# Hayes v. Henderson

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · February 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10011582

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** February 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

RON WESLEY HAYES PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:21-cv-4069

MS. CONNIE MITCHELL, Miller
County Prosecuting Attorney;
CHIEF ROBERT HARRISON, Chief
Texarkana, Arkansas Police Department;
JOHN DOE OFFICERS, Texarkana,
Arkansas Police Department;
SERGEANT HENDERSON, Miller
County, Arkansas; and NURSE KING,
Miller County, Arkansas DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed on January 12, 2022, by the
Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
(ECF No. 17). Judge Bryant conducted a preservice screening of Plaintiff Ron Wesley Hayes’
complaint and now recommends that the Court dismiss some of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff objects. (ECF Nos. 25, 26).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Miller County Detention Center, filed this civil rights lawsuit on
October 20, 2021, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That same day, the Court ordered him to file an
amended complaint to clarify his claims. Plaintiff did so on November 5, 2021. On November
22, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to further clarify his
claims and identify the Defendants to the case. Plaintiff did so on December 14, 2021.
In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe and Defendant Henderson each used
excessive force on him on separate occasions, the former breaking his face in either March or April
2019, and the latter slamming him to the floor at an unspecified time, causing him to need surgery.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harrison was responsible for the officers’ use of excessive force,
that Defendant Harrison denied him medical care by refusing to pay for surgery for the injuries he
sustained from the excessive force, and that Defendant Harrison conspired with Defendant

Mitchell and unspecified police officers to falsely charge Plaintiff with crimes he did not commit.
Plaintiff also alleges that after the 2019 excessive-force incident, Defendant King intentionally
filed incorrect paperwork to send him to the wrong doctor and delay his access to medical care.
Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities and seeks money
damages and the removal of the criminal charges from his record.
Judge Bryant conducted a preservice screening of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and then issued the instant Report and Recommendation, making
three recommendations. First, he recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s individual
capacity claims against Defendants Harrison and Mitchell without prejudice. Second, he
recommends that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all Defendants be dismissed without

prejudice. Third, he recommends that the Court allow Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against
Defendants John Doe, Henderson, and King to remain for service. Plaintiff filed two sets of
objections, primarily arguing that his claims against Defendant Harrison should remain.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear pre- and post-trial matters and to
submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of receipt of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, “a
party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); accord Local Rule 72.2(VII)(C). After conducting an appropriate review
of the report and recommendation, the Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“[T]he specific standard of review depends, in the first instance, upon whether or not a

party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation.” Anderson v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Generally,
“objections must be timely and specific” to trigger de novo review. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d
356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court applies a liberal construction when determining whether
pro se objections are specific. Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995). A “clearly
erroneous” standard of review applies to the portions of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to which no objections have been made. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793,
795 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note, subd. (b) (instructing
a reviewing court to “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record”).
For clarity’s sake, the Court will begin by addressing the recommendations for Plaintiff’s

individual capacity claims, grouped by Defendant. Then the Court will address Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against all Defendants.
A. Individual Capacity Claims Against Defendants John Doe and Henderson
Judge Bryant finds that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state viable excessive force
claims against Defendants John Doe and Henderson in their individual capacities. The Court
agrees.
When an excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest, it is most properly
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). To evaluate an excessive force claim under the
Fourth Amendment, a court must consider whether the force was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances, “rely[ing] on the perspective of a reasonable officer present at the scene rather than
the ‘20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant John Doe broke his face when he was not resisting.
Accepting those allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded
an excessive force claim against Defendant John Doe. Similarly, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
Henderson slammed him to the floor when he was not attempting to fight back, requiring him to
need surgery. That is sufficient at this stage to state a claim against Defendant Henderson.
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendants John Doe and Henderson shall remain
for service.
B. Individual Capacity Claims Against Defendant Harrison
Judge Bryant finds that Plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing a causal link between
Defendant Harrison and the alleged use of force against Plaintiff and the alleged refusal to pay for

