# Ledbetter v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · October 18, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009498

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** October 18, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009498

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the ALJ cannot discount a claimant’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
DAVONNE ELIZABETH LEDBETTER PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 6:17-cv-06088
NANCY BERRYHILL DEFENDANT
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Davonne Elizabeth Ledbetter (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II
of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for a Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 9.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on December 19, 2014. (Tr. 20). In this
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to due to laryngeal amyloidosis and GERD, acid
reflux. (Tr. 153). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of December 17, 2014. (Tr. 135). This application
was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 20).
On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff had an administrative hearing on her application. (Tr. 32-49).

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
1
Plaintiff was present and was represented by Michael Angel. Id. Plaintiff, and Vocational Expert
(“VE”) William Elmore, testified at this hearing. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff testified she was fifty-
three (53) years old and had a high school education with some college. (Tr. 36).
On April 26, 2016, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application.

(Tr. 20-27). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the
Act through December 31, 2019. (Tr. 2, Finding 1). The ALJ also found Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since December 17, 2014, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 22,
Finding 2).
The ALJ then found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: laryngeal amyloidosis.
(Tr. 22, Finding 3). The ALJ then determined those impairments did not meet or medically equal
the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations

No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 23, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 23-25). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but limited to occasional oral
communication of simple information where speaking was not essential to the job performance due
to voice problems. Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 18, Finding 6). The ALJ

found Plaintiff capable of performing her PRW as a teacher and custodian. Id. In the alternative,
given all Plaintiff's vocational factors, the ALJ also found a hypothetical individual would be able
to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as hospital cleaner with
2
approximately 450,000 jobs in the nation, and housekeeping with approximately 40,000 such jobs
in the nation. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability
as defined by the Act from December 17, 2014, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 27, Finding
7).

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 132-134). The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable decision. (Tr.
1-6). On August 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 16, 17. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the

findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
3
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,

or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this

analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred
4
in the RFC determination, (2) the ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s obesity, (3) the ALJ erred in his PRW
determination, (4) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s severe impairments, and (5) the ALJ erred
in assessing her credibility ECF No. 16. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in
any of his findings. ECF No. 17. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ improperly evaluated

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Thus, the Court will only evaluate Plaintiff’s first argument for
reversal.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny,
the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,
983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
5
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility

determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform an appropriate Polaski evaluation. Notably,

instead of evaluating the Polaski factors as the ALJ understood he was required to do and instead
of stating inconsistencies in the record as required by Polaski, the ALJ stated the following:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in the
decision.
(Tr. 24).
Other than mentioning some of Plaintiff’s daily activities, the ALJ made no specific findings
regarding the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claimed subjective complaints and the record
evidence. The ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulate the reasons for
discrediting the Plaintiff’s testimony, and address any inconsistencies between the testimony and the
6
record. The ALJ failed to perform this analysis.
The ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because the medical
evidence did not support those allegations was improper under Polaski. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at
1322 (recognizing the ALJ cannot discount a claimant’s subjective complaints “solely because the

objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Thus, because
the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski, this case must be reversed and remanded.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.

ENTERED this 18th day of October 2018.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009498. Public record. Not legal advice.