# Evins v. Adams

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · June 7, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010004

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 7, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010004

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that inmate was not deprived of liberty interest during nine months in administrative segregation
- holding that prisoners have a right to nutritionally adequate food
- finding that when an inmate misses one meal it does not rise to the level of a cognizable constitutional injury
- holding that prisoners are guaranteed a reasonably adequate diet
- stating that occasional missed meal that did not endanger the inmate did not state a claim

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

HERMAN DAVID EVINS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:18-cv-4095

CAPTAIN ADAMS, Miller County
Detention Center (“MCDC”); MRS.
WATSON, MCDC; and CORRECTION
OFFICER BROWN, MCDC DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by pro se Plaintiff, Herman David Evins, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 29).
Plaintiff has filed a response.1 (ECF No. 39). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.
I. FACTUAL BACKROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”) Delta
Regional Unit. His claims in this action arise from an alleged incident that occurred on April 16,
2018, and the disciplinary process that followed while he was incarcerated in the Miller County
Detention Center (“MCDC”). (ECF No. 1, p. 3). Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the relevant facts are as follows.
Plaintiff was booked into MCDC custody on January 26, 2018. (ECF No. 31-2, p. 2). On
February 26, 2018, Plaintiff’s probation was revoked, and he was scheduled for transfer to the
ADC. (ECF No. 1, p. 3).
On April 16, 2018, Defendant Brown reported an incident stating:

1 Plaintiff’s response is not verified, but he submitted a verified complaint. (ECF No. 1). A verified complaint is the
equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 994-
95 (8th Cir. 2001).
While serving chow to Max Bravo inmate Evins Herman walked up to receive his
trey during chow inmate Evins began being disrespectful stating ‘the portions are
not big enough and the trey was to small’ also stated ‘I do not want that trey’ I
Officer Brown said ‘ok’ and shut the door to Max Bravo inmate Evins walked back
up to the Max Bravo door and struck the glass with a closed fist. I officer Brown
removed inmate Evins form Max Bravo and placed him in Hand Restraints while
he was cursing me. I Officer Brown then escorted Inmate Evins to Max Alpha cell
806 while he continued to curse me. I then secured him in Max Alpha cell 806
without further incident pending disciplinary.

(ECF No. 31-5, p. 3). On April 17, 2018, Plaintiff responded to Officer Brown’s report stating,
“There was a misunderstand w/officer over refusal of a trey. I did not refuse and the officer
wouldn’t listen.” (ECF No. 31-5, p. 4).
On April 24, 2018, the Miller County disciplinary committee found Plaintiff guilty by
admission of refusing the food tray and disrespecting an officer with inappropriate language. The
sanction for these violations was thirty days in segregation. The committee found:
After hearing this inmate’s statement, Cpt. Adams explained that by him walking
away from the tray that was offered to him and he didn’t take it, that was in fact
refusing the tray. And that by cussing at the officer that was being disrespectful.
Therefore this inmate is found GUILTY by his own admission. Sanction is for 30
days.

(ECF No. 31-5, pp. 5-7).

On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating:
[A]pril 16, 2018 I was not given a tray. On [t]he grounds that I refused to take a
tray they handed me, Yet I as at the door when they closed it on me trying to get a
tray. When I argued with officer Brown, He cuffed me and put me in the hole with
no tray. I went to disiplenary court and there again he focus was more on me
argueing with Brown over not getting a tray than me not getting one. Thanks for
your time and consideration.

