# Wright v. Bella Vista Police Department

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · April 3, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010569

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** April 3, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010569

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that arresting officers were entitled to rely on a radio broadcast even though the bulletin ended up not 9 being supported by probable cause
- finding that an officer’s observations made through gaps in stall did not violate the Fourth Amendment

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TRACY D. WRIGHT PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:19-CV-05016

BELLA VISTA POLICE DEPARTMENT;
OFFICER JEREMIAH MORRIS; and
OFFICER ANTHONY KING DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Tracy D.
Wright1 contends his constitutional rights were violated during an encounter with two
officers of the Bella Vista Police Department on November 10, 2018. Specifically, Wright
maintains that he was unlawfully detained while on the way to the restroom; he was
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he was made to wait to use the
restroom; and his privacy was invaded when he was required to urinate and defecate in
full view of the Defendant officers. The Defendants are the Bella Vista Police
Department and Officers Jeremiah Morris and Anthony King. Although the Bella Vista
Police Department is a named Defendant, a police department is not usually considered
a legal entity subject to suit under 1983. See, e.g., Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974
F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). Defendants have been sued in both their individual and
official capacities.

1 Wright is proceeding pro se. In his summary judgment response, Wright has requested
appointment of counsel. (Doc. 38 at 9). However, his summary judgment response is
articulate, well-reasoned, and supported by legal research. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Wright is adequately representing himself, and his request for appointment
of counsel is DENIED.
1
The case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
26). Wright responded (Docs. 38, 41, 42, 47), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 39).
The Motion is ready for decision.
I. BACKGROUND

According to Officer Morris’s incident report, his interaction with Wright occurred
as follows. On Saturday, November 10, 2018, at approximately 12:00 am, Officer Morris,
who was traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 71 in Bella Vista, Arkansas, observed a
silver Chrysler Town and Country travelling northbound with its emergency lights flashing.
The car was going 25 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone. (Doc. 26-1 at 2).
Officer Morris initiated a traffic stop after he observed the vehicle weaving and abruptly
changing lanes. Id. The vehicle did not immediately stop. Id. The vehicle was being
driven by Alexandria McNeil, and Wright was seated in the back of the vehicle. Id. at 3.
McNeil and Wright explained to Officer Morris that they were driving slowly
because the transmission on the car had gone out and only first gear was operable. Id.

McNeil stated that she did not stop immediately because she could not get the vehicle
into park. Id. Both McNeil and Wright had suspended driver’s licenses and were active
probationers with search waivers on file. Id. Officer Morris searched the vehicle but
found nothing illegal except a mostly empty bottle of vodka. Id. He noticed that the odor
of intoxicants was present, and he conducted pat-down searches of both McNeil and
Wright.
McNeil was arrested for driving on a suspended driver’s license. (Doc. 26-1 at 3).
She was transported to the Bella Vista Police Department, cited for driving on a

2
suspended license, and then released. Id. The vehicle was towed because Wright’s
driver’s license was also suspended, and the vehicle was deemed unsafe. Id. Wright
retrieved his belongings and was taken by Officer King to a nearby Casey’s General Store
(“Casey’s”). Officer Morris drove McNeil to join Wright at Casey’s after McNeil was

released. Id.
At 2:45 a.m., Officer Morris was advised by dispatch that Wright had a possible
failure- to-appear warrant out of Springdale. (Doc. 26-1 at 4). Officers Morris and King
traveled to Casey’s to look for Wright. Id. Officer Morris reported that as they pulled up
to the store, Wright was watching them from the window. Wright stood up, put his hands
in his coat pockets, and started walking towards the restroom. Id. In his affidavit,
Officer Morris states that Wright was not wearing his coat during the traffic stop. (Doc.
26-9 at 1). Officer Morris claims that he entered Casey’s and repeatedly instructed
Wright to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Because of Wright’s “suspicious
demeanor,” Officer Morris worried that Wright “was hiding something illegal on his person

and planned to get rid of it in the bathroom.” Id. Wright told the officers that he needed
to urinate. (Doc. 26-1 at 4). Officer Morris took hold of one of Wright’s arms, told him
that he was being detained due to a possible warrant, and placed him in handcuffs. Id.
Wright continued to complain that he had to urinate. Officer Morris was worried
Wright may have been putting drugs or weapons in his pockets and attempting to destroy
the evidence in the restroom. Id. Wright allowed his pockets to be searched, and after
that, Officer Morris allowed Wright to go to the restroom, but not alone. Both officers
went with him. Id.

