# Stanley v. Katherine Finnegan

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · December 3, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009583

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** December 3, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

HAL W. STANLEY and MICHELLE
STANLEY, each individually and on behalf
of B.S., J.S., P.S., C.S., and V.S., as
parents and legal guardians PLAINTIFFS

v. No. 6:17-CV-06008

KATHERINE FINNEGAN, et al. DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Separate Defendant Katherine Finnegan’s motion (Doc. 46) for
judgment on the pleadings and brief (Doc. 47) in support of her motion. Plaintiffs Hal and
Michelle Stanley (collectively “the Stanleys”) filed a response (Doc. 52) in opposition and a brief
(Doc. 53) in support of their response. Finnegan filed a reply (Doc. 57) without leave of Court.
Finnegan then filed a motion (Doc. 63) for leave to file a reply and a brief (Doc. 64) in support of
her motion. The Court denied Finnegan’s motion (Doc. 65) for leave and will not consider her
reply. There is also pending a motion1 (Doc. 50) to adopt the pleadings filed by Separate
Defendants Garland County, Arkansas, Mike McCormick, Jason Lawrence, Mike Wright and
Terry Threadgill.
The Stanleys brought damages claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various
Arkansas officials, including Katherine Finnegan, individually and in her official capacity as an
investigator in the Crimes Against Children Division (CACD) of the Arkansas State Police (ASP),
for injuries caused by the alleged unlawful removal of their seven children by Arkansas

1 It is unclear why the Separate Defendants seek to adopt a motion for judgment on the pleadings
that is tailored specifically to the remaining claim against Finnegan and no other party.
Nonetheless, the Court will consider and grant their motion to adopt the pleadings.
Department of Human Services (DHS). Prior to the instant motion, Finnegan, among others, filed
motions to dismiss (Docs. 19, 21, & 22) the Stanleys’ claims on qualified immunity, collateral-
attack, and state preclusion grounds. The Court granted the motion2 with respect to all claims
against Finnegan based on qualified immunity except the claim alleging “that she removed
Plaintiffs’ minor children from their home without an adequate basis.”3 (Doc. 29, p. 10). Finnegan

appealed the order and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. (Doc. 51). Finnegan filed
this Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that the Stanleys’ remaining claim
against her should be dismissed as a matter of law because (1) the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine; (2) the Stanleys lack Article III
standing; (3) the remaining claim is a collateral-attack on state court proceedings; and (4) the
remaining claim is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. For the reasons set forth below,
Finnegan’s motion will be denied.
I. Legal Standard
When considering a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court uses the

same standard as that for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Ashely Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate “only if the moving party clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court must “accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving

2 The Court denied the motion with respect to Finnegan’s collateral-attack and preclusion
arguments finding that she failed to meet her burden of persuasion for those claims.
(Doc. 29, p. 9).
3 Specifically, the remaining claim against Finnegan is that she ordered the removal of the Stanley
children without a reasonable suspicion of child abuse. For purposes of this order, because the
state court conducted a “probable cause hearing,” the Court will use the term “probable cause”
instead of “reasonable suspicion” to avoid confusion.
party and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party.”
Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Any
& All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[A] complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Pleadings

that contain mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2009).
II. Discussion
At the outset, the Stanleys assert Finnegan’s arguments of issue preclusion, claim
preclusion, and collateral-attack should be struck under Rule 12(f) as redundant because the Court
ruled on the same issues in Finnegan’s earlier Rule 12(b)(6) motion and Finnegan failed to appeal
those grounds. The Court previously denied Finnegan’s motion to dismiss on these grounds
because the arguments were, at that time, unsupported by the record. Finnegan has since
supplemented her Rule 12(c) motion with additional factual allegations and documents specifically

in regard to the remaining claim against her. Moreover, the Court’s earlier decision on these
grounds was not subject to interlocutory review. Plaintiffs offer no legal support for the
proposition that Finnegan is prohibited from raising these arguments in her Rule 12(c) motion
under these circumstances. The Court will therefore address each of Finnegan’s claims.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Finnegan argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Stanleys’ claim
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because Rooker-Feldman implicates a jurisdictional
question, it must be addressed at the outset. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir.
2003). The Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing any
final state court decision on the merits, because “federal jurisdiction to review most state court
judgments is vested exclusively in the United States Supreme Court.” Simes v. Huckabee, 354
F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lemonds v. St. Louis Cnty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir.
2000)). If a claim is barred under Rooker-Feldman, the federal court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only in the limited circumstance in which a party
“seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state court decision to a lower federal court.” Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006). The doctrine prevents a state court loser “from seeking what
in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a [federal] district court, based on
the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994). Additionally, the doctrine precludes subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims which are “inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions.
Simes, 354 F.3d at 827. If a claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision, a federal
court lacks subject-jurisdiction unless the federal plaintiff was not given a “reasonable