(ECF No. 31-3, p. 28). In response, Administrator G. Officer stated, “The Disciplinary committee
will review our request. We will consider your request upon completion of that review. We will
take into consideration the nature of our misconduct when determining whether a reduction is
warranted.” In addition, Defendant Adams also responded stating, “You were in line to get a tray
and you didn’t like the one offered to you and walked away. That is refusing. We covered this in
disciplinary court.” Id.
It is the written policy of the MCDC that proper order be maintained in the facility and that

approved disciplinary procedures be followed when inmates attempt to disrupt order and security.
(ECF No. 31-6, p. 1). The purpose of this policy is to establish guidelines for acceptable behavior
and a system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures that deal with conduct that
causes or threatens to cause harm to self, others, property, or is disruptive of institutional
operations. Id.
The MCDC maintains a list of prohibited acts, their corresponding disciplinary actions,
and the method of establishment and loss of inmate privileges. A list of inmate rules, regulations
and sanctions is posted in each housing area. (ECF No. 31-6, p. 9). Under the rules and sanctions
list, disrespect of officials, employees, or other persons of constituted authority expressed by
means of words, gestures, and the like is a rule violation under Section 1. The maximum

disciplinary sanction is thirty days. Id. at p. 11.
The MCDC also has established procedures which are followed in the event an inmate is
accused of violating the facility’s rules. (ECF No. 31-6, pp. 3-8). The procedures include the
completion of a disciplinary report by the charging officer, an investigation—which includes
witness statements, the charging officer’s account of the incident, and the accused inmate’s
account of the incident, and a review and decision by a disciplinary committee. The accused
inmate is given a written statement of the charge and twenty-four hours advance notice of the
disciplinary hearing. The accused inmate is present at the disciplinary hearing unless documented
security issues require his/her exclusion. Id.
It is also the policy of the MCDC to provide inmates with three nutritious meals per day
that are developed by a certified dietician, prepared under sanitary conditions, at a reasonable cost,
and in such a manner that meets established government health and safety codes. (ECF No. 31-6,
p. 31). According to the MCDC’s Inmate Handbook, meals are regulated as follows:

All meals will be served in the day room in the cells when appropriate. Each inmate is
entitled to one tray only. Each inmate is responsible for getting up and receiving their own
food tr[a]y. You may not allow another inmate to get a tray for you. Food trays will be
returned immediately after consuming the meal. No food trays are to be kept in the housing
area. All menus are reviewed by the Miller County Sheriff’s Office/Detention Division’s
registered dietician to ensure the meals meet the recommended daily dietary allowances of
up to 2700 calories a day. Three meals will be served each day.

(ECF No. 31-6, p. 18).
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges Defendants
Brown, Adams, and Watson neglected their duties and abused their authority. Plaintiff claims that
on April 16, 2018, he “was not given a tray of food at dinner [by Brown]. I did not get to eat
dinner. Making me fearful that upsetting a guard might cause me to go hungry. Giving false
statements. I was also handcuffed and taken to a lockdown cell. For argueing with officer [Brown]
about not getting my tray.” Id. at pp. 4-5. Plaintiff also claims:
After proving Officer Brown made some false allegations…in disiplenary court…
defendants Cpt. Adams and Mrs. Watson stayed focused on my argueing with
Brown about not getting my tray, instead of me not getting my tray. Because I
argued with Officer Brown about not getting my tray, I was sentenced to 30 days
lockdown. I thought Adams and Watson were suppose to help protect my right to
eat.

Id. at pp. 6-7.
Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacity only. He seeks compensatory and
punitive damages and asks for, “the dismissal of officers involved so they can’t intimidate any
more of the inmates.” Id. at p. 9.
On March 14, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment arguing
they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) there is no constitutional injury caused by a
missed meal; (2) Plaintiff was provided due process of law; and (3) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. (ECF No. 29).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once
a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).