3
The Court has been provided with Officer Morris’s dashcam video. (Doc. 26-3).
While the video only shows the front of the store (from the perspective of the dashboard
on Officer Morris’s cruiser), the audio comes from a microphone attached to Officer
Morris’s person.

The restroom where Wright and the two officers entered was a multi-person, public
restroom with two or three urinals and two or three stalls. (Doc. 26-6 at 6). Officer
Morris took the handcuffs off Wright and told him to use the urinal. (Doc. 26-1 at 4).
Wright indicated that he also had to defecate and would need to sit down. Id. Officer
Morris wrote in his incident report that he held the stall door open “to verify [Wright] didn’t
take anything illegal out of his pants or body.” Id. In the audio from Officer Morris’s
dashcam, Officer Morris can be heard telling Wright that he could “shut the door” to the
stall but “not flush the toilet” because Officer Morris did not want Wright to be “flushing
some drugs.” (Doc. 26-3, at timestamp 2:43–2:53)
In Officer Morris’s opinion, Wright sat on the toilet an unreasonable amount of time.

When he told Wright to get out of the stall, Wright argued and stated he had hemorrhoids.
(Doc. 26-1 at 4). Wright demonstrated this by wiping and showing Officer Morris the
toilet paper with blood on it. Id. Wright at some point started rubbing “vigorously on his
right leg inside his pants.” Id. According to Officer Morris, when he asked what Wright
was doing, Wright responded that he had a leg cramp and was trying to rub it out. Id.
When Wright stood up, Officer Morris looked in the toilet and observed “no urine or feces”
and only toilet paper and a napkin from the restaurant section of the store. Id. Officer
Morris claims that he told Wright that he did not want to be in the restroom with him any

4
more than Wright wanted him there. (Doc. 26-9 at 2).
While Wright was in the restroom, Springdale Police Department confirmed that
Wright was, indeed, wanted on a warrant for failure to appear. Wright was placed under
arrest in the restroom (Doc. 26-3, timestamp 7:42), taken to Officer King’s patrol car,

searched, and then transported to the Pleasant Grove Wal-Mart to meet with the
Springdale Police Department. Wright was released into their custody.2
According to Officer King’s affidavit, when he arrived at Casey’s, he observed
Wright sitting at a table near the front of the store looking out the window at them. (Doc.
26-8 at 1). As Officer King was parking, Wright stood up and began walking away from
the front of the store and toward the restroom. Id. Once the officers entered the store,
Officer King observed Wright’s hands in his pockets. Id. at 2. In Officer King’s opinion,
“[at] that point, Mr. Wright posed a safety risk because we did not know if he put anything
illegal or harmful in his pockets, and it ha[d] been well over an hour since we last had
contact with Mr. Wright.” Id. Officer King found it suspicious that Wright began walking

toward the restroom as soon as he saw the officers parking their vehicles. Id. Once
Wright was detained and frisked, he was allowed to use the restroom. Id. Officer King
remained standing in the open doorway to the restroom while Wright and Officer Morris
went inside. Id.
Wright’s version of these same events is as follows. Wright testified at his
deposition that if viewed from the outside looking into Casey’s, he and McNeil were sitting