opportunity” to raise their federal claim in the state proceedings. Id.
Finnegan argues that the Stanleys claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment because “whether [the Stanleys] are entitled to relief hinges upon finding that [the state
court orders] were wrongly decided.” (Doc. 47, p. 14). She further argues that the Stanleys had a
reasonable opportunity to present their constitutional challenges at the juvenile proceedings and
therefore subject-matter jurisdiction is presently lacking. The issue the Court must decide is
whether the Stanleys’ remaining claim, that Finnegan ordered the removal of the children without
an adequate basis, is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment such that it precludes
subject-matter jurisdiction.
After the children were removed from the Stanleys’ custody, a hearing was conducted to
determine whether probable cause justified the removal of the children. The juvenile court which
held the hearing ultimately found probable cause existed at the time the children were removed.
The basis of the Stanleys’ remaining federal claim asserts the opposite—Finnegan removed the
children without probable cause. On its face, the claim certainly appears to be inextricably

intertwined with the state court’s findings. However, “not every federal claim which would cast
doubt on a state court judgment is barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Simes, 354 F.3d at 827. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine that does not extend to a
case merely “because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in
state court.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. The crucial inquiry in deciding whether a claim is
inextricably intertwined with a state judgment is to determine “whether the federal plaintiff seeks
to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.”
Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Skit Intern., Ltd. V. DAC Techs. of Arkansas, Inc., 487 F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2007) (“As

in Rooker, the alleged injury for which [the plaintiff] seeks to redress here stems directly from the
state court judgment itself rather than from some separate injury caused by the defendant.”). “[I]f
a federal plaintiff present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that
a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction and state
law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” Edwards v. City
of Jonesboro, 645 F.3d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293).
Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed this factual scenario, the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue in Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2002). In Jensen, an investigator
with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) removed a child from her
home without a warrant, court order, or a pre-deprivation hearing. Id. at 746. At a temporary
custody hearing two days later, the state circuit court determined that probable cause existed to
justify the removal of the child. Id. at 747. However, the state court later dismissed the neglect
petition and returned the child to the parents’ custody. Id. The parents filed a § 1983 complaint
in federal court asserting that the DCFS agents violated their Fourth and Fourteenth amendment

rights by removing the child. Id. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on Rooker-Feldman grounds. The Seventh Circuit disagreed.4 The appellate court
noted that Rooker-Feldman “bars a plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 suit to remedy an injury
inflicted by the state court’s decision” and determined it did not apply to the parents’ claim
“[b]ecause the injury that the plaintiffs here complain of was caused not by the state court’s
temporary custody order, but by the underlying taking of [the child] by DCFS.” Id. at 747-48.
There is no disputing that the Stanleys are not state court losers asking the Court to review
the state court decision. The Stanleys ultimately prevailed at the state court. Nor is this a claim
that is inextricably intertwined with a state court decision as Finnegan argues. Instead, this case

is directly on point with Jensen—the Stanleys assert a claim for the alleged unlawful taking of
their children independent of the state court judgment. The law is clear that the Stanleys may bring
such a claim, even if it denies a legal conclusion reached in the state court. In this case, the
Stanleys’ claim is premised on a lack of probable cause, and although the state court determined
probable cause existed, the Court has jurisdiction to hear the Stanleys’ constitutional challenge.
The more appropriate inquiry, as the Seventh Circuit discussed in the Jensen reasoning, is
grounded not in Rooker-Feldman, but in state preclusion grounds. Because this action does not

4 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the decision of dismissal. However, the court relied on
state preclusion grounds, not the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in reaching its decision. Id. at 748
(“[T]his suit implicates the preclusion doctrine, not Rooker-Feldman.”).
fall under the narrow purview of Rooker-Feldman, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Article III Standing
Finnegan next argues that the Stanleys lack Article III standing. Article III standing, a
threshold question in every federal court case, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the three elements
of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. E.L. by White v. Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Co.,

864 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992)). Injury-in-fact requires an “actual or imminent invasion of a concrete and particularized
legally protected interest.” Kinder v. Geithner, 695 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff
must show the defendant’s conduct caused the complained-of injury; that is, the “injury [must be]
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Red River Freethinkers v. City of
Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Liddell v. Special Admin. Bd. of Transitional School Dist. Of City of St. Louis, 894 F.3d 959, 966
(8th Cir. 2018); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & E. Kan. Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573,

