# Taylor v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · June 7, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009245

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 7, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009245

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the long-established rule that a claimant need not “be bedridden to qualify for disability benefits”
- holding a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
PAMELA TAYLOR PLAINTIFF
vs. Civil No. 1:17-cv-01044
NANCY A. BERRYHILL DEFENDANT
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pamela Taylor (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for a
period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on June 23, 2014. (Tr. 11). In this
application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to multiple sclerosis; transverse myelitis;
osteoarthritis, fibrmyalgia; chronic pain in her back, neck, lower extremities, and thoracic spine;
neuropathy; roto-scoliosis in her lower extremities; depression; degenerative joint and disc disease;
and thoracic spine scoliosis. (Tr. 136). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of April 2, 2014. (Tr. 11).
Her application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 47-58).

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Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application. This hearing request
was granted, and Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on January 19, 2016. (Tr. 22-46). At
this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by Greg Giles. Id. Plaintiff, Medical Expert
(“ME”) Kweli Amusa, and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Leonard Francois testified at this hearing. Id.

On March 31, 2016, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision
denying Plaintiff’s disability application. (Tr. 8-17). The ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2019. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since April 2, 2014,
her alleged onset date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: multiple sclerosis and arthritis. (Tr. 13, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the

requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 13, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 13-15, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints and found they were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) except claimant can sit for 30 minutes at a time, and then needs to
stand for about 10 minutes before returning to a seated position.

Id. The ALJ determined Plaintiff was fifty-one (51) years old, which is defined as an “individual
closely approaching advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (2008). (Tr. 16, Finding 7). The
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ALJ also determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was able to communicate in
English. (Tr. 16, Finding 8).

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 15-16, Finding 6).
Considering her RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not retain the capacity to perform her PRW.
Id. The ALJ then considered whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 16-17, Finding 10). The VE testified at the
administrative hearing on this matter. Id.
Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform

representative occupations such as appointment clerk (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 121,000 such
jobs in the national economy; receptionist (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 100,000 such jobs in the
national economy; and information clerk (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 96,000 such jobs in the
national economy. (Tr. 16). Because Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other work, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability (as defined by the Act) from April 2, 2014
through the date of her decision or through March 31, 2016. (Tr. 17, Finding 11).

Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. On June 1, 2017, the Appeals Council
denied this request for review. (Tr. 1-3.). On June 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case.
ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs and have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.
ECF Nos. 7, 11-12. This case is now ready for determination.
2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
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(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that

his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
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significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 11 at 1-13. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the following:
(1) the ALJ erred in assessing whether her impairments meet the requirements of the Listings; and
(2) the ALJ erred in finding she retained the capacity to perform light work. Id. Upon review, the
Court finds the ALJ has not a supplied a sufficient basis for assessing Plaintiff’s RFC and
discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Thus, the Court will only consider Plaintiff’s second

argument for reversal.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.1 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are

1 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
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as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints

of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them

[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but

whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead, the
ALJ based his credibility determination upon her finding that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were
not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 14-15). The ALJ briefly summarized Plaintiff’s medical
records and then discounted her subjective complaints because they were not supported by the

objective medical evidence:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the
reasons explained in this decision.
. . .
The objective evidence does not support the degree of limitation alleged by claimant.
. . .
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the
objective medical evidence of record.
(Tr. 14-15) (emphasis added). Such a finding was improper. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding
a claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical
evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”).
Indeed, the only other Polaski factors the ALJ referenced were her medical treatment and
daily activities. Notably, in the opinion, the ALJ stated Plaintiff had “not always sought regular
medical treatment . . . nor followed the treatment prescribed.” (Tr. 15). The ALJ, however, did not
elaborate as to what treatment Plaintiff failed to seek or to follow. Id.
Furthermore, the daily activities the ALJ referenced were the ability to do “some shopping
and household chores” as well as the ability “to take care of her personal needs.” (Tr. 15). These
are certainly not extensive daily activities that would detract from a finding of disability. See Hutsell
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v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the long-established rule that a
claimant need not “be bedridden to qualify for disability benefits”). Accordingly, because the ALJ
provided an insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be
reversed and remanded.

4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

52 and 58.
ENTERED this 7th day of June 2018.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10009245. Public record. Not legal advice.