2 Wright disputes that he was transported to the Pleasant Grove Walmart and was
released into the custody of the Springdale Police Department. (Doc. 47, p. 2). This
dispute of fact is not material to the issues before the Court on summary judgment.
5
at a table to the left of the door. (Doc. 26-6 at 3). The restroom was located to the right
of the door. Id. They both looked up when police cars came “barreling in on both sides.”
Id. at 4. Wright testified that he was getting up to go to the restroom. and as he passed
the front door, the officers came in. Id. The officers told him to stop, and Wright admits

that he kept walking for five or six feet until Officer Morris grabbed his arm and stopped
him. Id. Wright told the officer that he needed “to go to the bathroom now.” Id.
According to Wright, he “went to the bathroom standing up while they were holding me.”
Id. at 11. Wright testified that Officer Morris knew it and smelled it. Id. Wright indicated
that this was when the officers finally let him go to the restroom. Id.
Wright testified that Officer King stood in the doorway to the restroom holding the
door open, while Officer Morris went into the restroom with Wright and kept the stall door
all the way open. Id. at 5-6. Although Wright did not see anyone walking by, he claims
there was a “direct path” allowing anyone to “see into the bathroom.” Id. at 5.
According to Wright, the officers kept telling him to hurry up; and for this reason, Wright

showed Officer Morris paper with feces and blood on it. Id. at 7. Wright testified that
Officer Morris looked away and said to hurry up. Id. Wright indicated that he then had
to clean out his underwear and pants. Id. at 8-9. He testified that when he was rubbing
his pants leg, he did not have leg cramps but was simply cleaning his pants. Id. In
Wright’s estimation, he was only in the stall for about two minutes. Id. at 6. However,
the dashcam video indicates that Wright and the officers were in the restroom for
approximately seven minutes. (Doc. 26-3).
Wright believes that the “police department is responsible for its officers.” (Doc.

6
26-6 at 10). When he was asked if there was a City of Bella Vista policy or custom that
he contended was unconstitutional, Wright replied not that he was aware of one. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record,” Hartnagel v.
Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1982), or “when a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party on the question.” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409
F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the

burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other
evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l. Bank of
Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The non-moving
party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l. Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient
to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,

7
625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment for the following
reasons: (1) Wright was lawfully detained while the officers waited for confirmation of
the warrant; (2) the Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because Wright was
not a prisoner; (3) the officers’ relatively non-intrusive invasion of Wright’s privacy was
objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances; (4) there is no legal basis for holding
the City of Bella Vista liable; and (5) if Wright’s constitutional rights were violated,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Unlawful Detention Claim
The facts surrounding Wright’s detention at Casey’s are for the most part
undisputed. For summary judgment purposes, where a dispute exists, the Court has
assumed that the facts provided by Wright are true. The first legal question for the Court
is whether Wright’s detention was unlawful.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. “[T]he Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
726 (1968). “[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom

8
to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The
“ultimate touchstone . . . is ‘reasonableness.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381
(2014).
Here, Wright was clearly detained. He was placed in handcuffs and at least

initially told he could not go to the restroom. The Supreme Court has held that “the police
could stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’
even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). “The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of
objective justification’ for making the stop.” Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 201, 217 (1984). It demands “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, provide
the detaining officers with a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal
wrongdoing,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

Officers Morris and King had received information from the Arkansas Crime
Information Center that there was a possible outstanding warrant issued for Wright. The
Supreme Court has recognized that “[e]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted
unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to
another.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985). In this case, the
information came from a criminal database provided by various law enforcement
agencies. Cf. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (finding that arresting
officers were entitled to rely on a radio broadcast even though the bulletin ended up not

9
being supported by probable cause). An officer’s objectively reasonable belief in the
existence of an outstanding warrant provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to
detain. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. City of Mount Vernon, 372 F. App’x 202, 206 (2d Cir.
2010) (“An officer’s reasonable belief in the existence of an outstanding warrant justifies

an investigatory stop of a person while the warrant’s existence is confirmed.”); United
States v. Daniels, 2014 WL 7781016, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2014) (holding that an
officer advised of a possible probation warrant had reasonable suspicion to detain an
individual).
In this case, the investigative detention was brief. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983) (“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”). Less than three minutes elapsed
between the time Officer Morris entered Casey’s and told Wright he was being detained
and the time when all three men entered the restroom. (Doc. 26-3). During this time,
Wright was handcuffed and his pockets were searched. While Wright was in the

restroom, his warrant was confirmed, and he was advised that he was under arrest.
Approximately eleven minutes elapsed between the officers entering Casey’s and exiting
the store with Wright in custody. See Doc. 26-3.
In United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit
discussed the use of handcuffs during an investigative detention. The Court explained:
During an investigative stop, officers should use the least intrusive means
of detention and investigation reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose
of the detention. During a Terry stop, officers are authorized to take such
steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to
maintain the status quo during the stop. This court has previously held that
the use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop to
10
protect their safety and maintain the status quo.

