of her subjective
allegations are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed
and remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these
findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.

ENTERED this 2nd day of June 2023.

Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10012251. Public record. Not legal advice.