# Fritts v. Payne

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · September 4, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10004938

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** September 4, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10004938

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
PINE BLUFF DIVISION

BRANDON FRITTS PLAINTIFF
#1084818

No: 5:16-cv-141-DPM

DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Division
of Correction;* DALE REED, Deputy Director,
ADC; RANDY WATSON, Warden, Varner/
SuperMax; FLORIA WASHINGTON,
Classification Officer, Varner SuperMax;
CURTIS MEINZER, Deputy Warden, Varner
SuperMax; MOSES JACKSON, Deputy Warden,
Varner SuperMax; JEREMY ANDREWS, Deputy
Warden, Varner SuperMax; BILLY INMAN,
Deputy Warden, Varner SuperMax; and CHRIS
BUDNIK, Deputy Warden, Varner SuperMax DEFENDANTS

ORDER
On de novo review, the Court partly adopts and partly declines the
Magistrate Judge’s careful and thorough recommendation, Doc. 141,
and overrules Fritts’s objections, Doc. 144. FED. R. CIv. P. 72(b)(3).
The Court disagrees on a key point. Fritts was in administrative
segregation for four years and four months—some of that time for
punitive purposes, but most of it not. A stay of that length may well

* Dexter Payne has replaced Wendy Kelly as the Director of what is
now known as the Arkansas Division of Correction. The Court directs
the Clerk to amend the docket. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

amount to an atypical and significant hardship requiring due process
protections. The Court therefore declines the slice of the
recommendation concluding otherwise. Doc. 141 at 54. The Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge, though, that the Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity because the law on that point is not
clearly established and was not at the time of the alleged violation.
A clearly established right “must be settled law, which means it is
dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of
persuasive authority[.]” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
589-90 (2018) (quotations omitted). The law must be “particularized
to the facts of the case,” and “existing precedent must have placed the

. . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Morgan v. Robinson,
920 F.3d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted).
There is no controlling authority or robust consensus that four
years in administrative segregation implicates due process. For
example, Eighth Circuit cases are at poles: The Court of Appeals has
found no liberty interest implicated by being in administrative
segregation for relatively short periods of two years or so. Rahman X
v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2002). At the other end, the Court of
Appeals has held that more than a decade in administrative segregation
does trigger due process protections. E.g., Williams v. Norris, 277 F.
App’x 647, 648 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam). But there’s a

«Fa

gray area between the twenty-six months in Rahman X and the twelve
years in Williams. Without any guidance in that middle, the contours
of the due process right were too uncertain to give officials fair warning
here that their conduct might be unconstitutional. Sok Kong Trustee for
Map Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 992 (8th Cir. 2020). The
Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Fritts’s due
process claim.
Fritts argues hard that Chestang v. Varner Super Max clearly
established that a four-year stint in administrative segregation
implicates a liberty interest. 496 F. App’x 684 (8th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished per curiam). As the Magistrate Judge noted, though, the
difference in procedural posture matters: it’s easier to plead an
atypical and significant hardship than it is to prove one. Fritts’s case
is beyond the pleadings. Further, like Williams, Chestang is an
unpublished per curiam decision. Itisnot precedent. EIGHTH CIRCUIT
LOCAL RULE 32.1A. That decision therefore “provides little, if any,
support for imposing liability based on clearly established law[.]”
Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 925 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014).
Fritts also objects to the Court considering qualified immunity at
all. The Defendants pleaded qualified immunity and invoked it in
passing in their motion for summary judgment. Doc. 110at1. They
did not flesh it out in their brief. Rather than arguing that the law

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wasn’ t clearly established, they focused their brief on arguing that there
was no liberty interest and that Fritts received the process he was due.
Doc. 109 at 5-36. The Magistrate Judge addressed qualified immunity,
however, and this Court therefore gave both sides an opportunity to be
heard on whether the right at issue was clearly established. The Court
is aware of no authority —and Fritts cites none—holding that a Court
abuses its discretion in considering an argument in_ these
circumstances. Fritts’s objection is therefore overruled.
The Court adopts the remainder of the recommendation. The
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Fritts’s due process
claim; and Fritts’s Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment claims
fail on the merits. The motion for summary judgment, Doc. 107, 110
& 114, is therefore granted. Fritts’s remaining claims will be
dismissed with prejudice.
So Ordered.

ATrnrartek
D.P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
a Stuhr _2020

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10004938. Public record. Not legal advice.
