# Craig v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · May 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10011718

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** May 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10011718

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing an ALJ may properly rely on a state agency medical consultant’s opinion over the unsupported opinions of treating and examining physicians
- holding, the mere fact working may cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of disability
- recognizing an ALJ may discount a “claimant’s subjective complaints … if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole”
- finding the ALJ properly discounted an opinion where it was rendered on a checkbox form with no explanation or citation to supporting medical findings

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

STACEY N. CRAIG PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 6:21-cv-06001

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner,1
Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Stacey Craig (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 8.2 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on July 9,
2021. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Kilolo Kijakazi should be substituted
as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue this suit by reason of
the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document filed at ECF No. 17. These
references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on August 6, 2018, alleging onset date
of October 2, 2016. (Tr. 25, 97-98, 114-115). In her application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled
due to fibromyalgia, psoriatic arthritis, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depression, bone
density, and back issues. (Tr. 97-98, 114-115). Her application was denied initially on March 15,
2019 and was denied again upon reconsideration on July 16, 2019. (Tr. 132-134, 141-143).

Plaintiff subsequently requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request was granted.
(Tr. 144-152). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on March 12, 2020, in Hot Springs,
Arkansas. (Tr. 56-91). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Shannon
Muse Carroll. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Kola Brown testified at this
administrative hearing. Id.
On May 11, 2020, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 22-42). In his decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since August 6, 2018, her alleged onset date.
(Tr. 27, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff was forty-one (41) years old at the time she
filed her application, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008).

(Tr. 41, Finding 6). The ALJ found Plaintiff had a high school education was able to communicate
in English. (Tr. 41, Finding 7).
The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity,
degenerative changes of the lumbar and cervical spine, fibromyalgia, pain syndrome, psoriasis
versus psoriatic arthritis, depression, anxiety, PTSD, and personality disorder. (Tr. 27, Finding 2).
Despite being severe, the ALJ determined those impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(Tr. 28, Finding 3).
In his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 32, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff
retained the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(a), except she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can occasionally be exposed
to extreme cold and vibration; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can
never be exposed to unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery; can
understand and remember simple instructions; can sustain attention and
concentration to complete simple tasks with regular breaks every two hours; can
interact as needed with supervisors and coworkers; can occasionally interact with
the public; can adapt to routine work conditions and occasional work place changes.

Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff was
unable to perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 41, Finding 5). The ALJ then considered whether Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Tr. 41-42, Finding 9). Considering her RFC, age, education, and work experience, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following occupations existing in
significant numbers in the national economy: (1) addresser (sedentary unskilled) with 3,000 such
jobs available in the national economy; (2) document preparer (sedentary unskilled) with 19,000
such jobs available in the national economy; and (3) circuit board assembler (sedentary unskilled)
with 3,000 such jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 42, Finding 9).
Because Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other work existing in the significant
numbers in the national economy, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as
defined by the Act, from August 6, 2018, through the date of his decision or through May 11, 2020.
(Tr. 42, Finding 10).
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Councils review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability
determination. On November 24, 2020, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s
disability determination. (Tr. 1-4). On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF
No. 1. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on January 8, 2021. ECF No. 8. This

case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would
have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.

See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a
“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). A claimant must show that his or
her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. She determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers

the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of
this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following three arguments for reversal: (1) whether
the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s pain, symptoms, and subjective allegations; (2) whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment; and (3) whether the ALJ properly
evaluated the medical opinion evidence. ECF No. 19. The Court will consider each of these
arguments.
A. Subjective Allegations
In assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to
apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.3 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979 983 (2007). The factors

to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and
intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective
allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as
the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective
complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly
applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations are not entirely reliable, the ALJ’s determination of subjective allegations is entitled to
deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot

discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not
fully support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific
evaluation of a claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for discrediting the
testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel,

3 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your
pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.)” However,
under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors.
See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these
additional factors in this case.
159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not
a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is
not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance
of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ fully complied with Polaski in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s
subjective allegations. (Tr. 34-41). Indeed, the ALJ’s opinion outlined Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations and cited inconsistencies between those allegations and the record. Id. The ALJ also
noted her daily activities and set forth reasons for finding them not as limiting as described by
Plaintiff. Id. In addition, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s history of alcohol abuse. (Tr. 37-39, 67-
70). Specifically, the ALJ noted Plaintiff testified she stopped drinking four to five months prior
to the administrative hearing held on March 12, 2020; however, Plaintiff was admitted to National
Park Medical Center on January 17, 2020, with an elevated alcohol level. (Tr. 69, 857-866, 871-
874). Moreover, during Plaintiff’s hospital admission in January 2020, she confirmed she
consumed alcohol, she was hostile, and she was not cooperative. (Tr. 858, 871).