Id.
Here, when the officers first encountered Wright at Casey’s, Wright had been
outside the presence of law enforcement for more than an hour. He was wearing a coat
that officers believed he was not wearing an hour before, and he put his hands in his
pockets and began walking toward the restroom at around the time he observed the patrol
cars nearing the store. In addition, when Wright was initially asked to stop, he admits he
kept walking and did not halt until Officer Morris grabbed his arm. Finally, Casey’s was
open to the public and had members of the public inside at the same time that Wright’s
detention and arrest were taking place. Taking all of these facts together, the Court
concludes that the officers’ decision to place Wright in handcuffs “was a reasonable
response to the situation in order to protect the officers’ personal safety,” to protect the
public, and to “maintain the status quo.” Martinez, 462 F.3d at 907.
There are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Fourth Amendment

was violated by the brief investigative detention here. Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
Wright maintains that the Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment when they detained him on his way to the
restroom. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by
state actors only applies “after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,

11
671, n.40 (1977) (emphasis added). In other words, “the treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (emphasis added).
Wright’s complaints about his detention and arrest do not implicate the Eighth

Amendment and are instead properly analyzed under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
C. Invasion of Privacy Claim
Wright contends that his privacy was invaded, not by the pat-down search of his
person, but by the officers observing him while he was using the restroom. Wright
argues that he should have been allowed to use the restroom alone and believes his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by
government officials. Const. amend. IV. “The reasonableness of a search depends on

the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the
extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” Grady v.
North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015). As Defendants aptly note, the “broad search
condition—imposed for [Wright’s] prior criminal activity—‘significantly diminished
[Wright’s] reasonable expectation of privacy’ . . . and duly served the state’s legitimate
interests in preventing, detecting, and punishing additional criminal activity.” United
States v. Rodriquez, 829 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 120-21 (2001)).

12
“To invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment, one must establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” United States v. Hill, 393 F.3d
839, 841 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). Therefore,
one issue to consider is whether Wright had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

public restroom. In United States v. Hill, the Eighth Circuit considered an individual’s
expectation of privacy in a convenience store restroom and found that
an expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from,
and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home. These
cases recognize that regardless of one’s subjective expectation of privacy
in a public restroom, society’s recognition of that expectation of privacy is
limited by the physical design of the restroom, the location of the restroom,
and the probability that one will be asked to surrender use of the restroom
to others.

393 F.3d at 841.
Even when an individual has entered a stall, there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy to the extent he may be seen by someone in the common area of the restroom.
See, e.g., United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that an officer’s
observations made through gaps in stall did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
Next, the Court finds that Wright’s expectation of privacy in using the public
restroom was further diminished by the fact that he was being searched and handcuffed
at the time he told officers he needed to use the restroom. Officers Morris and King
allowed him to use the restroom, but they decided to accompany him there, since he was
in their custody. Moreover, this particular restroom was open to the public, contained
multiple stalls and urinals, and had no lock on the outside door. According to Wright, he
entered a stall and Officer Morris held the stall door open, but Officer Morris did not enter
13
the stall with Wright. Finally, Wright does not contend that any member of the public
actually observed him while he was in the restroom, since Officer King stood at the
restroom door and Officer Morris stood in front of the stall. Because the Court concludes
that police surveillance in this public restroom did not violate a recognized privacy interest,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Wright’s Fourth Amendment claim for
invasion of privacy. In light of Wright’s lawful detention by police as they verified the
existence of an outstanding warrant, Wright did not have a legitimate expectation that he
would be permitted to use the public restroom in private, unaccompanied by the officers.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Supreme Court has recognized that “notions of substantive due process
contained within the Fourteenth Amendment safeguard individuals from unwarranted
governmental intrusions into their personal lives.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.
23 (1977). “The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily

integrity.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-849 (1992)).
The Supreme Court has also held that “[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of
government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive
due process” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright, 510 U.S. at 273
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). In Albright, the Supreme Court
held that pretrial deprivations of liberty were covered by the Fourth Amendment and not

