# Norman v. Lewis

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · December 7, 2017

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10008887

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** December 7, 2017
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
DARREN LEE NORMAN PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 3:17-CV-03069
SHERIFF JOHN MONTGOMERY;
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR BRAD LEWIS;
SGT. ERIC NEAL; et al. DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER_.
The instant matter is a civil rights action filed by the Plaintiff, Darren Lee Norman,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Separate Defendant Sheriff John
Montgomery’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15).
|. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 17, 2017, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 2). An Amended Complaint was filed on September 26, 2017. (ECF
No. 9). Plaintiff alleges a delay of medical care and excessive use of force while he was
incarcerated at the Baxter County Detention Center. (ECF No. 9).
Separate Defendant Montgomery argues that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege
any actionable wrongdoing against him either in his personal or official capacity and that
the Complaint should be dismissed against him. The Plaintiff has not responded to the
Separate Defendant's motion.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will
liberally construe a pro se olaintiffs complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Ill. DISCUSSION
Here, the Plaintiff has sued Separate Defendant Montgomery in both his personal
and official capacities. Clearly, the Plaintiff has not set forth a claim against Separate
Defendant Montgomery in his personal capacity because he has not pleaded facts
suggesting that Separate Defendant Montgomery was personally involved in the alleged
delay of medical care and excessive use of force. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, -
676 (2009) (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
officials own individual actions, has violated the Constitution’).
Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.
2010). A Plaintiff “seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify
[an unconstitutional] policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Board of Cnty.
‘Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). “There are two basic
circumstances under which municipal liability will attach: (1) where a particular municipal
policy or custom itself violates federal law, or’directs an employee to do so; and (2) where
a facially lawful municipal policy or custom was adopted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to

its known or obvious consequences.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817-18 (8th Cir.
2009).
Plaintiff has not pointed to “any officially accepted guiding principle or procedure
that was constitutionally inadequate” and has not pointed to a “deliberate choice of a
guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority
regarding such matters.” Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Further, “a custom can be shown only by adducing evidence of a continuing,
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.” /d. at 634 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has simply not asserted facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim that there was any widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Separate Defendant
Sheriff John Montgomery's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) should be, and hereby is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE WITH
RESPECT TO ALL CLAIMS AGAINST SEPARATE DEFENDANT MONTGOMERY.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this qe day of December 2017.

GK

UMTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10008887. Public record. Not legal advice.