# Bonet v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · October 29, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010282

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** October 29, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010282

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing “[t]he ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints ‘solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION

STROTNEY T. BONET PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 1:18-cv-01074

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL DEFENDANT
SECURITY ADMINISTRATON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Strotney T. Bonet (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 10.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his SSI application on October 26, 2015. (Tr. 12). In this
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to back and neck problems, arthritis, and numbness
in his legs. (Tr. 239). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of October 1, 2015. (Tr. 12). This application

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document filed at ECF No. 13. These
references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.

1
was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 97-118).
After Plaintiff’s application was denied, he requested an administrative hearing on his
application, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 9-25). On March 12, 2018, the SSA held
an administrative hearing in El Dorado, Arkansas. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and
was represented by David Graham. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Beverly Majors
testified at this hearing. Id. During this hearing, Plaintiff testified he was forty-four (44) years
old, which is classified as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c). (Tr. 18, Finding 6).
Plaintiff also testified he had a high school education and could communicate in English. (Tr. 18,
Finding 7).
On April 25, 2018, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s SSI application. (Tr. 12-20). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not

engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since October 26, 2015, his application date.
(Tr. 14, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar
degenerative changes with L5-S1 protrusions, cervical degenerative changes with herniation and
foraminal stenosis and obesity. (Tr. 15, Finding 2). Despite being severe, the ALJ also determined
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 15, Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 15-18, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ found
Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
2
CFR 416.967(b) except may occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl;
and, occasional bilateral overhead reaching.

Id.
The ALJ evaluated his Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff was unable
to perform his PRW. (Tr. 18, Finding 5). Because he was unable to perform his PRW, the ALJ
then determined whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 19, Finding 9). The VE also testified at the
administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following occupations: (1) price marker (light,
unskilled) with 283,900 such job in the United States; (2) janitor (light, unskilled) with 136,000
such jobs in the United States; and (3) table attendant (light, unskilled) with 60,000 such jobs in
the United States. Id. Because the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other
work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability (as defined by the Act) at any
time since October 26, 2015 (his application date). (Tr. 19, Finding 10).
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ unfavorable disability
determination. On October 15, 2018, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability
determination. (Tr. 1-8). On December 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1.
The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on December 21, 2018. ECF No. 10. This
case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:

3
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would
have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.
See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff
must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

4
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only
considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final
stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:

In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raises two arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ improperly
assessed his impairments under the Listings; and (2) the ALJ erred in his RFC findings. ECF No.
17 at 12-16. Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s first argument is merited, and the ALJ erred
by failing to consider the evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Thus, the Court
will only consider this issue.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that in assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ
is required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th

5
Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d
979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the
duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See
Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective
complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long
as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective
complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly
applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.
See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your
pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).”
However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these
additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the
analysis of these additional factors in this case.
6
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for
discounting Plaintiff’s subject complaints. In his opinion, the ALJ merely provided the following
routine statement regarding those allegations:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. 16).
In his opinion, the ALJ based his credibility determination upon the fact Plaintiff’s medical
records did not support those allegations. The Court finds this determination was in error. See
Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (recognizing “[t]he ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints ‘solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the
subjective complaints]’”). Thus, this case must be remanded for further consideration of this issue.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s RFC determination and credibility
analysis are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and
remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these
findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
7
ENTERED this 29th day of October 2019.

Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010282. Public record. Not legal advice.