577 (8th Cir. 1998).
Neither party disputes the redressability element is satisfied. Finnegan argues “there is no
injury fairly traceable to [her] conduct as required to confer Article III standing.” (Doc. 47, p. 12).
It is clear Finnegan contends the causation element is not satisfied, but it is somewhat unclear
whether Finnegan also asserts the injury-in fact element is in dispute. She claims “[t]here is no
clearly established right under federal law to be free from child-abuse investigations as authorized
by state law or to be free from defending child-abuse allegations in state juvenile court.”
(Doc. 47, p. 12). In the interest of prudence, the Court interprets this as an argument in support of
the proposition that the Stanleys do not assert a concrete or particularized legally protected interest.
Finnegan’s argument on this element misses the point of the Stanley’s claim. The injury they
complain of is not an investigation, but the removal of their children. As the Eighth Circuit clearly
stated in its order affirming this Court’s earlier decision, “it is clearly established that the removal
of children from their parents’ custody violates a constitutional right if the removal occurs without
reasonable suspicion of child abuse.” (Doc. 51-2, p. 5). Accepting the factual allegations as true,

the Stanleys plead a concrete and particularized constitutional injury as their children were
removed from their custody allegedly without probable cause. Because this is the basis for the
Stanleys’ claim, the first element of standing is satisfied.
Regarding Finnegan’s next argument, she asserts “[b]ecuase Plaintiffs cannot attack the
state court’s order . . . there is no injury fairly traceable to the conduct of Finnegan as required to
confer Article III standing.” (Doc. 47, p. 12). In essence, Finnegan seemingly contends there is
no traceable injury because no constitutional violation occurred. Such circular reasoning, if
accepted, would create a standing issue in any case where a defendant challenges a plaintiff’s
allegations. The appropriate inquiry is whether the alleged constitutional violation, here the

unlawful removal of the Stanley children, can be traced to the defendant’s conduct.
The Stanleys argue their injury occurred because Finnegan insisted the children be
removed from the home without evidence corroborating the accusations of abuse and neglect, and
without evidence of maltreatment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 30). Although DHS ultimately removed the children,
the Stanleys allege DHS did so at the direction of Finnegan. (Doc. 1, ¶ 30). The law requires that
child abuse investigators possess a reasonable suspicion of child abuse before ordering the removal
of children. Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525, 534 (8th Cir. 2005).
Finnegan had a legal obligation to possess a reasonable suspicion before ordering the removal of
the children. The Stanleys contend she failed to satisfy this standard but ordered the removal of
the children nonetheless. On the pleadings, the injury is therefore directly traceable to Finnegan’s
conduct. The causation element is satisfied, and the Stanleys have Article III standing. Finnegan’s
motion will be denied on this ground.
C. Collateral-Attack
Finnegan next argues that the Stanleys’ claim is a collateral-attack on the state court

juvenile proceedings. In Arkansas, a facially valid judgment is not subject to collateral attack.
Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat’l Bank, 256 Ark. 452, 460 (1974). “As a general rule, an attack
upon a judgment is regarded as collateral if made when the judgment is offered as the basis of the
opponent’s claim.” Brooks v. Baker, 208 Ark. 654, 660 (1945) (citation omitted). The collateral-
attack doctrine therefore prevents a party from bringing an action in which its very purpose is to
impeach or overturn a prior judgment. Purser, 256 Ark. at 460.
Finnegan’s collateral-attack argument is without merit. Finnegan argues that the Stanleys
may not collaterally attack the state court “proceedings.” (Doc. 47, p. 16). But the collateral-
attack doctrine is concerned with the state court judgment, not the proceedings that were involved.

In this case, the Stanleys prevailed at the state court. The juvenile court did not find evidence of
abuse or maltreatment, and ordered the children be returned to the Stanleys’ custody in its final
judgment. It is this determination and not the probable cause finding at the probable cause hearing
which operates as the final judgment. The Stanleys do not offer the final judgment as the basis of
their claim. Nor do they seek to overturn or impeach the final judgment that allowed their children
to return to their care. Finnegan’s motion on this ground will be denied.
D. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion
Finnegan’s final arguments are that the Stanleys’ claim is barred by res judicata and
collateral estoppel. The doctrine of res judicata has two components—claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Barclay v. Waters, 357 Ark. 386, (2004). The Court gives the same preclusive effect
to Arkansas state court judgments as Arkansas state courts. Stephens v. Jessup, 793 F.3d 941, 943-
44 (8th Cir. 2015). Claim preclusion prohibits a party from further litigating on a cause of action,
whereas issue preclusion “forecloses further litigation in connection with a certain issue.” Craven
v. Fulton Sanitation Serv., Inc., 361 Ark. 390, 393-94 (2005).