The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Missed Meal
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown neglected his duty and abused his authority when

he refused to give Plaintiff a tray of food at dinner on April 16, 2018. The Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. This
prohibition is violated if an inmate is not provided with meals adequate to maintain his health. See
Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners have a right to
nutritionally adequate food); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
that prisoners are guaranteed a reasonably adequate diet). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Brown was deliberately indifferent to his dietary needs.
Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449.
The law is clear that one missed meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. See Williams v. Harness, No. 99-1326, 2000 WL 573448, at *1 (8th Cir. May 10, 2000)

(unpublished per curiam) (holding that denial of one meal does not give rise to a constitutional
violation); Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Correction, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that occasional
missed meal that did not endanger the inmate did not state a claim); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d
346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that when an inmate misses one meal it does not rise to the level
of a cognizable constitutional injury). Accordingly, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
B. Due Process
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Adams and Watson neglected their duties and abused their
authority during his disciplinary hearing when they sentenced him to thirty days in lockdown for
refusing his food tray. Plaintiff also claims that the accusations made against him by Defendant
Brown, which resulted in the lockdown and disciplinary hearing, were false. The Court construes
these allegations as claims based on denial of due process.
In order to prevail on a due process claim, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he was
deprived of life, liberty, or property by government action. Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846

(8th Cir. 2003). As noted by the Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995),
although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary limitation of many privileges and rights justified by the consideration
underlying our penal system.” Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of
misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law. Id.
“To prevail on such a claim based on prison housing, an inmate must show that the segregation
created an ‘atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life’ to demonstrate that his liberty interest was curtailed.” Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970,
973 (8th Cir. 2002) (alteration omitted) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
The record reflects that Plaintiff was placed in lockdown in the Max Alpha area of the
MCDC on April 16, 2018, after Plaintiff hit a window with his fist and began using disrespectful

language towards Defendant Brown. Plaintiff remained in lockdown for thirty days and then
returned to the general population. Plaintiff has not described any conditions of his confinement
during the time he was in lockdown to demonstrate he was subjected to a dramatic departure from
the basic conditions of his confinement. Moreover, simply being placed in disciplinary segregation
is not an “atypical and significant hardship…in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
and thus, is not the type of deprivation that creates a protected liberty interest. See Phillips, 320
F.3d at 847 (“We have consistently held that a demotion to segregation, even without cause, is not
itself an atypical and significant hardship.”).
The Eighth Circuit has also held that much longer periods in segregation than that
experienced by Plaintiff, with loss of privileges, does not implicate a liberty interest triggering due

process protections. See Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that inmate
was not deprived of liberty interest during nine months in administrative segregation); Rahman X,
300 F.3d at 974 (finding inmate’s placement in administrative segregation for twenty-six months
without a disciplinary charge or conviction and during which inmate could not watch television in
his cell did not “demonstrate that his liberty interest was curtailed”); Furlough v. Brandon, 2009
WL 4898418 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a due process claim
after being assigned to administrative segregation for nearly nine months).
Even if Plaintiff’s placement in punitive segregation for thirty days at the MCDC infringed
upon Plaintiff’s liberty interests, the Court finds that Plaintiff was provided procedural due process
in connection with his disciplinary confinement. Once an inmate has shown he has a viable liberty

interest, correctional facilities must follow certain procedures to conduct an impartial due process
hearing on a disciplinary matter. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). These procedures
include written notice of the charges, a brief period to prepare, a written statement of the evidence
relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action, and the ability for the inmate to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence. Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Plaintiff was given sufficient notice of the disciplinary charges against him
and adequate notice of the upcoming hearing. Plaintiff not only attended the hearing but presented
a statement in support of his position. Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Brown filed “false”
charges against him fails to state a constitutional claim. See Daniels v. Ferguson, 2008 WL
698485, *9 (W.D. Ark. March 13, 2008) (“To the extent [Plaintiff] contends his Due Process rights
were violated because the disciplinary charges were fabricated or the events simply never
occurred, courts have held that a prisoner enjoys no constitutional guarantee to be free from false
charges that may lead to punishment.”) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir.

1986) and Glick v. Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claims.2
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is
hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Captain Adams, Mrs. Watson, and
Officer Brown are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A judgment of even date shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 7th day of June 2019.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge

2 Because there was no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the issue
of qualified immunity.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10010004. Public record. Not legal advice.