# Morningstar v. Battle

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · September 15, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10004954

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** September 15, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

KHANIS-ORION MORNINGSTAR PLAINTIFF
ADC #164590

v. 4:19-cv-00239-SWW-JJV

JAY BATTLE, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge
Susan Webber Wright. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation.
Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the
objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports
your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the
United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings
and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.
If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or
additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at
the same time that you file your written objections, include the following:
1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.
2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing (if such a hearing is granted) was not offered
at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge.
3. The details of any testimony desired to be introduced at the new hearing in the form of
an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other non-
testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the new hearing.
From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional
evidentiary hearing. Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149
Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Khanis-Orion Morningstar, who is also known as Jeramye Hobbs (“Plaintiff”), is a
prisoner in the Maximum Security Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He has filed a
pro se Amended Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, while he was in the
Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility (“PCRDF”), Defendants former Chief Mike Sylvester,
Nurse Kimberly Stowe, and Nurse Mary Bahan, failed to provide him with constitutionally
adequate medical care and an appropriate diet for stomach issues that were causing him to vomit
and cough up blood.1 (Doc. No. 4.)
Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing there is no proof of personal
involvement by Defendant Chief Sylvester. (Doc. No. 57.) Additionally, that none of the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, that they are entitled
to qualified immunity, and that there is no unconstitutional policy implemented by them that

1 All other claims raised in the Amended Complaint were dismissed without prejudice during
screening mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and based on statute of limitations and for failure
to serve one defendant. (Docs. No. 14, 33, and 47.)
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id.) Concluding that there is no basis for official
capacity/county liability in this case. (Id.) Plaintiff has not responded; this matter is now ripe for a
decision. For the reasons set out below, I recommend the Motion for Summary Judgment be
GRANTED.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284
F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials but
must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v.
Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). “The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported

by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere
speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Id. (citations omitted). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence
is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if
its resolution affects the outcome of the case.” Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d
672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). “Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material
will not preclude summary judgment.” Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465
(8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
III. FACTS
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and taken from his Amended
Complaint, are as follows. On February 13, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the
PCRDF. (Doc. No. 4, at 3-4, 13-14.) During the booking process, Plaintiff reported to Defendant
Stowe that he had been coughing up blood. (Id.) For the next three months, Plaintiff complained
he was vomiting and coughing up blood, and he believed the PCRDF food was making the problem

worse. (Id.) Despite his repeated grievances and verbal complaints, he did not receive any medical
care or a special diet to treat his condition. (Id.)
On June 6, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred from the PCRDF to the Arkansas State Hospital
where he allegedly broke his finger. (Id.) Upon returning to the PCRDF, on an unspecified date,
Plaintiff filed numerous grievances regarding his broken finger, but he did not complain of
stomach issues or an inappropriate diet.2 (Id. at 4-6, 13-17.)
On November 27, 2015, Plaintiff began filing sick call requests claiming he was coughing up
blood, vomiting, and in need of a vegetarian diet. (Doc. No. 4 at 6, 17-21.) On November 29, 2015,
Plaintiff began filing numerous grievances seeking a special diet and treatment for his stomach
issues.3 (Id. at 6, 43-103.) The last administrative responses were signed on May 10, 2016 (Id. at

55, 67, 82). On August 4, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the ADC.4 See ADC website,
https://apps.ark.org/inmate_info/search.php.

2 Plaintiff’s claims regarding his broken finger have been dismissed. (Doc. No. 14.)

3 Plaintiff attached eighteen grievances to his Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 4.)

4 The last date of improper medical care for stomach issues alleged in the Amended Complaint is
April 17, 2016. (Doc. No. 4 at 20.) However, according to the attached grievances, Plaintiff
continued to claim he was receiving inadequate medical care for stomach problems for several
months thereafter. At this time, I will give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and presume he is
alleging he received inadequate medical care for his stomach problems until he was transferred
to the ADC.
On March 29, 2019, Plaintiff signed his Complaint commencing this action and put it in the
prison mail. (Doc. No. 2.) It was received by the Clerk and filed in the record on April 10, 2019.
(Id.)
Plaintiff used the inmate grievance procedure available at PCRDF and asserts these
grievances were neglected, he was routinely denied access to the grievance process, and the

grievances were ignored and/or not answered within the mandated time period set forth by the
Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office Branch directives. (Doc. No. 4, at 8.) Plaintiff claims the deliberate
indifference to medical needs, unsafe conditions, and denial of medical care violated his rights and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (Id.)
Plaintiff additionally alleges that any reasonable and prudent individual would find that
extreme indifference was shown in the care afforded to Plaintiff during his incarceration at
PCRDF. (Id.) Further, PCRDF willfully violated and refused to properly asses, diagnose, and treat
Plaintiff’s injury for three months. (Id.) Due to this refusal to care, PCRDF failed to ensure basic

needs were provided during Plaintiff’s incarceration. (Id.) Plaintiff states that PCRDF’s lack of
control and supervision of its personnel allowed them to directly ignore, retaliate, and cause
physical as well as undefinable psychological and emotional damage to Plaintiff. (Id.)
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to dismissal based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials who acted in an objectively reasonable manner
and shields an official from liability when his or her conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of
fact. McClendon v. Story Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, issues
concerning qualified immunity are appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously

permitted to go to trial.”) (emphasis removed).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, do not establish a violation of his constitutional right to be protected from
harm; or (2) that constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation,
such that a reasonable official would not have known that his or her actions were unlawful. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Cullor v. Baldwin, 830 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir.
2016). Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir.