1. Claim Preclusion
Claim preclusion “bars a claim in a second suit when five elements are satisfied: (1) the
first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based upon proper
jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same
claim or cause of action; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privities.” Stephens,
793 F.3d at 944. Furthermore, claim preclusion bars claims that were actually litigated and those
that could have been litigated. Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark.
347, 350 (1999).
Finnegan asserts the Stanleys’ claim is precluded because all issues related to the legality

of the seizure of the Stanley children were or could have been raised in state court. (Doc. 47, p. 18).
The present action, however, does not involve the same claim or cause of action that was litigated
in state court. The Stanleys present an independent claim based on the alleged unlawful taking of
their children. See supra Part II.A. This is not a case where a party has brought a claim against a
defendant in state court and later files the same action in federal court. Nor is this a case where a
party filed a cause of action in state court, only to file a different cause of action in federal court
based on the same events. This is the first time the Stanleys have brought any action against
Finnegan.
Additionally, Finnegan fails to articulate how the Stanleys could have brought their present
claim in state court. In fact, it is difficult to discern Finnegan’s argument in support of this
proposition, and the only such argument the Court could identify is her assertion that the lower
court had jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims. While this may be true, the probable cause
hearing was the only proceeding that evaluated whether probable cause existed to justify the initial
removal of the children. This hearing is statutorily limited in scope to determining whether

“probable cause existed to protect the juvenile.” Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-27-315. Because of the
limited scope, the Stanleys could not have vindicated their constitutional rights. Finnegan offers
no alternative or basis as to how the state court could hear this matter at the probable cause hearing.
Because Finnegan fails to meet her burden of persuasion, the Stanleys’ remaining claim is not
precluded.
2. Issue Preclusion
After discussing each of Finnegan’s previous arguments, the Court arrives at her most
compelling point—issue preclusion. Finnegan argues that because the probable cause issue was
already decided by the juvenile court, this Court may not relitigate the same issue. (Doc. 47, p. 18).

Issue preclusion prevents further litigation on an issue that has already been decided. Craven, 361
Ark. at 394. Issue preclusion requires the presence of four elements: (1) the issue sought to be
precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been
actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4)
the issue must have been essential to that judgment. Id. at 394. In addition, issue preclusion is
applicable only when the party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Id.
Taken at face value, Finnegan’s argument seems to hold merit as the question of probable
cause was decided in the affirmative at the state court. However, the probable cause issue is not
precluded under Arkansas law for two reasons. First, the probable cause determination was not
essential to the state court judgment. The state court found no evidence of abuse or maltreatment
and ordered the return of the children to the Stanleys’ custody. Whether probable cause justified
the initial removal has no bearing on the final determination of custody.
Second, the Stanleys did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of probable

cause at the probable cause hearing. There are notable distinctions between how allegations are
investigated in the juvenile court and how causes of action are litigated in the court of law. The
rules of evidence do not apply at the probable cause hearing, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-315(e), and
the proceedings are generally conducted without a jury, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(a)(1)(A). The
lack of a jury trial alone may prohibit preclusion under Arkansas law. See Cravens, 361 Ark. at
397-98 (“Given the nature of these proceedings, especially the lack of a jury trial, we conclude
that to give the Commission’s decision preclusive effect would deprive [the party] of a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue.”). But the distinction between the two proceedings goes
further than procedural limitations.

More compelling is that issues at the state court proceedings are factually dissimilar from
those in the civil case. The focus of the probable cause hearing is to protect the overall well-being
of the child, hence why procedural safeguards such as the rules of evidence are more relaxed than
in a typical trial. The judge at the juvenile court considers whether probable cause justified the
initial removal in order to protect the children. The Stanleys’ present action, however, is concerned
with their constitutional rights as parents. This action asks the Court to determine whether
probable cause justified the removal in a manner which did not infringe upon their constitutional
rights. Although the issues seem similar in style, they are factually dissimilar and issue preclusion
does not extend to the probable cause determination. See e.g. Craven, 361 Ark. at 400-01
(Imber, J., concurring). Finnegan’s motion will be denied.
III. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 50) to adopt the pleadings is
GRANTED to the extent the present motion (Doc. 46) relates to claims against Separate
Defendants Garland County, Arkansas, Mike McCormick, Jason Lawrence, Mike Wright, and

Terry Threadgill.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion (Doc. 46) for judgment on the
pleadings is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the stay on discovery is LIFTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of December, 2018.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009583. Public record. Not legal advice.