The ALJ carefully summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and noted how she was
receiving treatment and medication for her impairments, and when she abstained from alcohol,
Plaintiff appeared to improve. (Tr. 39-40). Based on the Court’s review, there is no basis for
reversal on this issue. See, e.g., Gulliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing an ALJ may discount a “claimant’s subjective complaints … if there are
inconsistencies in the record as a whole”).
B. RFC
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(1). It is defined as the individual’s capacity for work activity “on a regular and
continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(b), (c). A disability claimant has the burden of establishing

her RFC. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). The ALJ determines a claimant’s
RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record, including medical records, observations of
treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his or her limitations. Jones
v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010); Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir.
2009). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment.
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s
residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 479 (8th Cir.
2015) (citing Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses

the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir.
2012). However, an ALJ is not required to adopt or include all limitations assessed by a medical
source, even if the source is found to be persuasive. McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir.
2011) (in making an RFC determination, “we do not require an ALJ to mechanically list and reject
every possible limitation.”)
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in her RFC determination. ECF No. 19, pp. 16-18. In this
matter, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a reduced range of sedentary
work. (Tr. 32, Finding 4). As the Eighth Circuit has recognized, a limitation to sedentary work
“in itself is a significant limitation.” Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005). The
ALJ imposed additional limitations in the RFC, finding Plaintiff could not climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds and could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel crouch and
crawl. (Tr. 32). The ALJ also included environmental limitations and found Plaintiff could have
no exposure to unprotected heights or moving machinery and limited Plaintiff to regular breaks

every two hours. Id.
While Plaintiff clearly suffers from some degree of pain and discomfort, she has not
established she is unable to engage in any and all gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d
433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding, the mere fact working may cause pain or discomfort does not
mandate a finding of disability). Even so, the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and
included more limitations in his RFC determination than initially determined by the state agency
consultants. The ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff’s medical records and subjective
allegations in this matter. An ALJ may decide within a “zone of choice,” and reversal is
unwarranted simply because some evidence might support a different conclusion. Heino v. Astrue,
578 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2009).

Upon review, the Court finds no basis for reversal on this issue. The ALJ did rely upon
the findings of consulting physicians, in addition to the record as a whole, when assessing her
RFC. (Tr. 28-41). Such a reliance is entirely proper. See Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 692-94
(8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing an ALJ may properly rely on a state agency medical consultant’s
opinion over the unsupported opinions of treating and examining physicians).
C. Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in discrediting the opinion of her treating physician in giving
her opinion little weight. ECF No. 19, p. 19. However, Plaintiff filed her application for benefits
after March 2017, therefore, the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinion evidence is governed by 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c.4

The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Sullivan unpersuasive in accordance with the applicable
regulation, explicitly discussing the supportability and consistency factors. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(a)-(c) (2017); (Tr. 40-41). The ALJ also found the opinion to be inconsistent with Dr.
Sullivan’s own treatment notes as her notes and other treating physicians notes reflected normal
mental status examinations, limited abnormal objective findings on physical examinations, and
mild to moderate findings on diagnostic studies. (Tr. 41, 303-304, 417-420, 443-444, 516, 615-
619, 634, 636, 753-754, 844-846, 916, 907-910, 923-926, 929, 975-977, 1101-1108).
Additionally, Dr. Sullivan’s medical source statement was on a checkbox form with no
citation to medical evidence. See Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 675-676 (8th Cir. 2018)

(short checkbox opinions may properly be discounted, if they are conclusory or unsupported by
relevant medical evidence); see also Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1025 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding
the ALJ properly discounted an opinion where it was rendered on a checkbox form with no
explanation or citation to supporting medical findings).

4 On January 28, 2017, the Administration promulgated new regulations governing how ALJ’s assess medical opinion
evidence. The new rules, with an effective date of March 27, 2017, focus on whether an opinion is persuasive, based
on: (1) supportability; (2) consistency with the evidence; (3) relationship with the claimant [which includes; (i) length
of treatment relationship; (ii) frequency of examinations; (iii) purpose of the treatment relationship; (iv) extent of the
treatment relationship; and (v) examining relationship]; (4) provider specialization; and (5) any other important
factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)-(c) (2017). An opinion is more persuasive if it is consistent with and supported
by the medical evidence as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2) (2017)). See Phillips v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-34-
BD, 2020 WL 3451519, at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 24, 2020).
In sum, the ALJ properly considered the supportability and consistency factors in
discounting Dr. Sullivan’s opinion as unpersuasive, and substantial evidence supports this finding.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s disability determination is

supported by substantial evidence in the record and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating
these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 18th day of May 2022.

Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10011718. Public record. Not legal advice.