2009).
According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, it appears he was a pretrial detainee during
most of the time he was incarcerated at the PCRDF. Accordingly, his claims are not analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment, but instead under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007). “This makes little difference as a practical
matter, though: Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citing Butler v.
Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006)).
To prevail here, Plaintiff allege acts or omissions that reveal “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1976). After reviewing the record as a
whole and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, I find no support for Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). Rather, more fully discussed infra, Defendants responded

to each grievance request in a timely manner and each time found nothing medically wrong with
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue that
Defendants withheld medical treatment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown a constitutional
violation by Defendants as required under the first prong of Pearson. Therefore, I recommend
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Medical Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
see also Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012). Prison officials are under a

constitutional duty to provide medical treatment when a prisoner is in need. Gamble, 429 U.S. at
103. “Deliberate indifference” encompasses both that the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825-26. The official
must be (1) aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and (2) the official must also draw the inference. Id. So, the Plaintiff must
demonstrate “(1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison
officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d
1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnaham, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
i. Objectively Serious Medical Need
For Plaintiff to show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need he must
show he “has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges he suffered from food allergies that created a stomach condition causing him to

vomit both food and blood. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of a diagnosed food
allergy or stomach condition which caused the vomiting. Plaintiff alleges that his stomach
condition was the result of not being provided a diet free of meat, soy, eggs, and bologna. He
requested various diet changes and alleges that the failure to change his diet resulted in him
vomiting his meals and was also the cause of blood present in the vomit. Nothing in the record
suggests that a diet change was medically necessary or that Plaintiff suffered from a stomach
condition.
Additionally, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s stomach condition or food allergies were so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. In fact,

the record indicates that whenever medical personnel were directed to examine Plaintiff’s vomit,
they commented “it looks like spit.” (Doc. No. 59 Ex. A2, at 64.) It is also worth noting that none
of the Defendants possessed the authority to change Plaintiff’s diet. And curiously, upon Plaintiff’s
departure from PCRDF to the Arkansas Department of Corrections, his symptoms seem to
disappear. (Id. Ex. B, at 8-278.) Plaintiff has not shown he suffers from an objectively serious
medical condition. Therefore, Plaintiff fails the first prong of the deliberate indifference standard.
ii. Deliberately Disregarded Objectively Serious Medical Need
Even if Plaintiff had met the requirements of the first prong, he clearly fails the second
subjective prong. When proving that prison officials actually knew of and deliberately disregarded
objectively serious medical needs of a prisoner, “the prisoner must show more than negligence,
more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not give
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, which demands more than negligent misconduct.” Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512
F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Deliberate

indifference may also be established by “prison guards . . . intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
There is no evidence to suggest Defendants deliberately disregarded any serious medical needs
of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was examined by PCDRF medical staff on multiple occasions and each time
the staff was not able to find anything medically wrong. PCRDF monitored and observed Plaintiff,
completed an x-ray of Plaintiff’s stomach, ran bloodwork, performed weight checks, and various
other exams. (Doc. No. 59 Ex. A3.) None of these diagnostic tests revealed any medical condition,
much less a serious medical need. Dr. Johnson eventually prescribed the prescription drug Zantac

to Plaintiff, but he refused to take the medication. (Id.) Based on Plaintiff’s extensive medical
record while incarcerated at the PCRDF, I find nothing to suggest Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need. Accordingly, I find Plaintiff also second prong of the
deliberate indifference standard.
C. Official Capacity Claims
PCRDF can only be held liable if Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated as a result of
an official policy or unofficial custom. See A.H. v. St. Louis Cty., Missouri, 891 F.3d 721, 728 (8th
Cir. 2018); Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). Local governments may not be
held vicariously liable for the conduct of officials and employees of the local government. Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff has shown nothing to support an
official capacity claim. Accordingly, I recommend Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against
Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (if a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis, the court may dismiss, at any time, for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted).

D. No Personal Involvement by Defendant Chief Sylvester
To state a claim under 42. U.S.C. § 1983, the complainant must allege facts, which if proven
true, would demonstrate that the named defendant(s) violated the complainant’s federal
constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49
(1988). Further, “[l]iability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights” protected by the Constitution. Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208
(8th Cir. 1990). Additionally, “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only
liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). Finally, “prison
supervisors . . . cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.” Langford

v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff says:
Defendant, Mike Sylvester, was the acting Chief of Pulaski County Regional
Detention Facility, second in command to the Sheriff . . . [and] was legally
responsible for the operations of the Detention Center where the Plaintiff was
confined and also legally responsible for the welfare of all inmates at PCRDF
making him too responsible for not holding his subordinates responsible for not
following employee and jail policy.”

(Doc. No. 4 at 2.)

Plaintiff has clearly named Defendant Sylvester because of his supervisory position within
PCRDF and based on a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff has put forth no evidence of
personal involvement by Defendant Sylvester. As such, he is entitled to summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:
1. Defendants Bahan, Stowe, and Sylvester’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 57)
be GRANTED.
2. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal
from any Order adopting these recommendations and the accompanying Judgment would
not be taken in good faith.
DATED this 15th of September 2020.
A Jun
I ve LPE
iN AD STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10004954. Public record. Not legal advice.