14
the Fourteenth, “with its ‘scarce and open-ended guideposts.’” Id. at 275 (quoting Collins
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
The reasoning of Albright applies to this case, as Wright was a detainee/arrestee
at all times relevant to his Complaint. As such, his claims are appropriately analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment rather than the substantive due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But even assuming the protections of substantive due process
extended to this situation, the claim would fail. To establish a substantive due process
violation, Wright must demonstrate not only that a fundamental right was involved but
also that that the police officers’ conduct shocks the conscience. Folkerts v. City of
Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Akins v. Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178,
1183 (8th Cir. 2009)); see also Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 980-81 (8th Cir. 2005).
“Because the conscience-shocking standard is intended to limit substantive due process
liability, it is an issue of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury.” Terrell, 396
F.3d at 981.

In Terrell v. Larson, the Eighth Circuit discussed the “level of culpability the § 1983
plaintiff must provide to establish that the defendant’s conduct may be conscience
shocking.” 396 F.3d at 978. The Court reasoned:
Mere negligence is never sufficient. Proof of intent to harm is usually
required, but in some cases, proof of deliberate indifference, an
intermediate level of culpability, will satisfy this substantive due process
threshold. The deliberate indifference standard is sensibly employed only
when actual deliberation is practical. By contrast, the intent-to-harm
standard most clearly applies in rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous
situations which preclude the luxury of calm and reflective deliberation.

15
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).3
The circumstances at issue in the case at bar do not demonstrate that Officers
Morris and King were deliberately indifferent to Wright’s constitutional rights. As
discussed previously, the restroom at issue was public, the officers were detaining Wright

on a suspected warrant and were concerned that he was hiding contraband, and there
was a legitimate need to protect the public during Wright’s detention and arrest. Further,
the Court does not find that the officers’ conduct shocks the conscience. For all these
reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment
invasion of privacy claim.4
3. State Law Invasion of Privacy Claim
Defendants read Wright’s Complaint as also asserting an invasion of privacy claim
under Arkansas law. To the extent Wright asserts such a claim, the Court declines to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over it. All claims within the original jurisdiction of the
court are being dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (c) (“The district courts may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”).

3 For purposes of the discussion here, “deliberate indifference” requires a showing of
conduct that is “more than mere unreasonableness, namely conduct that is so knowingly
hostile or indifferent to a clearly establish constitutional right that it evidences a level of
‘criminal recklessness.’” Lund v. Hennepin Cnty., 427 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).

4 There is no need for the Court to consider whether Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity at this point because the Court has already held that no constitutional violation
occurred during Wright’s detention and arrest. See Branch v. Gorman, 742 F.3d 1069,
1072 (8th Cir. 2014).
16
D. Official Capacity Claim
An official capacity claim against a defendant is “functionally equivalent to a suit
against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d
1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Wright's official capacity claims, were they cognizable, would
have been treated as claims against the City of Bella Vista. See Murray v. Lene, 595
F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010). However, the Court has already determined that Wright's
constitutional rights were not violated by the Bella Vista officers. The official capacity
claims are dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Summary Judgment
Motion (Doc. 26) is GRANTED, and all federal claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Bella Vista Police Department is TERMINATED as a Defendant, as
it is not subject to suit under § 1983. Finally, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over
any state-law invasion of privacy claim that might be construed from the Complaint, and
the state-law claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Judgment will enter soma re
IT IS SO ORDERED on this a day of April 2020/
□□ a
>
”UMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010569. Public record. Not legal advice.