Plaintiff’s medical care. Judge Bryant also finds that Plaintiff only offered conclusory allegations
that Defendant Harrison conspired with others to falsely charge him with crimes. Thus, Judge
Bryant recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendant
Harrison.
Plaintiff objects, appearing to state that he had some sort of previous interaction with
Defendant Harrison that resulted in Plaintiff filing an unspecified complaint. He also states that
unspecified officers told him that Defendant Harrison directed them to arrest him for committing
certain crimes that Plaintiff claims he did not commit. He states that he feels that Defendant
Harrison made the decision to refuse paying for his facial medical bills.
The problem with Plaintiff’s newly offered allegations is that he may not assert arguments,
claims, or legal theories in his objections to Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation that were
not first presented to Judge Bryant for consideration. Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.,
Inc., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012); Chaney v. Hutchinson, No. 4:18-cv-0478-BSM, 2018

WL 4134639, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2018) (citing Hylla v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 536
F.3d 911, 921 (8th Cir. 2008)). “[T]he purpose of referring cases to a magistrate for recommended
disposition would be contravened if parties were allowed to present only selected issues to the
magistrate, reserving their full panoply of contentions for the trial court.” Roberts v. Apfel, 222
F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2000). To hold otherwise would effectively give a party “two opportunities
for judicial review.” Id.
The newly raised allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint regarding officers telling him that
Defendant Harrison directed them to falsely arrest him are insufficient because they were not first
presented to Judge Bryant and because they are too speculative to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Plaintiff’s unsupported belief that Defendant Harrison made the decision to refuse

paying for his medical bills is too speculative to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court agrees with Judge Bryant that the
allegations in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fail to state an individual capacity claim
against Defendant Harrison upon which relief can be granted. Those claims will be dismissed.
C. Individual Capacity Claims Against Defendant Mitchell
Judge Bryant finds that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim against Defendant
Mitchell in her individual capacity because she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Plaintiff sparingly mentions Defendant Mitchell in his objections, only saying that she worked
with Defendant Harrison to falsely charge him with crimes and that she would not offer him low
bail after he had been arrested.
A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit under section 1983 for any conduct
undertaken in his or her role as advocate for the state. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28

(1976). Absolute prosecutorial immunity protects the prosecutor as a key participant in the
criminal justice process, such that the prosecutor need not be inhibited from performing his or her
functions by a constant fear of retaliation. Id. at 428. This is true no matter the underlying motive
of the prosecutor or the propriety of the actions taken. Schenk v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th
Cir. 2006); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d. 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987).
“Absolute immunity covers prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a
criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately
associated with the judicial process.” Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir.
1996). However, prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out
of functions performed outside the role of advocate. Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 842

(8th Cir. 2013).
The Court agrees with Judge Bryant that Defendant Mitchell is entitled to prosecutorial
immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against her. His allegations concern her
initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, along with other conduct intimately associated with
the judicial process, such as asking for heightened bail. Because these allegations concern actions
allegedly taken in Defendant Mitchell’s role as a prosecutor, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims
against her will be dismissed.
D. Individual Capacity Claim Against Defendant King
Judge Bryant finds that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a viable deliberate
indifference claim against Defendant King in his individual capacity. The Court agrees.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate

indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th
Cir. 2012). The deliberate-indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
medical needs and (2) that the . . . officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (alterations in original).
Plaintiff alleged that when he was in custody with a broken face and required facial surgery,
Defendant King intentionally filed incorrect paperwork to send him to the wrong doctor and delay
his access to medical care. Taking these allegations as true at this stage, this is enough to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant
King will remain for service.

E. Official Capacity Claims
Judge Bryant finds that Plaintiff failed to state an official capacity claim against any
Defendant because he did not allege the existence of any policy, practice, or custom of any
Defendant’s employer that contributed to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not address this
finding in his objections.
Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are treated as claims against each Defendant’s
respective employing governmental entity. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010).
“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Atkinson v. City of
Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish liability under section
1983, a “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official

custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817
(8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of an official custom, policy, or practice of any
Defendant’s employing governmental entity that caused a deprivation of his rights. His complaint
and objections only repeat the allegations made for his individual capacity claims, none of which
involve a custom, policy, or practice of violating constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon de novo review of all issues related to Plaintiff’s specific objections and finding no
clear error on the face of the record for all issues that were not objected to, the Court overrules

Plaintiff’s objections and adopts the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 17) for the above-
stated reasons.
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendants Harrison and Mitchell are hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all Defendants are likewise DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claims against Defendants John Doe, Henderson, and King remain for service.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of February, 2022.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10011582. Public record. Not legal advice.